Experimental Evidence from Germany and Ghana by Grosch, Kerstin
UNIVERSITY OF GOETTINGEN
DOCTORAL THESIS
Essays on Behavioral Labor Economics





A thesis submitted in fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Dr. rer. pol.
in the
Research group: GlobalFood




Erstgutachterin: Prof. Marcela Ibañez, Ph.D.
Zweitgutachterin: Prof. Dr. Claudia Keser




Versicherung gemäß Prüfungs- und Studienordnung für den
Promotionsstudiengang Wirtschaftswissenschaften
1. Die Gelegenheit zum vorliegenden Promotionsvorhaben ist mir nicht kommerziell
vermittelt worden. Insbesondere habe ich keine Organisation eingeschaltet, die
gegen Entgelt Betreuerinnen und Betreuer für die Anfertigung von Dissertatio-
nen sucht oder die mir obliegenden Pflichten hinsichtlich der Prüfungsleistungen
für mich ganz oder teilweise erledigt.
2. Ich versichere, dass ich die eingereichte Dissertation "Essays on Behavioral Labor
Economics" selbstständig und ohne unerlaubte Hilfsmittel verfasst habe; fremde
Hilfe habe ich dazu weder unentgeltlich noch entgeltlich entgegengenommen
und werde dies auch zukünftig so halten. Anderer als der von mir angegebe-
nen Hilfsmittel und Schriften habe ich mich nicht bedient. Alle wörtlich oder sin-
ngemäß den Schriften anderer Autoren entnommenen Stellen habe ich kenntlich
gemacht.
3. Die Richtlinien zur Sicherung der guten wissenschaftlichen Praxis an der Univer-
sität Göttingen werden von mir beachtet.
4. Eine entsprechende Promotion wurde an keiner anderen Hochschule im In- oder
Ausland beantragt; die eingereichte Dissertation oder Teile von ihr wurden nicht
für ein anderes Promotionsvorhaben verwendet.
5. Des Weiteren ist mir bekannt, dass Unwahrhaftigkeiten hinsichtlich der vorste-
henden Erklärung die Zulassung zur Promotion ausschließen bzw. später zum




How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature,
which interest him in the fortunes of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though
he derives nothing from it, except the pleasure of seeing it.
Adam Smith
The natural distribution is neither just nor unjust; nor is it unjust that persons are born into
society at some particular position. These are simply natural facts. What is just and unjust is
the way that institutions deal with these facts.
John Rawls
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2 Chapter 1. General Introduction
1.1 Introductory words
The dissertation presents a collection of essays that deal with behavioral aspects on
labor markets and focus especially on social interactions. Each Chapter from 2 to 5 rep-
resents one separate project/essay. In this general introduction, I will embed the four
essays in the broader frame of behavioral labor economics and elucidate the relevance
for agricultural markets.
1.2 International market integration
The efficient design of institutions in labor markets is key for economic growth. Em-
ployees in companies and independent entrepreneurs create added value and con-
tribute substantially to a country’s welfare. In recent times, global agri-food systems
have undergone a rapid transformation towards higher-value products, higher quality
and a higher degree of international and vertical integration (Reardon et al., 2009). Es-
pecially companies in developing countries can largely benefit when they integrate into
international value chains, e.g., exporting goods to western countries or attracting for-
eign direct investment. Modern supply channels hold potentials to gain higher margins
and regions may profit from increasing labor demand (Reardon et al., 2009). However,
developing countries in particular suffer from weak institutions that impede success-
ful participation in emerging supply chains (Gómez et al., 2011, Holzapfel and Wollni,
2014). Weak institutions may aggravate contract conclusion since investors shy away
from contracts that inhere too much uncertainty. Also, once contracts are concluded,
contract compliance may be challenged when legal systems are not functioning prop-
erly. In Section 1.5, I will elaborate on this aspect.
Another challenge that companies or smallholder farmers face, who integrate into in-
ternational markets, is the exposure to more intense competition. To prevail in the
global market, permanently refining organization’s efficiency is crucial. Since agri-
culture is still highly labor intense in Sub-Saharan Africa, it is important to increase
particularly agricultural labor productivity (Dorward, 2013). Various studies point out
that the share of employment is about three times larger than the share in value added
coming from agriculture (Kuznets et al., 1971, Gollin et al., 2002, 2014, Cai and Pandey,
2015). The factor is even larger for developing countries. This implies that the value-
added per worker is lower in the agricultural than in the non-agricultural sector. Even
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when taking into account the particularities of the agricultural sector such as the num-
ber of hours worked and the education level, the “agricultural productivity gap” re-
mains (Gollin et al., 2014). This emphasizes the importance of enhancing productivity
especially in the agricultural sector. Productivity can be increased by using (pay) in-
centives or building up social capital. In the following, I describe the two instruments
in more detail.
1.3 Social capital
Social capital can be described as “features of an organization such as networks, norms
and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit” (Put-
nam, 1995, p.67). At the workplace, social relations among co-workers can be critical
for an organization’s success (Beal et al., 2003). A friendly and cooperative work en-
vironment can reduce transaction costs as workers are more willing to support each
other, share information and cooperate in joint projects (Brief and Motowidlo, 1986). In
addition, good interpersonal relations facilitate communication and enhance employee
commitment (Leana and Van Buren, 1999, Adler and Kwon, 2002, Bright et al., 2006).
As much as prosocial behavior is beneficial to companies as harmful can be antisocial
behavior at the workplace. Antisocial behavior describes actions which bring harm to
an organization, its employees, or its stakeholders (Griffin and Lopez, 2005). Conse-
quences are substantial costs due to, e.g., fraud and theft (Coffin, 2003).
In standard economic theory, workers on labor markets are treated as Homo Oeco-
nomicus, who are self-interested profit-maximizing actors not caring about other peo-
ple’s welfare. Some attention has been paid to the idea that people may not solely
be acting in this self-oriented way but may also be altruistic, that is they selflessness
care about the well-being of non-akin others (Trivers, 1971). But only with the addition
of reciprocity and the inclusion of fairness norms that theory becomes more accurate
(e.g. Rabin, 1993, Berg et al., 1995). Altruism and social behavior is a complex matter,
meaning that the occurrence is context-dependent. For instance, the potential length
of relation and other persons’ actions, either cooperative or not, can be crucial for the
motivation to engage in voluntary cooperative behavior (Keser and Van Winden, 2000).
If somebody is nice to you, fairness norms dictate to respond in a nice manner (positive
reciprocity). However, if somebody acts nastily towards you, fairness norms also allow
to behave nastily accordingly (negative reciprocity).
Examples for reciprocity, positive or negative, in the organizational context are mani-
fold. In a work relation between employer and employee for instance, the employer can
send signals to the employee: higher wages paid are rewarded by higher effort levels
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(Akerlof, 1982, Prendergast, 1999) whereas wage cuts can lead to reductions in effort
exerted (Kube et al., 2013). Negative reciprocity can be observed, e.g., when employers
increase to monitor employees’ work. Workers feel not trusted any longer and conse-
quently punish the employer by withdrawing effort (Falk and Kosfeld, 2006, Sliwka,
2007). Negative reciprocity may also arise when there is not one single employer to
blame for the work environment but when workers are fed up with the institution and
the payment procedures. This may lead to indirect reciprocity: Workers feel badly or
unfairly treated and may pass these negative feelings on to their co-workers and reduce
pro-social actions or increase anti-social actions. This topic will be subject of Chapter 2
and Chapter 3, which I elaborate on in the subsequent sections.
As described, it has been shown that humans are not solely driven by profit-maximizing
motives. Individuals reflect other people’s behavior and are affected by the organiza-
tional setting, and can be prosocial or antisocial accordingly. This social behavior can
be crucial for an organization’s success. Therefore, assessing social capital should not
be neglected when examining company’s efficiency and labor market outcomes.
In the next section, I explain the other instrument to increase labor productivity: incen-
tives.
1.4 Incentives
In standard economic theory, it is argued that wages are paid by companies depending
on demand and supply of workers. The wage paid clears the market resulting in zero
unemployment. The problem with this simple story is that managers have no exact
information about employer’s productivity levels and workers might want to exert as
little effort as possible. Because of this lack of information, wages are not in line with
the market-clearing wage by nature. Moreover, wages my be evaluated by workers
and effort levels adjusted to the perceived fairness of the wage. The fair wage-effort
hypothesis introduced by Akerlof and Yellen (1990) constitutes that workers will with-
draw effort if they do not perceive their wage level as fair. Experimental evidence
corroborates this theory: Fehr et al. (1993) finds in an experimental study that employ-
ers offer a higher wage than the market-clearing wage to evoke that employees deliver
high-quality work. However, that leads to involuntary unemployment on the labor
market.
This shows, that incentives, which are “interventions to influence behavior by altering
economic costs or benefits of some targeted activity” (Bowles and Polania-Reyes, 2012,
p.368) can be used to increase individual productivity by using incentives for perfor-
mance. They can be effective and spur effort exerted by workers (e.g. Prendergast, 1999,
1.4. Incentives 5
Lazear, 2000a, Shearer, 2004). Extra money might be perceived as a gift and increases
worker’s motivation (Akerlof, 1982). This idea of a positive effort effect as a response
to higher wages has been shown in the lab (e.g. Hannan et al., 2002, Charness, 2004).
Similarly, negative reciprocity to perceived unfair wages have been shown to reduce
effort exerted (e.g. Fehr and Gächter, 2000, Fehr et al., 2009). However, field exper-
iments support positive reciprocity only weakly (Gneezy and List, 2006, Cohn et al.,
2009, Kube et al., 2012). There seem to be other determinants that play a role: When
paying more, intrinsic motivation might be crowded out (Frey and Oberholzer-Gee,
1997), a reference payoff might bound effort at a certain level (Camerer et al., 1997) or
workers are inequality averse and concerned about coworkers payoff (Bandiera et al.,
2010). Moreover, it has been found that the currency of the gift matters. Field experi-
mental research suggests that non-monetary incentives such as awards or gifts can be
similarly effective compared to monetary incentives (Kosfeld and Neckermann, 2011,
Kube et al., 2012, Ashraf et al., 2014).
This summary of research emphasizes that incentives can have the intended effect.
However, there seem to be other relevant factors altering behavior that have not been
captured and fully analyzed in the lab yet. One relevant factor may be crowding out of
initial motivation. For instance, it has been shown that the use of incentives can crowd
out intrinsic motivation (see for a review Bowles and Polania-Reyes, 2012). Putting a
market price on desired behavior can therefore have opposite effects than intended (e.g.
Frey and Jegen, 2001, Tirole, 2006). Depending on the context, an explanation can be
that people want to be admired for a good deed that they do voluntarily. As soon as
that good deed is imprinted with a monetary incentive, people cannot brush up their
self-image with this deed any longer.
We contribute to these studies and test potential negative side effects from incentives
on another domain: (anti-)social behavior. Pervasively used in companies are bonus
payments to increase labor productivity. At the same time, workplace relations matter
for the organization’s efficiency. Therefore, it is interesting to examine potential side ef-
fects of pay incentives on social capital. We expected that the (wrong) use of incentives
can be perceived as unfair and can be evaluated in relation to coworkers. For instance,
if coworkers are treated fairly, that is, they receive the opportunity to obtain a bonus
but others not, those who are treated unfairly may become resentful and may feel the
urge to retaliate. In Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, we examine how different pay regimes,
discriminatory and competitive, affect (anti-)social behavior at the workplace. In the
following, I briefly summarize the motivation, experimental design and contributions
to the literature of these two essays.
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1.4.1 Competitive incentives (Chapter 2)
In Chapter 2, we investigate how pay regimes affect prosocial attitudes at the work-
place. Commonly used is competitive remuneration, i.e., extra payment can be earned
exclusively by workers that have prevailed in the competition for bonuses. Both theo-
retical and empirical literature suggest that competitive payment schemes can increase
effort and productivity (e.g. Lazear and Rosen, 1981, Erev et al., 1993, Bandiera et al.,
2011). Yet, it is not clear if such type of incentives could negatively affect the ex-post
quality of co-workers relationships. In this essay, we address this question and investi-
gate the effects that competitive payment schemes have on pro-social attitudes between
co-workers after they have been exposed to competition.
Our main hypothesis is that competitive payment schemes generate a negative effect on
the quality of co-workers relationships. For example, competition generates a feeling
of rivalry among competitors. Workers might perceive others as opponents and adopt
a more individualistic behavior in such an environment (Dechenaux et al., 2015). We
test various channels that could play a role for becoming less prosocial (or reciprocal)
such as rival feelings, inequality aversion and perceived unfairness.
To test for the effect of competition on prosociality, we conducted an experiment with
workers from a banana-producing agribusiness in Ghana. The experiment comprises
three stages. In the first stage, we measure baseline prosociality by a public goods game
(PGG) and social value orientation (SVO) game (Murphy et al., 2011). In the second
stage, participants solve a real-effort/output task that takes the form of individually
assembling ballpoint pens. In this stage, we implement a between subject design and
each subject is randomly allocated to either a competitive or a non-competitive pay-
ment scheme. In the competitive scheme, the participant who assembles most pens
correctly earns a high payment and in the non-competitive payment scheme, every
participant who correctly assembles more than a given number pens wins a high pay-
ment. The second dimension that we vary in our design is the difference between the
winner’s and loser’s payoffs (dispersion in payments) being either high or low. In the
high dispersion conditions, the winner’s payoff is 3 times the loser’s while in the low
dispersion it is 1.5 times. Finally, in the third stage, we measure the ex-post effect of
different payments on prosociality. Hence, subjects repeat the PGG and the SVO. In
the analysis, we compare prosociality (PGG or SVO) in the third stage relative to the
first stage, across the payment schemes and dispersion. Since all treatments have a
high-income earner and a low-income earner, we can further compare the effect of the
payment scheme of each group of participants across payments and dispersion levels.
We find that when much is at stake, i.e., the dispersion between the winner’s and loser’s
payoffs is high, competition crowds out prosociality which confirms prior lab findings.
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This effect seems to be mainly driven by (1) those who win the competition, (2) those
who are more inequality averse, (3) those who usually work in teams at the company
and (4) those not aware of the bonus system in place. However, when there is less at
stake, we find that competition does not affect prosociality compared with the thresh-
old payment.
With this study we contribute to the literature of competitive incentives and side ef-
fects on prosociality. Buser and Dreber (2015) have demonstrated in an amazon-mturk
study that competitive remuneration reduces prosocial behavior. Our experimental de-
sign allows to control for relative income effects. A novel finding is therefore that the
effect of winning a competition is driving (partly) the effect independent of potential
income effects. Furthermore, we show that inequality aversion reduces prosociality un-
der a competitive payment scheme. Furthermore, our study is a field study showing
that work-related determinants such as exposure to teamwork influence cooperation
heterogeneously.
1.4.2 Discriminatory incentives (Chapter 3)
Another characteristic of incentives is that they are often (deliberately or not) discrim-
inatory. Such obscure pay regimes are pervasive as monitoring of effort and ability is
imperfect (Berger et al. 2013). Thus, when pay regimes are not transparent, workers
may doubt the fairness of the process. Especially discriminated workers, i.e., workers
that are excluded from a competition for bonuses, might become resentful and reduce
the organization’s social capital by becoming more antisocial. This essay investigates
if discriminatory pay regimes lead to more pronounced antisocial behavior among co-
workers compared to non-discriminatory pay regimes. Especially “unjustifiably-paid”
workers, i.e., workers with a high (perceived) performance who receive no compensa-
tion, may feel frustrated. Finally, we examine if a discriminatory pay regime lowers
prosocial actions towards co-workers (Buser and Dreber, 2015, Grosch et al., 2017).
To investigate the link of discriminatory pay regimes and antisocial behavior, we con-
duct a real-effort experiment. Here, we vary two determinants of pay regimes: dis-
crimination and justification of payments by performance. In our Discrimination treat-
ment, half of the workforce is randomly selected and promoted and participate in a
tournament for bonuses (high-income workers) whereas the other half receives no pay-
ment (low-income workers). In another treatment Competition, all payments are justi-
fied and there is no discrimination. All subjects participate in a tournament, are ranked
by performance and receive payments according to their performance (best 50% re-
ceive bonuses and worse 50% receive zero payment). Afterwards, antisocial behavior is
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measured by a Joy-of-Destruction game where participants can destroy canteen vouch-
ers. To measure spillover-effects on cooperative behavior, we implement a prisoner‘s
dilemma game at the end of the experiment.
The data show that low-income workers destroy significantly more vouchers than high-
income workers. A driver to destroy could be individual aversion to inequality. How-
ever, results show that inequality aversion influences decision-making in the compet-
itive but not in the discriminatory pay regime. Destruction behavior in the discrim-
inatory pay regime is driven by workers who receive payments that are not justified
by performance. When all payments are justified, that is in our competition treatment,
the difference vanishes. By using a treatment with random payments, we show that
unjustifiably-paid workers destroy less when they had equal opportunities to receive a
high payment, i.e., when they were not discriminated by the pay regime.
Our findings contribute to managerial economics and the design of fair procedures in
pay regimes to mitigate worker frustration. A large strand of literature emphasizes
that workers’ intrinsic motivation is sensitive to the inappropriate use of financial in-
centives (e.g. Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000, Benabou and Tirole, 2003). We draw on this
and show that employees do not only respond negatively to the “wrong” use of finan-
cial incentives per se. Instead, we emphasize the importance of the appropriate design
of pay institutions and highlight that intransparent pay regimes may cause antisocial
behavior. Due to the fact that antisocial behavior often raises high costs, these insights
may help to achieve higher workplace efficiency.
1.5 Honesty and Compliance
Another important aspect in work relationships is compliant and honest behavior. In
business relationships compliance with contracts is key for fruitful long-term relation-
ships. In Africa, the majority of agricultural produce comes from smallholder farm-
ers. They often face difficulties to flourish because of underlying financial constraints
– they cannot afford to purchase fertilizer, buy new equipment or hire staff (Reardon
et al., 2009). Therefore, resource-based contracts, i.e., a party invests money or pro-
vides inputs in a farm and the farmer sells a certain amount of (high-quality) produce
in return to the investor, can increase revenues for smallholder farmers. However, only
when smallholder farmers comply to contracts they may benefit from cooperations in
the long run. Compliance with an agreed upon contract can be seen as a first step
towards trustworthy rapports, which is a vital determinant for economic growth (Al-
gan and Cahuc, 2010). However, especially in many developing countries building up
trustworthy business relationships is impeded due to non-functioning legal systems
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and, on average, lower trust levels in societies with a certain history in slave trade and
civil wars (Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011). As well as that, many African countries are
ethnically diverse which can further curb trustworthy and compliant behavior (Glaeser
et al., 2000). Therefore, it is particularly interesting to examine determinants hampering
compliant behavior in the African country context. In our paper presented in Chapter
5, we are interested in examining the influence of overconfidence in one’s own perfor-
mance on compliant behavior. In Section 1.5.2 more details will be given on that study.
Related to compliant behavior is honest behavior since honest behavior can be inter-
preted as being compliant to a social norm. If people get the opportunity, they are
dishonest to gain a certain benefit (Mazar et al., 2008). However, not all individuals
are dishonest and a substantial share of people are commonly found honest and forgo
economic rents. In the majority of studies in the field of honest behavior, individual-
level motives as an important determinant of honest behavior are neglected so far. We
can contribute with our study to a better understanding why some people may be and
other people may be not acting honestly. In the following section we describe the study,
which will be presented in Chapter 4, in more detail.
1.5.1 Gender differences and the role of social preferences (Chapter
4)
Being compliant or honest in a particular situation might have payoff consequences.
For instance, if we imagine a situation where worker A receives unmeritedly credit for
successfully settling a project, s/he can decide to be honest and tell that her colleague
B deserves the acknowledgments. This decision may have payoff consequences if set-
tling the project is rewarded by a bonus. If worker A tells the truth, s/he forgoes the
bonus. If worker A lies, s/he receives the bonus but at the same time threatens the
norm to be honest. Therefore, for the decision to tell the truth or not, it might matter
how concerned somebody is about another person’s payoff.
In this chapter, we experimentally analyze the role of social preferences and gender on
honest behavior. We focus on a situation where dishonest behavior pays off at the cost
of somebody else. In such situations, rational people are dishonest to the full extent to
maximize their monetary payoff irrespective of the negative externality. However, hon-
esty is a social norm and people face psychological costs when violating this norm since
it might induce guilt (Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2007) or a disadvantageous change in
self-perception (Bénabou and Tirole, 2011). Studies in the domain of the norm honesty
confirm that psychological costs affect behavior. In experiments, psychological costs
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can be varied and behavior differs according to priming (Cappelen et al., 2013, Cohn
et al., 2015), moral balancing (Ploner and Regner, 2013, Clot et al., 2014) and contextual
cues that allow for self-delusion/self-justification (Mazar et al., 2008, Shalvi et al., 2011,
Jiang, 2013, Kajackaite and Gneezy, 2017). However, in the majority of these studies
individual-level motives are neglected as an important determinant of honest behav-
ior. In other words, if the context is varied and honest behavior is compared between
different contexts, it is not clear which characteristics or preferences make people re-
spond differently.
In this study, we fill this gap and examine how the individual-level motive of social
preferences affects honest behavior. Social preferences can reflect preferences for pay-
off distributions. In turn, engaging in dishonest behavior affects payoffs. As a con-
sequence, social preferences could explain why some people behave dishonestly and
some people act honestly in the same situation. People with more pronounced social
preferences, i.e., people who are relatively more prosocial, might face higher psycho-
logical costs when their immoral act has negative payoff consequences for another per-
son’s payoff. Thus, more pronounced social preferences might translate into behaving
more honestly to avoid a negative effect on somebody else’s payoff.
To test the link between social preferences and dishonest behavior, we run a laboratory
experiment. First, we elicit subjects’ social value orientation (SVO) with the measure
of Murphy et al. (2011). This measure reflects people’s magnitude of concern for other
people’s payoffs. Here, subjects make decisions on payoff distributions for themselves
and another person. Based on these decisions, an individual SVO angle can be calcu-
lated for each subject. A lower angle reflects a higher value put on one’s own monetary
payoff, whereas a relatively high angle reflects concern for another person’s payoff.
Subsequent to the elictiation of SVO, we implement a die rolling game to elicit dishon-
est behavior (Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi, 2013). Subjects are asked to roll a die 10
times and report the number after each cast. Reporting higher numbers is rewarded by
higher monetary gains. Dishonest behavior in this game can be called a selfish black lie
(Erat and Gneezy, 2012). The reason is that dishonesty guarantees gains for the liar and
bears costs for the experimenter. Using the mean of the 10 die rolls allows us to inves-
tigate individual-level dishonest behavior. When we refer to dishonest behavior in our
study, we mean that although people are supposed to tell the truth they misreport the
die roll. Regarding behavioral predictions, we expected that with an increasing SVO
angle, fewer misreporting will occur.
Our results show that individual social preferences matter for explaining differences
in honest behavior. With an increasing SVO angle, subjects are more honest. In other
words, prosocial subjects behave more honestly than individualistic subjects. Besides
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this novel result we confirm previous findings of gender differences, i.e., women are
more honest than men. Focusing on gender and SVO reveals that indeed women’s
SVO is more pronounced than men’s. In a mediation analysis, we find that the gender
effect can be explained by a difference in SVO between men and women.
Transferring our results to the workplace example from the beginning, it suggests that
women may behave more honestly and miss chances for promotions or rewards be-
cause they have more pronounced social preferences compared to men. Rand et al.
(2016) demonstrated that women show certain “female traits” such as social prefer-
ences to a higher extent when they are particularly aware of their gender role. This
implies that in settings where gender roles are less salient, women may behave sim-
ilarly to men. That is an interesting finding that may induce ideas for the design of
institutions, such as providing anonymity in certain situations, to avoid “gender-role
driven” behavior.
1.5.2 Overconfidence (Chapter 5)
The design of institutions can also be crucial in another context: compliance with con-
tracts. This is especially important for developing countries. One reason is that many
companies (established or in the set-up phase) depend on principal’s investments to
build up their business, to enhance produce or services and to integrate into interna-
tional value chains. However, in developing countries functioning legal systems are
often absent, corrupt or too slow to be usable (Dixit, 2003). This emphasizes the impor-
tance of contract compliance and the understanding of its drivers.
In Chapter 5, we present field experimental evidence of contract breach in a principal-
agent setting conducted in Ghana. Our main focus is on an agent’s individual-level
motive to break a contract, i.e., biased expectations about his/her performance. In
behavioral economics, there is extensive evidence that people’s judgment under un-
certainty is often misguided, i.e., people often do a poor job in assessing their own
performance in a certain task (e.g. Moore and Healy, 2008). Often, people are overcon-
fident and overestimate their real performance.
Cognitive limitations may have crucial consequences for principal-agent relations. It
is likely that overconfidence in combination with payoff expectations may rationalize
contract breach. Think of an agent with biased expectations of output and payoff. It
is likely that s/he overestimates her performance and consequently makes a generous
offer to a principal. The principal invests in the agent’s production, the production
gains in value and then the agent realizes that her expectations do not come true. In
this scenario the agent’s real output is lower than expected. Therefore, the agent would
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receive a “real payoff”, which is below her expectations, if s/he complied to the con-
tract. In such a situation, agents might strive to meet their payoff expectations (Camerer
et al., 1997). Breaching the contract allows agents to eradicate the divergence between
payoff expectations and the status quo. Based on this reasoning, our main hypothe-
sis is that overconfidence fosters contract breach. The channel that we want to test is
reference-dependent preferences. More precisely, payoff expectations resulting from
performance misjudgment may serve as a reference point. This means, after material-
ization of the contract, agents compare the status quo (real payoff from the contract)
with their expected payoff. Furthermore, we want to examine possible moderators that
may bolster reference-dependent behavior. It has been shown that people may evaluate
payoffs as gains and losses rather than as a detached state of wealth (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979). In the moment of realizing that expectations do not materialize, agents
may sense a loss. Along the lines of the model on reference-dependent preferences
from Koeszegi and Rabin (2006), sensed losses may resonate the more intensely with
individual aversion towards losses. To counteract the relatively high utility loss, over-
confident agents might engage in contract breaching to a higher extent with increasing
loss aversion. Furthermore, breaching might be facilitated if the environment is non-
deterministic, i.e., production shocks can occur, compared to a deterministic environ-
ment. Production shocks are prevalent in many businesses. For example, in the farm-
ing context, weather shocks (positive or negative) can occur and affect production out-
comes. In such an environment, agents are enabled to attribute outcome/performance
to external factors according to their ex-ante beliefs (Grossman and Owens, 2012). Own
accountability from failing to meet the performance goal can be (partly) shifted to the
occurrence of a shock. This way, agents can utilize the shock to legitimate contract
breach while keeping up their self-image.
We investigate our hypotheses in a lab-in-the-field experiment with students in Ghana.
We use a multi-stage investment game where an agent and a principal conclude a con-
tract with an inherent hold-up problem. We designed the experiment in a way that
targets the investigation of payoff expectations as reference points. Our focus is on the
formation of payoff expectations, the alleged reference point. Payoff expectations vary
by individual misjudgment of performance/ output. In the final stage of the exper-
iment, agents can decide to comply or not to comply. Payoff expectations are made
salient at this stage as we want to provoke that agents compare the expected payoff
with the status quo.
We establish the following results: With increasing overconfidence, sellers breach con-
tracts to a higher extent. We can also confirm that individual loss aversion moderates
the effect of sensed losses on breaching contracts. Interestingly, these results only hold
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in a non-deterministic environment. In order to identify whether the effect from over-
estimation is causal, we manipulate expectations by an experimental treatment, where
performance/output guesses are raised by an anchor (Tversky and Kahneman, 1975)
to ensure that reported effects are causal.
A novelty of our study is that we show how a common heuristic such as overconfidence
(e.g. Barber and Odean, 2001) may lead to non-compliant behavior in contract settings
by forming inflated payoff expectations. In our set-up, the reference point forms en-
dogenously based on one’s own performance misjudgment. Furthermore, in contrast to
the majority of studies that focus on ex-ante behavioral change under reference points
(e.g. Camerer et al., 1997, Rabin, 2000, Abeler et al., 2011), we focus on an ex-post im-
pact of unmet expectations. Moreover, this study contributes to the scarce empirical
and experimental literature on reference-dependent preferences.
1.6 Research method: Economic lab experiments
In this dissertation, all essays presented make use of the research method of economic
lab experiments. This has several reasons. Most experimentalists would probably ar-
gue that the key advantage of laboratory experiments is that the experimenter can con-
trol circumstantial conditions. By varying a single factor, lab experiments are a tool to
cleanly test for causal relationships. Identifying cause-effect-relationships can be tricky
when using empirical methods particularly in labor markets since contextual variables
differ across sectors, companies or working groups. For example, workers self-select
into certain jobs and workers differ in their individual characteristics. Moreover, there
are differences in the microcosms of relations between co-workers or between hierarchy
levels within a firm. Therefore, although there are rich data sets available, accounting
for the variation of contextual variables might be very difficult if not impossible (Char-
ness and Kuhn, 2011).
Another advantage of lab experiments is the cost-and time efficient way to elicit indi-
vidual heterogeneity in (social) preferences and behavior. Moreover, different levels of
(social) preferences can be captured in the lab. In contrast, collecting reliable data in
survey studies can be very challenging in terms of elicitation method, time and costs.
Controlling for individual-level (social) preferences is important for all studies pre-
sented in this dissertation. In the study “Competition and prosociality”, we study how
social preferences are affected by different payment schemes. Here, social preferences
are center stage and the main outcome variable of interest. In the studies presented
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in Chapters 3 and 4, we use measures of inequality aversion and distributional pref-
erences for examining mechanisms of behavior. We also elicited a selection of (social)
preferences in the study presented in Chapter 5 to control for varying preferences in the
analysis. As well as that, using lab experiments allowed us to measure loss aversion at
an individual level. We used this measure to dig deeper into the underlying motives
and test theoretical evidence on reference-dependent preferences.
The majority of laboratory experiments in economics and psychology are conducted
with participants from WEIRD (Western, educated, industrialized, rich and democratic)
societies. Experimental findings indicate considerable behavioral differences among
societies in diverse domains such as analytic reasoning, fairness or cooperation (Hen-
rich et al., 2010, Jones, 2010). Depending on the research question external validity can
be increased by using a more natural subject pool. For this reason, I conducted two
studies in Ghana – one with workers from a large agri-food company and one with
students in urban areas. For the other two studies, it did not seem necessary to study
the research questions in the field and hence we conducted those at the University of
Goettingen.
In the upcoming Chapters 2 to 5, the four experimental studies are presented in full




A field experiment in Ghana
This chapter is joint work with Marcela Ibañez and Angelino Viceisza. I was mainly
responsible for literature research, field work in Ghana, data analysis and writing up
the manuscript. Marcela Ibañez has been involved intensely in developing the exper-
imental design, analyzing the data and polishing the manuscript. Angelino Viceisza
improved the study by critically commenting and giving input at all stages of the study.
Moreover, he contributed substantially to the final writing of the paper.
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Chapter 2. Competition and prosociality:
A field experiment in Ghana
2.1 Introduction
The success of an organization critically depends on social relations among co-workers
(Beal et al., 2003). Good interpersonal relations are associated with more willingness
of people within an organization to help each other, share information and cooperate
in joint projects (Brief and Motowidlo, 1986). In addition, good interpersonal relations
facilitate communication, enhance employee commitment, foster individual learning,
strengthen relationships and result in improved organizational performance (Leana
and Van Buren, 1999, Adler and Kwon, 2002, Bright et al., 2006). Employees report
higher job satisfaction, organizational commitment, and less absenteeism when they
perceive that co-workers are friendly (Rhoades and Eisenberger, 2002). Hence, man-
agers should try to create and maintain a more friendly working environment.
Despite the importance of workplace relations, managers are also under extreme
pressure to increase individual productivity and thus, turn to incentives for boosting
performance. Relative payment schemes, where workers compete for a bonus, are a
very common instrument used in the workplace. Both theoretical and empirical litera-
tures suggest that competitive payment schemes that are based on relative performance
can increase effort and productivity relative to fixed payments or piece rate (e.g. Lazear
and Rosen, 1981, Erev et al., 1993, van Dijk et al., 2001, Irlenbusch and Ruchala, 2008,
Bandiera et al., 2011). Yet, it is not clear if such competitive incentives could nega-
tively affect the ex-post quality of coworker relationships. In this paper, we assess how
competitive versus individual payments obtained from a non-collaborative task impact
cooperation and prosocial attitudes after such a task. Our setting can thus be thought
of as a work environment in which individuals work independently and the best per-
forming individual receives a bonus. We consider the effect that this payment has on
interactions among workers afterwards.
Our main hypothesis is that competitive payment schemes generate a negative ef-
fect on the quality of coworker relationships. There are various channels that might
explain this effect. First, competition generates a feeling of rivalry among competitors.
Confrontations in the workplace might cause workers to see each other as opponents
and thus, adopt more individualistic behavior (e.g. Drago and Garvey, 1998, Brandts
et al., 2009, Dechenaux et al., 2015). Second, there are always winners and losers in
a competition. This generates inequality in endowments and status. Empirical evi-
dence suggests that those two forms of heterogeneity are associated with lower levels
of prosociality and lower incentives to enter into competition (e.g. Chan et al., 1999,
Cherry et al., 2005, Buckley and Croson, 2006). Moreover, it has been shown that peo-
ple with a pronounced aversion to inequality are less likely to enter a competition (e.g.
Bartling et al., 2009). Compelled to work under a competitive payment scheme, these
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workers might become unsatisfied with the workplace environment and ultimately re-
duce their prosociality. Lastly, competitive payments can be regarded as unfair. This
in turn may decrease incentives to act prosocially after individuals have been exposed
to a competition (e.g. Akerlof and Yellen, 1990). Especially workers usually exposed
to teamwork might perceive an individual bonus scheme as unfair. This might lead to
frustration and less prosocial actions.
To test the effect of competition on prosociality, we conducted a lab-in-the-field ex-
periment (artefactual field experiment in the terminology of Harrison and List, 2004)
with workers from a banana-producing agribusiness in Ghana. The field context is par-
ticularly relevant for this question for two reasons. First, due to low productivity at
the time the experiments were being designed, the firm was considering introducing
a competitive bonus system with relative incentives in order to boost effort provision.
Second, teamwork is important for the performance of the firm. In fact, about 50% of
the tasks (e.g. bunchcare, harvesting, and quality control in packaging) rely on teams.1
So, to test the potential effectiveness of a competitive bonus system and evaluate the
potential side effects on (un)cooperative behavior among team members, the firm per-
mitted us to do an experiment with a sample of their workers.
In our experimental design, we randomly and confidentially match two participants
for the duration of a three-stage experiment.2 In the first stage, we measure baseline
prosociality via a one-shot public goods game (PGG) and a social value orientation
(SVO) game (à la Murphy et al., 2011). To eliminate income or reputational effects,
feedback on the outcomes of the first stage is not provided until after the third stage. In
the second stage, participants complete a real-effort/output task in which they individ-
ually assemble ballpoint pens. We chose an individual task in order to make the link
between effort and payment salient to subjects. Finally, in the third stage, we measure
prosociality again by means of the PGG and the SVO. In the second stage, we imple-
ment a between-subjects design where each subject is randomly allocated to either a
competitive, a threshold, or a random payment scheme. In the competitive scheme,
the participant who assembles most pens correctly earns a high payment; in the thresh-
old scheme, every participant who correctly assembles more than a given number pens
earns a high payment; and in the random scheme, the high earner is determined by
chance. The second dimension that we vary in our design is the difference between the
winner’s and loser’s payoffs (dispersion in payments). In the high-dispersion condi-
tion, the winner’s payoff is 3 times the loser’s while in the low-dispersion condition, it
is 1.5 times. This gives rise to a 3×2 design. In the analysis, we first compare effort and
1Of course, the whole production line could also be considered one large team as it is an integrated
production system where failure in one setting affects another.
2This is comparable to van Dijk et al. (2002).
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then, changes in prosociality (PGG or SVO) between the first and the third stage across
payment schemes and dispersion levels.
Since all treatments have a high-income earner, which we refer to as “winner”, and
a low-income earner, which we refer to as “loser”, we can further compare the effect of
the payment scheme on each group (winners and losers) and also across dispersion lev-
els. Moreover, the comparison of behavior in the competitive and the random payment
schemes relative to the threshold payment scheme allows us to disentangle the effect
of winning against another personfrom the pure effect receiving a relatively higher or
lower payment by luck. To test for additional, potential mechanisms, we also elicit
preferences for risk, competition, and inequality aversion prior to the experiment.
We find the following. When much is at stake, i.e., the dispersion between the win-
ner’s and loser’s payoffs is high, competition crowds out prosociality. This is in line
with prior findings (e.g. Buser and Dreber, 2015). The effect seems to be mainly driven
by those who (1) win the competition (comparable to Schurr and Ritov, 2016, Gee et al.,
2016), (2) are more inequality averse, (3) usually work in teams, and (4) are unaware of
the existing bonus system. However, when there is less at stake, competition does not
affect prosociality. Random payment also crowds out prosociality when the dispersion
of payment is high and has no effect when dispersion of payments is low. Compared
with competition, the crowding out effect of random payments is lower in at least one
dimension (SVO). This suggests that competition does have a particular effect on proso-
ciality that is distinguishable from only high and low payments by luck. Overall, our
findings suggest that the impact of competitive schemes (such as relative pay for perfor-
mance) on workplace cooperation is likely to be context-specific. So, managers should
keep the nuances of incentive systems in mind as they consider implementing such
schemes in the workplace (as alluded to by for example Holmström, 2017).
Theoretical and lab-experimental evidence suggest that individuals respond to the
incentives induced by competition. For example, in order to win a competition peo-
ple might (1) sabotage competitors (e.g. Lazear, 1989, Harbring and Irlenbusch, 2011),
(2) behave more dishonestly (e.g. Gill et al., 2013, Kilduff et al., 2016), (3) be less trust-
ing/trustworthy (e.g. Dirks and Ferrin, 2003, Keck and Karelaia, 2012), and (4) cooper-
ate and coordinate more (e.g. Bornstein and Erev, 1994, Bornstein et al., 2002). Apart
from these incentive effects, some papers have examined whether exposure to compe-
tition or awareness of it could crowd out ex-post prosociality by increasing dishonesty,
destructive behavior and individualism, or by affecting moral judgment (e.g. Chen,
2011, Buser and Dreber, 2015, Schurr and Ritov, 2016, Jauernig et al., 2016).3 Related,
3This has also led to a tangential research agenda exploring the ‘thin line’ between competition and
prosociality (e.g. Savikhin and Sheremeta, 2013, Milkman et al., 2014), as tends to be the case in most
naturally-occurring workplace environments.
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another line of literature argues that the potential downside effects of relative pay for
performance are likely to depend on organizational transparency (e.g. Ockenfels et al.,
2015, Breza et al., 2016, Cullen and Pakzad-Hurson, 2017).
Our main novelties relative to previous literature are (1) experimental variation of
the strength of competition by having high- and low-dispersion conditions; (2) the field
context, which allows us to assess how relevant pre-characteristics or conditions “out-
side the lab” impact responses to our treatments; (3) the use of a threshold payment
scheme, which enables us to keep the distribution of payments (mean and variance)
similar between competitive and non-competitive payments; and (4) the pre- and post-
elicitation of measures of prosociality, which enable us to control for baseline differ-
ences that may confound the treatment estimates. We thus seek to understand the un-
derlying mechanisms that previous literature has not.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 discusses the field con-
text and study design. Section 2.3 presents the main findings. Finally, Section 2.4 con-
cludes with some discussion and potential policy implications.
2.2 Study design
2.2.1 Field context
We recruit workers from a major banana-producing agribusiness in Ghana. The firm
is fair-trade certified and exports all of its produce, which constitutes 95% of Ghana’s
national production of bananas to Europe. Its workforce comprises approximately 1815
men and 230 women, all of whom are employed full-time. Most of the employees
complete basic jobs such as bunchcare, harvesting, packaging and quality control.
Banana production is divided into eight sectors. All sectors have the same structure:
a plantation with a cableway system moving the banana bunches to one of eight pack-
ing houses. The majority of employees are specialized in a specific job and work in a
specific sector. Sectors 1-7 employ 200 to 250 people every day from Monday to Friday.
About 45 people are employed on sector 8, where organic bananas are cultivated. The
remaining workers are not attached to a specific sector and get assigned based on need
every morning. Apart from being assigned to a sector, workers also specialize in a cer-
tain type of job such as caring for and harvesting of banana bunches, cutting leafs off
the banana trees, and packaging bananas for transport. Workers in several of these jobs
– bunchcare, harvesting, and quality control of packaging – report that they regularly
work in teams.
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In order to foster higher productivity, the firm established a rather complex bonus
system that rewards employees when a target production level is reached. Approxi-
mately one third of the workers report being unaware of how the existing bonus system
works. At the time these experiments were being designed, the firm was considering
revising its existing bonus (i.e., relative/competitive payment) scheme. Therefore, the
managers gave our research team permission to carry out the experiments with their
workers. The results of the study were also presented to them.
2.2.2 Experiments and surveys
FIGURE 2.1: Study session
A study session comprised a pre-survey, an experiment with three stages (the crux
of the session), and a post-questionnaire as shown in 2.1.
At the beginning of the experiment, we randomly and confidentially matched two
participants (i and j). Groups remained fixed throughout the experiment. Instructions
were presented stage by stage. In the first stage, we elicited the baseline level of proso-
ciality. In the second stage, participants engaged in an individual real-effort task under
one of six treatments with either an individual or a relative payment scheme (more be-
low). In the third stage, we elicited participants’ ex-post level of prosociality using the
same measures as in the first stage. We thus assess the change in prosociality from the
first to the third stage as a result of being exposed to an individual versus a relative
payment scheme. Below we explain the procedures used in each of the stages.
Stage 1: Baseline level of prosociality.
Prosociality was measured through two games: a one-shot public goods game (PGG)
and a social value orientation (SVO) game, the order of which was randomized. In
the PGG (Figure A.1), subjects received an endowment of GHS 10 (represented by 10
paper coins during the task) and had to decide how much to invest in an individual
or a joint account (represented by two envelopes). The return on investment in the
private account was 1 while the marginal per-capita return from the joint account was
0.7. After making a decision, each subject i was asked to guess the amount the other
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person j contributed to the group account. Correct guesses earned GHS 2; guesses that
deviated by one unit earned GHS 1; and guesses that deviated by two units earned
GHS 0.5.
The SVO game (Figure A.2) is based on Murphy et al. (2011).4 Due to time con-
straints, we used the reduced version in which subjects compare six distinct money
allocations for themselves (i) and their partners (j). To calculate the so-called SVO
angle, the preferred amounts across the six decision sets are summed up for i and j
respectively and then, the inverse tangent of the proportion of the sums is used to de-
termine the angle. The higher the angle, the more altruistic/prosocial a person is. This
game was played via the strategy method and accordingly, the role of payoff-allocator
(dictator) was randomly assigned to one of the participants (more when discussing in-
formation revelation further below).
Stage 2: Real-effort task and differential payment schemes
Subjects completed a real-effort (RE) task in which we exogenously varied the incen-
tives for performance. The task entailed assembling ballpoint pens for eight minutes
(Figure 2.2). Each participant received components for up to 65 ballpoint pens. This
task was chosen since it is a task that can be completed regardless of education level
and it is easy to to assess quality: A properly functioning (high-quality) pen was one
that was able to eject/retract; anything else was of low quality. For purposes of pay-
ment, only properly functioning pens were counted.
Stage 3: Ex-post level of prosociality
In the last stage, prosociality was measured again using the same procedures as in Stage
1. The only difference was that the decision sets for the SVO game were presented in
a different order to mitigate mere mimicking/repetition of the decisions made previ-
ously.
Procedures
As mentioned previously, while participants knew that the experiment had different
tasks, instructions were presented stage by stage. Information revelation occurred as
follows. Subjects were informed that either Stage 1 or Stage 3 and only one of the
prosociality games (either PGG or SVO) would be selected at random for payment. If
the SVO was selected, the role of dictator and one of the six decisions would also be
selected at random (given the strategy method was used). Feedback on these stages
4The original amounts were divided by 12.5 such that incentives were similar across SVO and PGG.
22
Chapter 2. Competition and prosociality:
A field experiment in Ghana
FIGURE 2.2: Instruction phase
(in particular Stage 1) was given only after subjects completed the post-questionnaire
such that changes in prosociality were unlikely to be due to endowment, learning, or
reputation effects. Participants did receive feedback immediately after the RE task and
these earnings were paid with certainty (unlike those for Stages 1 and 3). The latter
was done to enhance the salience of the main treatments, i.e., exposure to the payment
schemes.
To further investigate the drivers of changes in prosocial behavior and complement
the findings from our experiment treatments, we also had subjects complete a pre-
survey. This included questions on (1) basic socioeconomic characteristics, (2) work-
related measures such as job satisfaction, and (3) behavioral measures such as social
preferences (including inequality aversion), risk and time preferences (à la Charness
and Viceisza, 2015), competitive preferences (à la Gneezy et al., 2009), Schwartz-values
(à la Schwartz, 1992), and self-esteem. Inequality aversion and competitive preferences
were elicited in an incentivized way. As these measures were elicited before the exper-
iment, they can be argued to be exogenous to treatment. We thus use them to further
explore the drivers of behavioral change.
We also obtained limited administrative data (e.g. job type and sector) from the firm
to validate/complement (some of) the work-related measures in the pre-survey.
2.2. Study design 23
2.2.3 Treatments
We implemented a 3×2 between-subjects design with three different payment schemes
(threshold, competitive, and random) and two different dispersion levels between win-
ners and losers (high and low). Subject-pairs were randomly assigned to one of the
resulting six treatments (Table 2.1). In the threshold scheme (T ), any participant who
assembled 40 or more pens correctly (the median output observed during pilot ses-
sions of the competition, high-dispersion treatment) received a high payment while
those who did not received a low payment. We refer to participants who received the
high payment as winners and those who received the low payment as losers (not to be con-
fused with high- and low-dispersion treatments below). In the competitive scheme (C),
payments were based on relative performance. The subject (in the pair) who assembled
most pens correctly won/earned the high payment. Finally, in the random scheme (R),
the winner was determined at random. In the high-dispersion treatments (H), the win-
ner and loser received 15 and 5 respectively and in the low-dispersion treatments (L),
they received 12 and 8 respectively.
TABLE 2.1: Experimental treatments
Competition (C) Threshold (T ) Random (R)
High (H) most pens earns 15 ≥ 40 pens earns 15 randomly earns 15
other earns 5 < 40 earns 5 other earns 5
Low (L) most pens earns 12 ≥ 40 pens earns 12 randomly earns 12
other earns 8 < 40 earns 8 other earns 8
Our experimental design ensures that, in this stage, winners and losers in the thresh-
old treatments have the same monetary payoffs as winners and losers in the competi-
tive and random treatments. Therefore, conditional on being a winner or loser, differ-
ences in behavior across treatments cannot be driven by differential payoffs. Moreover,
this design should give rise to similar distributions of payments (mean and variance)
across treatments. While we were mainly interested in the differential effect of compet-
itive versus threshold payments on changes in prosociality, we included the random
payment scheme in order to isolate the potential effect of being confronted with other
participants from the effect that would result from receiving a differential payment.5 If
we find that prosociality decreases more in the competition than in the random pay-
ment, we can attribute this change to being exposed to relative payments. If the effect
is of similar magnitude, then we can conclude that it is not competition that affects
prosociality but rather the inequality that it generates.
5Like treatments have also been compared to “murky” bonus schemes (e.g. Buser and Dreber, 2015).
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2.2.4 Recruitment and sample
The firm provided a listing of its employees. This list included employee names and
identification numbers, sector numbers, and the type of job. A sample of employees
was randomly selected and assigned to experimental sessions. However, there was im-
perfect compliance in terms of actual attendance. Employees had to be released by their
sector supervisors, some of whom were less cooperative. In addition, due to the nature
of the tasks, packing-house employees tended to be available during the morning. So,
while relatively substantial compared to the population of employees, our sample is
not necessarily representative of all sectors and job types across the firm.
In total, we conducted 51 sessions, one in the morning and one in the afternoon on
Mondays through Fridays, over the course of five weeks. The sessions were announced
as “workshops” and supervisors were informed of selected employees a week in ad-
vance in order to release them at a given time. Table 5.1 shows the number of sessions,
individuals, winners, and losers across treatment conditions. Sessions lasted approxi-
mately three hours and paid 26.31 Ghanaian cedi/GHS (USD 7), relative to a daily wage
equivalent of GHS 18. A total of 619 individuals (589 of whom were men) showed up.
TABLE 2.2: Number of observations
Treatment Sessions Individuals Winner Loser
CH 8 94 48 (0.51)∗ 46 (0.49)∗
CL 9 107 50 (0.47)∗ 57 (0.53)∗
TH 10 117 66 (0.56) 51 (0.44)
TL 10 105 69 (0.66) 36 (0.34)
RH 7 93 46 (0.49) 47 (0.51)
RL 7 103 54 (0.52) 49 (0.48)
Total 51 619 333 (0.54) 286 (0.46)
*If the number of subjects in a session was uneven, the “extra" subject was randomly assigned to an existing group.
For purposes of internal validity, we run balancing tests across a wide range of pre-
characteristics as well as baseline levels of the outcome variables, PGG and SVO. Table
2.3 contains a selected set of variables, in particular those that are significantly differ-
ent at the 5% level and below. As expected, subjects appear to be significantly differ-
ent based on some firm/work-related variables such as length of employment, bonus
awareness, and the number of other subjects they have “close” relationships with. In
addition, subjects appear to be different on age, education, and preferences for risk and
competition. Finally, subjects contribute differently to the PGG at baseline across treat-
ments. In the following section, we discuss how our estimation strategy deals with this
unbalancedness.
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TABLE 2.3: Internal validity balancing tests
Variables Ni All CH CL TH TL RH RL p-value
Demographics
Age 618 31.26 31.94 30.80 32.92 32.13 29.88 29.62 0.03∗∗
Female 617 0.05 0.10 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.02∗∗
Years of schooling 586 9.98 10.07 10.21 9.19 9.80 10.47 10.29 0.00∗∗∗
Ethnicitya 617 2.66 2.67 2.70 2.74 2.51 2.62 2.65 0.71
Marital Statusb 610 1.52 1.56 1.54 1.46 1.52 1.48 1.53 0.85
HH size 603 5.20 5.91 4.82 5.56 4.92 4.74 5.23 0.06
Povertyc 601 1.34 1.40 1.49 1.49 1.32 1.26 1.31 0.40
Behavioral
Trustd 619 0.89 0.95 0.87 0.92 0.89 0.86 0.85 0.22
Fairnesse 618 0.39 0.34 0.38 0.37 0.40 0.39 0.46 0.67
Risk seekingf 606 3.88 3.41 3.70 3.37 3.86 4.59 4.43 0.00∗∗
Inequality averseg 619 2.51 2.70 2.35 2.75 2.44 2.37 2.42 0.18
Timeh 605 202.20 191.68 186.75 157.57 192.07 184.13 300.70 0.26
Competitioni 619 0.62 0.46 0.70 0.52 0.62 0.71 0.73 0.00∗∗
Schwartz valuesj
Benevolence 617 4.53 4.39 4.61 4.50 4.51 4.66 4.48 0.07
Conformity 618 4.57 4.54 4.64 4.60 4.55 4.53 4.51 0.67
Collectivism 619 0.73 0.62 0.73 0.71 0.78 0.75 0.76 0.15
Firm-related
Months employed 611 42.60 41.18 45.74 49.41 45.17 42.75 30.20 0.00∗∗∗
Monthly wage 610 374.19 377.49 390.38 373.99 369.43 365.85 366.87 0.18
Aware of bonus 619 0.69 0.46 0.72 0.62 0.71 0.77 0.82 0.00∗∗∗
Works in team 614 0.45 0.55 0.45 0.51 0.38 0.46 0.36 0.06
Job satisfactionk 615 4.50 4.33 4.60 4.51 4.38 4.64 4.56 0.00∗∗∗
Job type 606 4.79 4.61 4.92 4.56 4.89 5.39 4.44 0.16
Sector 602 4.64 4.89 4.49 4.26 4.97 4.96 4.41 0.08
Close relationsl 615 1.18 1.16 1.14 1.53 1.24 0.58 1.30 0.00∗∗∗
Outcomes
PGG (stage 1) 619 0.49 0.47 0.46 0.50 0.53 0.45 0.52 0.04∗∗
SVO (stage 1) 619 21.82 20.95 22.78 22.57 22.76 18.67 22.62 0.09
PGG (stage 3) 619 0.47 0.44 0.47 0.51 0.47 0.44 0.48 0.13
SVO (stage 3) 619 22.23 19.80 23.01 23.04 22.16 20.84 24.02 0.16
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05. The last column is obtained by running a one-way ANOVA
test. These values are also robust to running a seemingly unrelated regression model
for continuous variables and a χ2-test for categorical variables. The tests for baseline
equivalence of outcomes (PGG and SVO) are additionally robust to a Wilcoxon rank-sum
test.
Variable definitions (see questionnaires for additional detail): a 1=Akan, 2=Ewe, 3=Ga/
Dangbe, 4=Krobo, 5=Hausa; b 1=married, 2=single, 3=separated, 4=divorced, 5=wid-
owed; c number of adults per bedroom in the home; d 0=most people can be trusted,
1=need to be very careful trusting; e 0=most people take advantage, 1=most people try
to be fair; f number of seeds out of 10 chosen that are risky; g based on payoff equaliza-
tion or not (aka Fehr allocation activity); h average GHS needed in one month to sacrifice
100 GHS tomorrow; i based on choice to be paid relative to someone else (compete) in a
marble activity; j based on Schwartz (1992); k 1=terrible, 2=unhappy, 3=mixed, 4=mostly
satisfied, 5=pleased; l number of people known during experiment session.
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Overall, the average participant is 31 years old, lives in a household with 5 persons
(including children), has been employed by the firm for 43 months, and has a close
relationship with 1 other person in the session.
2.2.5 Empirical strategy
Given we collected measures of prosociality in Stages 1 and 3 (i.e., at baseline/pre-
treatment and follow-up/post-treatment) and there is evidence of some baseline im-
balance, we estimate our treatment effects according to the following specification:
∆Yi = β0 + βCCi + βRRi + βY0Yi0 + βZZi + εi, (2.1)
where ∆Yi is the difference in prosociality between Stages 1 and 3 at the individual
level i; Ci and Ri are dummies for individual-level exposure to treatment, competition
and random respectively. So, threshold (Ti) is taken as the control. Yi0 is the initial level
of prosociality in Stage 1; Zi is a set of covariates comprising the unbalanced charac-
teristics in Table 2.3; and εi is an error term. We run these specifications for both PGG
and SVO for the pooled sample as well as separately for the low- and high-dispersion
subsamples.
To further tease apart mechanisms, we expand Equation 2.1 by adding interactions
between the treatment dummies (Ci andRi) and covariates of interestXi. Among these
covariates are (1) whether or not the subject is a winner (i.e., earned 15 or 12 depend-
ing on whether s/he is in the high- or low-dispersion condition); (2) typical behavioral
measures such as risk and inequality aversion; (3) preferences for competition (see for
example Brandts et al., 2009, Gneezy et al., 2009); and potentially relevant adminis-
trative/external variables such as (4) whether or not the subject engages in teamwork
(i.e., a more prosocial context) in her/his usual job and (5) whether or not the subject is
aware of the bonus the firm currently has in place.
We thus run the following specification:
∆Yi = β0 + βCCi + βRRi + βXXi + βCXCiXi + βRXRiXi + βY0Yi0 + βZZi + εi, (2.2)
where all is as defined previously.
2.2.6 Hypotheses
In line with prior literature (e.g. Buser and Dreber, 2015), we expect the coefficient βC
to be negative indicating a larger decrease in prosociality in the competitive relative
to the non-competitive (threshold) payment scheme. We also expect the decrease in
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prosociality to be more pronounced in the high-dispersion treatments (where winners
earn 15 and losers earn 5) than in the low-dispersion treatments (where they earn 12
and 8 respectively). This would be consistent with Lazear (1989), although some of
the mechanisms are likely to be different, given sabotage is not possible in our context.
In lieu of a theoretical framework, we elaborate on the potential mechanisms for these
hypothesized effects in the context of existing literature.
Erkal et al. (2011) and Schurr and Ritov (2016) find that winners of a competition
tend to behave in a less prosocial way than losers. Schurr and Ritov (2016) in partic-
ular demonstrate that merely remembering the moment of winning a competition is
sufficient to increase cheating behavior. The implication for our context is that winning
in a competition, thus alters prosocial behavior. So, winners might keep more money
for themselves (in PGG or SVO) in Stage 3 if they think that their “superior” (winner)
status entitles them to do so. Consistent with this finding, we would expect winners in
the competitive payment scheme to decrease prosociality more in Stage 3 than winners
in the non-competitive (threshold) payment scheme, i.e., βC < 0.
The coefficient βR further allows us to pin this down. In the random treatment the
outcome is determined by sheer luck. So, a comparison of the effect of random and
competitive treatments enables us to assess if income inequality alone explains the de-
crease in prosociality. If that is the case, we expect to observe a similar magnitude of the
effect between competition and random treatments, i.e., βC would be of a similar mag-
nitude as βR. However, if competition generates a feeling of rivalry and confrontation,
we expect that the crowding out effect of prosociality would be larger in the compe-
tition than in the random treatment, so βC would be larger than βR. In summary, a
significant effect for βC but not for βR would be more solid evidence that changes in
prosociality are due to competition.
Evoked feelings of rivalry from competition (relative to the threshold treatment)
could also lead to a decrease in prosocial behavior. For example, Kilduff et al. (2016)
find that increased rivalry is related to “competitors” being more (1) concerned with
their status and (2) performance-oriented. Similar mechanisms could be at play here.
Finally, perceived unfairness of the competitive payment scheme could also affect
prosocial behavior (e.g Akerlof and Yellen, 1990). Beliefs about unfairness could lead
to frustration and anger, which in turn discourage worker effort and demotivate them
to behave prosocially. Subjects might perceive a competitive payment scheme as unfair
(relative to the threshold payment), since there is an exclusive bonus at play that ulti-
mately only one worker in the dyad will benefit from directly. This perception might
be particularly pronounced for those who are (1) more inequality averse (e.g. Bartling
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et al., 2009); (2) less used to incentive schemes as part of their day-to-day work en-
vironment (as proxied by not being aware of the firm’s existing bonus system or not
being used to working in teams); and (3) more inclined to compete (as proxied by our
measure of preferences for competition).
2.3 Results
2.3.1 Descriptives
To get a sense of potential unconditional treatment effects, we start with some graphs.
Figure 2.3 looks at the difference in PGG contributions and SVO angle between Stages
1 and 3 across threshold (T ), competition (C), and random (R); low (L) and high (H)
dispersion. Two aspects are striking:
1. The bars for T and C typically point in opposite directions. Evidence is somewhat
mixed for C versus R.
2. Dispersion seems to matter. The bars forH point in the expected direction, specif-
ically the contributions (and angle) in C decreased between Stages 1 and 3 while
they increased in T . However, the bars for L show the opposite.
FIGURE 2.3: Changes in PGG contributions (left) and SVO angle (right)
across treatments
Collectively, these findings suggest that competition led to a greater decrease in
prosociality across Stages 1 and 3 relative to the threshold treatments, but only when
the dispersion between the winner’s and loser’s payoffs is high (i.e., when there is
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much at stake). When the dispersion between the winner’s and loser’s payoffs is low,
this effect is reversed. Indeed, statistical tests confirm these findings for PGG (t-test,
p-value < 0.1).
Figure 2.4 shows the distribution of the number of ballpoint pens assembled across
treatments. On average, subjects completed about 40 pens. Both, on average and over
the whole distribution, there are limited statistically significant impacts across treat-
ments. So, effort appears to be unaffected by the type of payment scheme, regardless
of dispersion. Perhaps this is not so surprising when comparing T and C as both treat-
ments create an incentive for higher performance. However, the finding that effort in R
(the random treatment) is similar to that in T and C is more striking, given the outcome
is determined by sheer luck. That said, this could be because subjects have exerted ef-
fort to attend the session or feel observed by the experimenters (and indirectly, the firm)
and thus have the need to “do something” while sitting in the session.
FIGURE 2.4: Distribution of effort across treatments
	  
As stated in Section 2.2.4, there are some baseline imbalances across treatments.
So, the claims made in this section should be taken with caution. Next, we present
conditional effects according to the specifications in Section 2.2.5. As stated in Section
2.2.4, there are some baseline imbalances across treatments. So, the claims made in this
section should be taken with caution. Next, we present conditional effects according to
the specifications in Section 2.2.5.
2.3.2 Treatment effects
Table 2.4 presents the estimates of the treatment effects according to the specification in
Equation 2.1. Panel A presents the impacts on changes in PGG and Panel B presents the
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impacts on changes in SVO. For the sake of brevity, the table does not explicitly report
the coefficients for the Z covariates; however, the table footnote lists the covariates that
are included when applicable. Results are available from the authors upon request.
In columns (1) and (2), we pool observations across high and low dispersion for the
three payment schemes: competition, random, and threshold. The constant term is pos-
itive and significant, indicating that in the threshold treatment (the omitted category)
there is an increase in prosociality from Stage 1 to Stage 3. The negative and signifi-
cant effect of the baseline level of prosociality (PGG and SVO) indicates that in Stage
3 the dispersion in prosociality decreases. In other words, individuals with initially
low levels of prosociality cooperate more in the third stage than in the first stage, while
individuals with initially high levels of prosociality cooperate relatively less. Looking
at the pooled data, competition seems to have no effect on prosociality. To investigate
whether these effects may be heterogeneous with respect to high and low dispersion,
we run separate regressions (columns 3-6).
Once we disaggregate by high and low dispersion, a different picture emerges. Un-
der high dispersion (columns 3 and 4) there seems to be an increase in prosociality in the
threshold treatment from the first to the third stage. Focusing on column (4), which con-
trols for the full spectrum of baseline imbalances, PGG contributions are 16.8% higher
post-treatment (although not statistically significant) and the SVO angle increases by
10.99 points post-treatment. However, PGG contributions increase by 5.6% less in the
competition than in the threshold between Stages 1 and 3. Similarly, the SVO angle in-
creases by 4.2 degrees (about 38%) less under competition than under threshold. Both
of these effects are significant at the 5% level. Prosociality also increases less under the
random treatment compared with the threshold treatment. Yet, while the magnitude
of the decrease is not significantly different between random and competition for PGG
contributions (3.25% lower increase in random), the SVO angle decreases more under
competition than under the random treatment (0.151 points). These results suggest that
competition has a larger crowding-out effect on prosociality than random payments.
This finding is thus consistent with the hypothesis that competition indeed can erode
prosociality (à la Lazear, 1989, Holmström, 2017).
Under low dispersion (columns 5 and 6), prosociality also increases in the threshold
treatment from the first to the third stage. However, contrary to the case of high dis-
persion, there are no differential changes in prosociality, be it PGG or SVO, across the
competitive and threshold or random and threshold treatments (once that we control
for socioeconomic characteristics). There is also no significant difference in change in
PGG or SVO between the competition and the random treatment. While we expected
that competition under low dispersion would have less of an impact on prosociality
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TABLE 2.4: Treatment effects on change in PGG and SVO (pooled, high,
low dispersion)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pooled Pooled High High Low Low
Panel A: ∆ PGG contributions
Competition -0.0197 -0.0143 -0.0768** -0.0561** 0.0372 0.0530
(0.0231) (0.0222) (0.0276) (0.0216) (0.0296) (0.0375)
Random -0.0200 -0.00226 -0.0534** -0.0325 0.0180 0.0522
(0.0208) (0.0227) (0.0208) (0.0193) (0.0311) (0.0421)
Baseline PGG (Yi0) -0.444*** -0.455*** -0.422*** -0.427*** -0.457*** -0.473***
(0.0453) (0.0459) (0.0665) (0.0705) (0.0629) (0.0591)
Constant 0.214*** 0.184** 0.234*** 0.168 0.185*** -0.129
(0.0266) (0.0766) (0.0394) (0.108) (0.0328) (0.113)
R-squared 0.217 0.242 0.226 0.308 0.233 0.314
Panel B: ∆ SVO angle
Competition -1.046 -1.018 -3.586** -4.199** 1.328 1.074
(1.102) (1.110) (1.409) (1.854) (1.540) (2.062)
Random 1.504 0.948 -0.151 0.490 3.150* 2.869
(1.003) (1.235) (1.189) (1.201) (1.598) (2.281)
Baseline SVO (Yi0) -0.661*** -0.651*** -0.655*** -0.657*** -0.679*** -0.635***
(0.0499) (0.0507) (0.0687) (0.0741) (0.0741) (0.0736)
Constant 14.86*** 12.87** 15.44*** 10.99** 14.45*** 22.82**
(1.368) (5.123) (1.787) (5.048) (2.155) (8.972)
R-squared 0.324 0.347 0.302 0.341 0.357 0.405
Observations 538 538 262 262 276 276
Covariatesa NO YES NO YES NO YES
+ Robust standard errors clustered at the session level in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
a Covariates: age, female, risk, inequality averse, poverty, competition, months em-
ployed, bonus awareness, job satisfaction, close relations, order of PGG and SVO, day
and time of the session.
relative to high dispersion, we did not expect this effect to be statistically insignificant.
These results thus suggest that competition may not always lead to a decrease in proso-
ciality. It depends on the context; notably, how well/badly off the competition leaves
winners relative to losers.
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2.3.3 Mechanisms
To investigate potential mechanisms beyond those that are feasible using only our ex-
perimental variations, we first run the specification in Equation 2.2. Table 2.5 summa-
rizes the effects for changes in prosociality across treatments for individuals of differ-
ent characteristics X under high dispersion.6 The first, third and fifth column present
the effects for changes in PGG contribution and the second, fourth and sixth column
presents the effects for changes in the SVO angle for comparisons between the com-
petition and the threshold treatment (columns 1 and 2), between the random and the
threshold treatment (columns 3 and 4) and the comparison between these two former
comparisons (columns 5 and 6). The results for low dispersion are included in Table
A.1 in Appendix A.
We find the following under high dispersion:
1. Winners: Those who win the competition are less prosocial after having been ex-
posed to the competition than those who win in the threshold treatment. This
effect is only significant for changes in PGG contributions. This is consistent with
Erkal et al. (2011) who find that winners are more likely to behave in a selfish
manner. However, in contrast to Erkal et al. (2011), this does not seem to be due
to selection of less prosocial types into the winner position as this specification
controls for various individual and social preferences as discussed previously. So,
we think this is more likely due to winner-subjects feeling more entitled and thus,
believing they deserved their payments more than had they been in the threshold
treatment. High earners in the random payment treatment, however, do not be-
have less cooperatively compared with high earners in the threshold treatment.
This suggests that indeed competition has a particular effect on winners that is
not only due to higher income. This also relates to Gee et al. (2016) who find that
when income is earned through performance, individuals use income differences
as a heuristic to infer relative deservingness.
2. Inequality aversion: Based on an easy distribution task from Fehr et al. (2008),
we classify individuals as inequality averse when they preferred the equal dis-
tribution over the unequal distribution in all three questions and not inequality
averse otherwise. We find that those who are inequality averse decrease proso-
ciality (PGG) in competition compared with threshold. The effect for SVO is also
negative, but not statistically significant. This is consistent with findings from
Cherry et al. (2005) who find that contribution levels are significantly lower when
6The effects reported in this table are equivalent to (βC + βCX) + (β0 + βX) in Equation 2.2 (aka
contrasts, e.g., in Stata).
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TABLE 2.5: Heterogeneous effects on change in PGG and SVO (high dis-
persion; C vs. T )a
(1) (2)







not inequality averse -0.0335 -3.7620
(0.0322) (3.2476)
inequality averse -0.1214* -4.6301
(0.0682) (3.4913)
risk seeking 0.0028 0.0439
(0.0087) (0.5227)
dislikes competition -0.0871 -3.3085
(0.0543) (3.3379)
likes competition -0.0676 -5.0836
(0.0441) (3.3031)
Work-related variables
does not work in teams -0.0411 -4.5677
(0.0373) (3.1905)
works in teams -0.1138* -3.8243
(0.0617) (3.2144)
is not aware of bonus -0.1081** -6.4739**
(0.0489) (3.0383)





+ Robust standard errors clustered at the session level
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
a This table presents contrasts acrossC and T , i.e., (βC+
βCX)−(β0+βX) as discussed in Section 2.3.3. Contrasts
across R and T are not shown.
b Covariates: PGG or SVO (stage 1), age, female, risk,
preference for competition, months employed, bonus
awareness, job satisfaction, close relations, order of
PGG and SVO, day and time of the session.
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Competition (C) -0.287** 0.219 0.0799
(0.134) (0.168) (0.438)
Random (R) -0.395** 0.0391 -0.104
(0.193) (0.208) (0.447)
Winner 0.0369 0.0433 -0.0360
(0.0386) (0.107) (0.294)
C× Winner 0.177* -0.0637 -0.271
(0.0924) (0.136) (0.374)
Inequality averse -0.000741 0.198* 0.651**
(0.0560) (0.114) (0.277)
C× Inequality averse 0.0876 -0.257* -0.614*
(0.0983) (0.154) (0.368)
Works in teams -0.00554 -0.0201 -0.228
(0.0348) (0.0987) (0.213)
C× Works in teams -0.113 0.106 -0.0330
(0.105) (0.142) (0.340)
Is aware of bonus 0.0184 -0.109 -0.613**
(0.0387) (0.102) (0.260)
C× Is aware of bonus -0.0970 0.0636 -0.216
(0.114) (0.150) (0.379)
Baseline PGG (Yi0) -0.295*** -0.0228 0.123
(0.113) (0.123) (0.297)
Constant 1.415*** -1.124*** 2.395***
(0.219) (0.277) (0.736)
R-squared 0.364 0.359 0.280
Observations 262 262 261
Covariatesb YES YES YES
+ Robust standard errors clustered at the session level in
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
a This table only presents effects that were previously sig-
nificant, particularly for interactions with the competitive
treatment (C). Interactions with the random treatment
dummy (R) are omitted.
b Covariates: age, female, risk, preference for competition,
months employed, bonus awareness, job satisfaction, close
relations, order of PGG and SVO, day and time of the ses-
sion.
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groups have heterogeneous (rather than homogeneous) endowments. In the ran-
dom payment treatment, we do not observe differences in contributions to PGG
or SVO between inequality averse individuals compared with the threshold treat-
ment. Here again, competition appears to trigger a change in behavior compared
with the random treatment.
3. Risk seeking: We find no significant effect of risk preferences on changes in proso-
ciality between competition and threshold or for random and threshold, for nei-
ther PGG nor SVO. This is different from for example Teyssier (2012) who finds
that risk aversion is significantly and negatively correlated with contributions of
first movers; although we recognize that our impacts are identified on changes in
prosociality and not contribution levels.
4. Preferences for competition: Competitive preferences are measured in the ex-ante
survey with a simple marble game in three stages à la Niederle and Vesterlund
(2007). We find that preferences for competition do not explain differences in PGG
or SVO across treatments.
5. Working in teams: We find that participants who are used to working in teams,
reduce prosociality in competition relative to threshold. As before, the effect is
only significant for changes in PGG. This finding could imply that the erosion of
prosociality may be exacerbated when competition is induced between members
of same team rather than between teams. No such effects are observed in the
random treatment. Future work should explore whether inter-team competition
has a differential effect on in- versus out-group members.
6. Bonus awareness: Participants who are unaware of the firm’s existing bonus also
decrease prosociality in the competition compared to the threshold payment and
in the random compared with the threshold treatment. The magnitude of this
effect is higher for the competition than for the random treatment. This suggests
that lack of prior exposure to related schemes can increase the negative impacts
of newly implemented relative-performance schemes.
Finally, under low dispersion, none of the covariates significantly predict differen-
tial behavior across competition and threshold. That said, losers do have a greater (pos-
itive) point estimate (albeit statistically insignificant) than winners, possibly suggesting
an effect à la Schurr and Ritov (2016).
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2.4 Conclusion
In this study, we conduct a lab-in-the-field experiment with workers from an agribusi-
ness in Ghana to test whether competitive (relative to individual) payment schemes
crowd out prosociality in subsequent tasks. We thus partially revisit a question that
has been addressed by Buser and Dreber (2015), in a context where the findings have
the potential to immediately inform workplace and development policy. We particu-
larly seek to understand underlying mechanisms by first experimentally varying the
strength of the competition through the dispersion between the winner’s and loser’s
payoffs and two interacting treatment variation with survey covariates as well as exter-
nal, work-related variables.
When there is much at stake, i.e., when the dispersion between the winner’s and
loser’s payoffs is high, we confirm prior findings: Competition crowds out prosocial-
ity. This effect seems to be mainly driven by (1) those who win the competition, (2)
those who are inequality averse, (3) those who usually work in teams and (4) those
who are unaware of an already existing bonus scheme at the firm. However, when
there is less at stake, we find quite the opposite: Competition does not affect prosocial-
ity. Closer analysis indicates that prosociality is also eroded under random payments.
Yet, the erosion of prosociality occurs in more dimensions (i.e., SVO) under competi-
tion than under random payment. Our results only partly replicate the findings by
Buser and Dreber (2015) but are in line with Schurr and Ritov (2016) who find that sub-
ject’s (dis)honesty is impacted by exposure to competitive environments. Furthermore,
Drago and Garvey (1998) demonstrate that strong promotion incentives can crowd out
helping behavior among coworkers. Overall, our findings suggest that the impact of
competitive schemes (such as bonuses and merit pay based on relative performance) on
cooperation in the workplace is likely to be context-specific. So, managers should keep
the complexities of incentive systems in mind as they consider implementing them in
the workplace (as alluded to by for example Lazear, 1989, Holmström, 2017). Since
we report results from a stylized experiment, we need to be careful with proclaiming
definite work-policy advice. For example, in companies coworkers interact frequently
and repetitively. Several times over the course of a year, they may get feedback on
their performance in form of a bonus pay. In the short-term, it has been shown that
workers who once won the competition will be motivated to work in the subsequent
working phase (Bandiera et al., 2013). Over a longer term, the bonus incentive may
wear off and workers may reduce effort exerted. Furthermore, the workers who rarely
receive a bonus may become dissatisfied with their job which can have negative conse-
quences for the organization’s efficiency in terms of less organizational support (Miceli
and Mulvey, 2000) or crowding out of intrinsic motivation (Bowles and Polanía-Reyes,
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2012). Moreover, incentives may not work as intended when social ties among cowork-
ers are considered. The effect from an incentive pay on social interaction may also
collude with the strength of bonds among coworkers (Ashraf and Bandiera, 2017).
Our findings leave some avenues for future research. First, our setting could be ex-
tended to include collaborative tasks where strategic complementarities are important.
Second, the effect of different threshold levels on effort and subsequently prosociality
could be explored. Third, it would be interesting to look at environments in which in-
dividual performance is not perfectly observable and could lead to perceived discrim-
ination (e.g. Grosch and Rau, 2017a). Fourth, in lieu of a measure of cooperation and
prosociality, future work could look at the impact of different payment incentives on
subsequent effort provision/productivity tasks. Fifth, in light of the literature on gen-
der differences in competition (e.g. Gneezy et al., 2003, 2009) and uncertainty aversion
(e.g. Croson and Gneezy, 2009), future research could explore the differential impact of
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3.1 Introduction
Antisocial behavior at the workplace brings harm to an organization, its employees,
or its stakeholders (Griffin and Lopez, 2005). The occurrence of antisocial actions is
not rare (Charness et al., 2013) and may lead to substantial efficiency losses. Empir-
ical evidence corroborates this and reports that US firms lose about $50 billion each
year because of white collar crime, i.e., fraud and theft (Coffin, 2003).1 This emphasizes
the importance for management to design workplace environments which counteract
worker resentment. Importantly, dissatisfaction at work is not only affected by man-
agement styles and personal interactions with colleagues. There is evidence that insti-
tutional factors such as pay regimes and pay transparency may crucially reduce worker
satisfaction (French et al., 2000, Miceli and Mulvey, 2000, Card et al., 2012).
In the organizational economics literature, it is argued that antisocial behavior at
the workplace can be unleashed if there is a trigger, a so-called frustrator (Giacalone
and Greenberg, 1997). Such frustrators can lead to work dissatisfaction and increase
workers’ engagement in antisocial activities. Examples of these triggers are controver-
sies with superiors (Geddes and Baron, 1997), co-workers (Skarlicki and Folger, 2004),
or perceived unfairness in an organization (Neuman, 2004).2
A widely used pay regime are bonuses as they generate incentives to put forth effort
(Lazear, 2000b). Importantly, the allocation procedure of bonuses is often not fair. It is
possible that managers do not grant all employees similar and fair chances to get pro-
moted. For example, Price (2012) experimentally shows that male managers discrim-
inate against female employees in a context where performance information is avail-
able.3 Furthermore, discrimination can also be unintentional and can arise from insti-
tutional procedures (French et al., 2000). That is, when performance is not impeccably
observable since work processes are complex and the monitoring of effort and ability
is imperfect (Berger et al., 2013). UK data show that more than one-third of financial
professionals believe that bonuses given to top earners are unjustified and cause re-
sentment in the office (CIMA, 2016).4 We argue that discriminatory pay regimes which
deprive workers of the opportunity to receive a bonus, might serve as a frustrator. In
1Similarly, Disselkamp (2004) reports that German firms bear costs of 5e0 billion because of inner
dismissals, conflicts in the workplace, and high drop-out rates reflected in the number of staff on sick
leave.
2Empirical evidence also shows that wage cuts damage work morale (Kube et al., 2013).
3An overview of experiments on discriminatory actions is given by Anderson et al. (2006). Riach and
Rich (2002) summarize field-experimental evidence of discrimination against non-whites and women in
markets.
4The importance of procedural fairness is also emphasized in experiments. The studies analyze the
redistribution decisions of stakeholders or spectators and show that they are affected by the processes of
how incomes are allocated (Konow, 2000, Cappelen et al., 2007, 2013, Akbaş et al., 2016).
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particular, if (perceived) high performance is not rewarded, workers might become re-
sentful which could ultimately trigger antisocial behavior.
Our study investigates whether discriminatory pay regimes lead to more pronounced
antisocial behavior among co-workers compared to non-discriminatory pay regimes.
“Unjustifiably-paid” workers, i.e., workers with a high (perceived) performance who
receive no compensation, may feel particularly frustrated. Finally, we examine whether
a discriminatory pay regime lowers prosocial actions toward co-workers (Buser and
Dreber, 2015, Grosch et al., 2017).
To investigate the link between discriminatory pay regimes and antisocial behavior,
we conduct a real-effort experiment. We vary the procedures of pay regimes and subse-
quently measure workers’ engagement in antisocial actions. In the Discrimination treat-
ment, half the participants are randomly selected and receive a zero payment. The re-
maining half are promoted and compete for bonuses. Here, relative performance within
the group of promoted workers determines payments, i.e., the 50% best-performing
subjects receive e15, whereas the 50% least-performing participants from this group
receive e5. By contrast, in the treatment Competition all payments are justified by per-
formance and there is no discrimination – all workers participate in a competition for
bonuses. The competitive pay regime is characterized by the transparency of payments
in accordance with subjects’ relative performance. That is, a worker’s performance is
directly revealed by the payment she receives.5 After subjects receive information on
their payments, we measure antisocial behavior in a “joy-of-destruction (JoD)” game
(Abbink and Sadrieh, 2009, Abbink and Herrmann, 2011). Workers who received no
payment are paired with a worker from the paid group. Both subjects receive six can-
teen vouchers and simultaneously decide how many canteen vouchers of their paired
player they want to destroy. After the JoD game, we implement a sequential prisoner’s
dilemma game to test whether a discriminatory pay regime dampens prosocial behav-
ior.
JoD experiments find that people enjoy harming others, even though this action does
not increase own monetary benefits (Abbink and Sadrieh, 2009, Abbink and Herrmann,
2011). Moreover, inequality-averse subjects engage in money burning to equalize in-
comes (Zizzo and Oswald, 2001, Zizzo, 2003, Fehr, 2016). Fehr (2016) finds that sub-
jects burn money to retaliate against sabotage behavior. We extend that research, con-
sidering whether the source of income inequality (i.e., discriminatory compensation
vs. equal chances), the transparency of remuneration, and unjustified payments, affect
the level of antisocial behavior. In our set-up, inequality in payments is kept constant
5Workers who rank in the first quartile receive e15, workers who rank in the second quartile receive
5e, and the 50% worst-ranked workers earn nothing.
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among the worker groups across all treatments. We collect baseline measures on in-
equality aversion (Blanco et al., 2011) before the crux of the experiment to examine the
explanatory power of individual preferences.
As expected, we find that low-income workers destroy a larger fraction of vouchers
than high-income workers. Antisocial behavior is more pronounced in the Discrim-
ination treatment compared to non-discriminatory pay regimes. Inequality aversion
only has explanatory power for non-discriminatory pay regimes and cannot explain the
large destruction level under a discriminatory pay regime. We find that the treatment
effect is entirely driven by workers who receive an unjustified payment. We disentan-
gle the effect of discrimination from receiving an unjustified payment in a treatment
called Random. It turns out that workers engage in particularly antisocial behavior only
when a discriminatory payment procedure leads to unjustified payments. In addition,
discrimination crowds out prosocial behavior, as workers are less cooperative in the
Discrimination treatment compared to the non-discriminatory pay regimes. Our find-
ings may inhere interesting implications for organizational economics and the choice
of appropriate pay regimes. Hence, we test for external validity and examine how
different Big-5 personality traits (Costa and McCrae, 1989) are linked to our measure
of antisocial behavior.6 Our data suggest that observed behavior in the JoD game is a
valid proxy for antisocial behavior at work, i.e., “neuroticism” and “agreeableness” can
partly predict destructive behavior in our JoD game. This is in line with empirical data
(Jones et al., 2011, Miller and Lynam, 2001) which show that workers with high scores
in this trait are more likely to engage in antisocial actions.
3.2 Experimental Design
3.2.1 Experimental Framework
The experiment consists of a short pre-survey, the main part with four stages, and an
ex-post questionnaire. The sequence of actions is illustrated in Figure 2.1. After a brief
questionnaire, we elicit the inequality-aversion parameters of the Fehr and Schmidt
(1999) model with the method introduced by Blanco et al. (2011) at stage 1. The idea is
that inequality aversion can partly explain antisocial behavior. The subsequent stages
and the ex-post survey are summarized in the following. Full instructions can be found
in Appendix B.
6This is motivated by empirical studies, which demonstrate that “neuroticism” and “agreeableness”
are important predictors of antisocial behavior (for meta-analyses see Jones et al., 2011, Miller and Ly-
nam, 2001). For instance, the trait “neuroticism” measures emotional instability and the level of experi-
encing anger and anxiety.
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FIGURE 3.1: Experimental sequence
Stage 1: Inequality Aversion (α and β)
To measure inequality aversion, we apply the method of Blanco et al. (2011) and im-
plement two different games. The first one is to measure β, aversion to advantageous
inequality, and the second one serves to elicit α, aversion to disadvantaged inequality
(see Fehr and Schmidt, 1999).
For measuring β a modified dictator game is implemented. The dictator is confronted
with 21 pairs of competing payoff distributions. One option, in which the dictator
receives 20 tokens and the recipient 0 (20,0), is kept constant. The other payoff distribu-
tion holds equal payoffs starting from (1,1), (2,2) etc. rising to (20,20) for dictator and
recipient. Dictators have to decide for a switching point at which they prefer equal out-
comes to being ahead. Participants’ β varies between -0.025 and 1 and increases with
the level of aversion of being ahead. After decisions are made, one of the 21 decisions
is randomly drawn for payment and one participant of a dyad is randomly selected for
the role of the dictator who determines payoffs.
To measure the parameter α that captures the acceptance of disadvantageous inequal-
ity, we ask the responder in an ultimatum game for the minimum acceptable offer. First,
participants in the role of the proposer are given 20 tokens and make an integer offer of
x tokens to the responder, keeping 20 tokens - x tokens to themselves. Responders have
to indicate which minimum first-mover offer they would accept. The lowest amount
that can be accepted is 0 tokens for herself and 20 tokens for the other participant. This
amount determines an individual’s parameter α ranging from 0 to 4.5. The higher the
parameter, the more a person dislikes disadvantageous inequality. For calculating pay-
ments, we randomly draw one of the 21 possible payment allocations and randomly
select one participant in each dyad for the role of the proposer and respondent respec-
tively. If the minimum acceptance level exceeds the offer, both earn nothing. Otherwise,
the randomly drawn payment allocation is implemented.
In the two inequality games, we apply an exchange rate of 1 token = e0.15. Across
the games at stage 1, we use stranger matching and strategy method. Participants are
always informed about exchange rates from experimental currency to real currency at
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the beginning of each game.
Stage 2: Real-Effort Task
In this stage, subjects work on a real-effort task in which we exogenously vary the pay
regime. The eight-minute task involves individually counting zeros in 5 x 9 matrices
consisting of random numbers of zeros and ones. After completion of the task half the
participants will be assigned to group A and the remaining half will be assigned to
group B. Participants A receive 15e or 5e, whereas participants B receive a zero pay-
ment. The payment allocation results in three different payment groups which is kept
constant across treatments: half the workforce receive zero (type B), 25% earn 5e (type
A5), and 25% earn 15e (type A15).
The pay regime, i.e., how participants are assigned to the groups, is our treatment vari-
able. Participants are informed about the allocation before they work on the real-effort
task. Information about the group assignment and payment is done by distributing
envelopes with money (if any) and a card with a written ’A’ or ’B’ enclosed.
In three treatments we vary two determinants of pay regimes in the real-effort task:
(i) discrimination to receive a bonus and (ii) justification of all payments by performance.
“Discrimination” can be defined as treating a particular group of people differently, e.g.,
withdrawing such opportunities as the participation in a competition for bonuses. We
define a pay regime where the pay procedures guarantee that better-performing work-
ers will receive at least as much of a payoff as an equivalent-performing worker, as a
pay regime where “all payments are justified.” These two channels are switched on and
off in the different treatments. A brief overview can be found in Table 3.1. We elaborate
on the design details of the Discrimination treatment and the two non-discriminatory
treatments in the following paragraphs.
TABLE 3.1: Summary of treatments




In Discrimination, we create a pay regime with neither equal opportunities nor jus-
tified payments for all workers. Participants are randomly assigned to either the role
of a type-A or a type-B worker. Here, the performance of type-B workers is ignored
when determining the payoffs and therefore they are therefore discriminated against.
In contrast, type-A workers are ranked within group A based on their total number
of correctly solved matrices. The workers ranked in the upper half of the distribution
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receive e15 and those ranked in the lower half receive e5.
In contrast, in the Competition treatment, all participants are treated equally and all
payments are justified. In this case, a performance ranking among all participants is
executed. Participants who rank in the first quartile of the distribution earn e15, par-
ticipants who rank in the second quartile of the distribution earn e5. They are assigned
to group A. Workers who rank in either the third or fourth quartile receive nothing and
are assigned to group B.
To control for the impact of receiving an unjustified payment under a non-discriminatory
pay regime, we run another treatment called Random. Here, the assignment to groups
A and B is imposed randomly, as is the ranking within group A. Consequently, workers
are paid independently of their performance. As all workers still have an equal chance
of receiving a bonus, the pay regime is not characterized to be discriminatory. How-
ever, not all payments are justified, as the random pay mechanism ignores workers’ indi-
vidual performance. The treatment comparison of unjustifiably-paid workers between
Random and Discrimination enables us to disentangle the effects of discrimination from
unjustified payments. Before subjects work in the real-effort task, they are informed
about the pay procedures. After the real-effort task, we hand out envelopes with some
information on group affiliation, A or B, and we enclose the respective banknotes (if
any) they earned in this stage.
Stage 3: JoD game
We modify the JoD game by Abbink and Sadrieh (2009). At the beginning, each par-
ticipant is virtually endowed with six canteen vouchers.7 A participant B is matched
with a participant A. Type Bs are informed about the exact payment (5e or 15e) of
the matched partner in the previous stage. Type As know that they are matched with a
type B. Every participant (type A and B) then simultaneously decide how many vouch-
ers (between 0 and 6) they want to destroy from the matched participant.8 Decisions are
entered on a computer screen and destruction is free of cost. Subjects know that a ran-
dom parameter, which destroys vouchers with a 50% probability, is implemented. In
this case, the computer randomly destroys 0–6 vouchers (subjects know that all levels
are equally likely). In the other 50% of the cases the participant’s decision determines
7Students at the university hold a student identity card. This ID card is used to pay for meals at the
university’s canteen and can be topped up with credit. With one of our vouchers participants could top
up their credit by 1e.
8Subjects know that destroyed vouchers would become useless for both subjects. To explain the mech-
anism, we applied the wording “you can remove vouchers.”
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the number of vouchers destroyed. The implementation of the random component re-
duces moral costs since mean actions can be hidden under the guise of a possible ran-
dom event (Abbink and Herrmann, 2011). In real life, in many cases antisocial actions
such as stealing from or bullying co-workers cannot be traced back to one particular
person. Only at the end of the experimental session do we inform participants about
the number of devalued vouchers.
Stage 4: Cooperative behavior
We use a sequential-move prisoner’s dilemma (Blanco et al., 2014) to measure cooper-
ation. All participants (independent of their type) are matched in dyads and receive
no information about the matched partner. The first mover makes a binary decision
and chooses to cooperate or to defect. Similarly, the second mover responds with ei-
ther cooperation or defection. If both defect, both players receive a payoff of 10 Tokens.
If both cooperate, they receive 14 Tokens each. If the first mover cooperates and the
second mover defects, the first mover earns 17 Tokens and the second mover earns 7
Tokens (for a game-tree illustration see experimental instructions in Appendix B). In
this game we apply the strategy method. To determine the payments, one participant
in each dyad is randomly selected into the role of the first mover and the other par-
ticipant is selected into the role of the second mover. We apply an exchange rate of 1
Token=e0.20.
Questionnaires
At the very beginning of the session, participants fill out a short pre-survey in which we
collect baseline measures on subjects’ mood and risk preferences.9 After the experimen-
tal session, participants are asked about their fairness perceptions of the pay regime
among other questions about the experiment. Additionally, we capture personality
traits using the BIG-5 query (Costa and McCrae, 1989) and conduct post-experimental
questionnaires.10 Finally, socio-demographic features such as age and study program
are recorded.
3.2.2 Experimental procedures
We collected the experimental data from June to August 2016. In total, 252 students
from the University of Göttingen took part in 13 sessions. In each session, we had
9For this purpose, we ask subjects to classify them based on their risk preferences on a scale between
1 (not prepared to take risks) and 10 (fully prepared to take risks) (Dohmen et al., 2012).
10We collect data on a measure for the acceptance of hierarchies, called “social dominance orientation”
(Pratto et al., 1994).
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16 to 24 participants. The experiment was programmed and conducted in z-Tree (Fis-
chbacher, 2007). Subjects from various fields of studies were recruited with ORSEE
(Greiner, 2015). The sessions lasted approximately 90 minutes and subjects earned e17
(ca. $16) on average.
3.2.3 Hypotheses
In this section, we derive our hypotheses. The real-effort framework is characterized by
bonus payments which lead to income inequality between (high-income) type-A and
(low-income) type-B workers. Hence, type-B workers, who are matched with type-A
workers, may suffer a utility loss because they particularly dislike disadvantageous
inequality (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt, 1999, Card et al., 2012). Experiments studying an-
tisocial behavior report that subjects burn money to equalize incomes (e.g., Fehr, 2016,
Zizzo, 2003, 2004). Thus, inequality-averse type-B workers may try to level the play-
ing field with to type-A workers by burning vouchers. It follows that the amount of
destroyed vouchers depends on type B’s level of aversion toward disadvantageous in-
equality.
Hypothesis 1:
(a) Type-B workers destroy significantly more vouchers than type-A workers.
(b) The destruction level depends on the degree of type Bs’ aversion toward disadvantageous
inequality.
Giacalone and Greenberg (1997) argue that workers engage in antisocial behavior if
they are dissatisfied. Worker resentment may be induced by perceived injustice in the
workplace (Neuman, 2004). We vary an institutional aspect, i.e., discrimination of the
pay regime, that potentially serves as a frustrator. Based on relative deprivation theory
(Davis, 1959), workers might compare their payoff in their group relative to the payoff
of another group and may feel deprived if they do not earn what they feel would have
been procedurally fair. In the Discrimination treatment, type-B workers are deprived of
the right to participate in a competition for bonuses (group A). They might therefore be
particularly frustrated when comparing their payoff with the payoff of type-A work-
ers. Laboratory evidence is provided by Bracha et al. (2015) who show in a real-effort
experiment that remuneration differences affect subjects’ work supply. The study finds
that when subjects are aware of pay differences, the disadvantaged group reduces ef-
fort provision. In contrast to our Discrimination treatment, pay differences are justified
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by performance differences in Competition. Hence, we expect that the difference in de-
struction levels between type Bs and type As is more pronounced in Discrimination than
in Competition.
Generally, being paid unjustifiably may increase frustration and hence antisocial be-
havior. Under discrimination we expect that type-B workers who had a relatively high
performance and expected a promotion may feel entitled to take part in the competition
for bonuses (Gurr, 1970, Crosby, 1976, Clark and Oswald, 1996) and they therefore be-
come more dissatisfied and antisocial than justifiably-paid workers. Moreover, as there
is no competition at all in Random, unjustifiably-paid workers cannot feel deprived of
the right to take part in a competition. Therefore, frustration should be lower and
unjustifiably-paid workers become more antisocial under discrimination than under
a random pay regime. Based on the reasoning above, we deduce the following three
hypotheses.
Hypothesis 2:
(a) The difference in destruction levels between type B and type A is more pronounced in Dis-
crimination compared to Competition and Random.
(b) Unjustifiably-paid workers destroy more than justifiably-paid workers.
(c) Unjustifiably-paid workers under Discrimination destroy more than unjustifiably-paid work-
ers under the random treatment.
Beliefs about the sentiments of co-workers might differ depending on the pay regime.
The discrimination of workers can lead to resentment within an organization (CIMA,
2016). Such an begrudged atmosphere might affect the willingness to cooperate with
co-workers. Based on that, we deduce our third hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3:
Workers are less cooperative under Discrimination compared to workers under Competition or
Random.
3.3 Results
This section first reports the main results of the JoD game. Afterwards, we scrutinize
potential mechanisms. Finally, we examine whether discrimination also spills over to
less cooperative behavior. When applying non-parametric tests we always report two-
sided p− values throughout.
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3.3.1 Main results
Overall, the results show that, on average, type B destroys more vouchers (1.33) than
type A15 (0.87) and type A5 (0.65).11 The same pattern is supported by the data on the
destruction frequency, i.e., type B destroys more often (37%) than type A15 (30%) or
A5 (24%). In what follows, we merge the data on the destruction levels of A5 and A15
types as they do not significantly differ between each other in any of the treatments.12
FIGURE 3.2: Destruction levels and frequencies of type A and type B
Figure 3.2 displays the average level of destroyed vouchers in the treatments and
standard deviations in parentheses from type-A and type-B workers. We find that type-
B workers destroy significantly more vouchers (1.33) than all type-A workers (0.76)
(Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.050) confirming Hypothesis 1a. A closer look reveals that
this difference is especially pronounced in Discrimination, where type-B workers de-
stroy significantly more vouchers (1.80) than type-A workers (0.65) (Mann-Whitney
test, p = 0.009). In contrast, in the Competition treatment no significant differences can
be observed between the destruction levels of type Bs (1.27) and type As (0.58) (Mann-
Whitney test, p = 0.198). Similarly, in Random the destruction level of type Bs (0.89) is
insignificantly lower than the destruction level of type As (1.11) (Mann-Whitney test,
11We provide an overview of destruction levels, destruction frequency, performance, and observation
numbers in Table B.1 in Appendix B.
12Data on destruction levels: all treatments, Mann-Whitney test, p > 0.457; data on destruction fre-
quency: all treatments χ2-tests, p > 0.500.
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p = 0.463).13 This confirms Hypothesis 2a, i.e., the difference between the antisocial be-
havior of type-B and type-A workers is more pronounced in Discrimination compared
to non-discriminatory pay regimes.
Regarding the performance in the real-effort task, we find no difference between Dis-
crimination (30.03) and Competition (30.65). This shows that the treatment manipula-
tion between Discrimination and Competition did not affect workers’ performance. In
Competition, type assignment is dependent on performance by design and therefore
type-B workers perform significantly worse than type-A workers (Mann-Whitney test,
p < 0.001). In the Discrimination treatment, however, due to the random assignment to
groups A and B, type-B workers have a similar performance to type-A workers (Mann-
Whitney test, p = 0.751). Therefore, we claim that part of the workforce is indeed
discriminated against in the Discrimination treatment. Not surprisingly, subjects’ per-
formance is lowest (24.43) in the Random treatment, where subjects’ remuneration is
independent of their performance.
To summarize, the results show that a discriminatory pay regime leads to more pro-
nounced antisocial behavior between type-B and type-A workers than non-discriminatory
pay regimes. This is in line with our expectation that discrimination at the workplace
serves as a frustrator and ultimately evokes resentment and antisocial behavior.
Result 1:
(a) Type-B workers destroy significantly more vouchers than type-A workers under a discrimi-
natory pay regime.
(b) In non-discriminatory pay regimes, such as Competition and Random, there is no differ-
ence in antisocial behavior between type-A and type-B workers.
In the following sections, we will analyze the mechanisms of destructive behavior.
In particular, we will examine the impact of inequality aversion and test Hypothesis
1b. Furthermore, we will test hypotheses 2b and 2c. That is, we analyze the effect of
receiving an unjustified payment. That way, we can further disentangle the effect of
discrimination, per se, from the effects of resulting unjustified payments. We conclude
this section by linking personality traits to antisocial behavior.
13These results are robust when focusing on destroy frequencies. In Discrimination type-B workers
destroy significantly more often (50%) than type-A workers (23%) (χ2(1) = 6.545; p = 0.011). No differ-
ences can be observed between the destruction frequencies of type As (32%) and Bs (23%) in Competition
(χ2(1) = 0.844, p = 0.358) and Random (type A: 29%; type B: 37%) (χ2(1) = 0.002, p = 0.963).
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3.3.2 Mechanisms: Inequality aversion
Inequality aversion between workers’ incomes may be a potential source of why work-
ers destroy vouchers. With respect to total incomes type Bs are always behind type
As. Thus, a reduction of the income inequality is possible, if Bs burn more vouchers
than their counterparts.14 Figure 3.3 depicts type Bs’ destruction levels conditioned on
their aversion to disadvantageous inequality (α) (standard deviations in parentheses).
The diagram conditions subjects on the median alpha of the whole data set (0.93). We
distinguish between type-B subjects with an above/below median alpha.
FIGURE 3.3: Destruction levels of type Bs conditioned on aversion to dis-
advantageous inequality
On average, type-B subjects with an above-median alpha destroy more than work-
ers with a below-median alpha. In the treatments Competition and Random, Spear-
man’s rank correlation coefficients find significant positive correlations between work-
ers’ aversion to disadvantageous inequality and destruction levels (Competition: ρ =
0.281, p = 0.053; Random: ρ = 0.389, p = 0.016). In Competition, highly inequality-averse
subjects destroy significantly more vouchers (1.65) than subjects with a low inequality
aversion (0.59) (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.050). Similarly, in Random workers character-
ized by high alphas clearly remove more vouchers (1.24) than workers with low alphas
(0.47) (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.054). This correlation does not exist in Discrimination,
where destruction levels of high-alpha (1.96) and low-alpha subjects (1.50) do not sig-
nificantly differ (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.543). We therefore only find support for
Hypothesis 1b in the non-discriminatory treatments but not in Discrimination. Thus,
14Note that if Bs are matched to A5s they could equalize incomes by destroying all of their vouchers.
However, equalizing incomes also requires that A5s do not destroy more than one voucher from a type
B. It is never possible for type-B workers to catch up to A15-workers.
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antisocial behavior is obviously not (solely) triggered by inequality aversion when dis-
crimination is at hand.15
Result 2:
(a) Workers’ inequality aversion determines destruction levels in non-discriminatory pay regimes.
(b) Inequality aversion does not predict destruction levels under a discriminatory pay regime.
Since inequality aversion cannot explain the differences in destruction levels in Discrim-
ination, we focus on an alternative explanation for type-B workers’ antisocial behavior:
unjustified payments.
3.3.3 Mechanisms: Unjustified payments
In this section we analyze the situations when workers received payments that are not
justified by performance. These cases may occur in the Discrimination and the Random
treatment. The idea of a potential mechanism is that particularly high-performing B
types (who are aware of this) become frustrated when informed about receiving a zero
payment (Hypothesis 2b). When comparing unjustifiably-paid workers from these two
treatments, it is interesting to test whether workers feel more frustrated and destroy
more under a discriminatory vs. a non-discriminatory pay regime (Hypothesis 2c).
To identify unjustifiably-paid workers, we focus on their productivity and classify them
based on their precision in the real-effort task, i.e., the share of correct answers. Work-
ers receive no feedback on their absolute performance. Therefore, we use the preci-
sion in the task as a proxy for (perceived) ability, assuming that workers who rarely
make mistakes can assess their performance well. As a consequence of the simple task,
high-ability workers with a high precision should be aware of their high performance.
Indeed, we find a significant positive correlation between workers’ precision and their
belief about belonging to the 50% best subjects in their session (Pearson’s correlation
coefficient, ρ = 0.132, p = 0.036).16 Therefore, conditioning subjects on their work pre-
cision serves as a valid proxy of “perceived high performance.” Type-B workers with a
high work precision are classified as unjustifiably-paid, whereas type-B workers with a
low work precision are classified as justifiably-paid. For the precision measure, we use
an indicator variable which takes on a value 1 if type-B workers have a precision which
15Focusing on beta we find that this measure proxies prosociality. That is, subjects with higher beta
destroy significantly less in Discrimination (ρ = −0.316, p = 0.047) and Competition (ρ = −0.250, p =
0.086) but not in Random (ρ = 0.076, p = 0.651).
16We asked all subjects about their belief of their relative performance directly following their partic-
ipation in the real-effort task. At this stage they had not yet been told of the payment sum they would
receive. The belief elicitation was incentivized, i.e., subjects had to guess in a ranking which quartile
their performance belonged to. Subjects received e0.50 if they correctly guessed their quartile.
3.3. Results 53
is above the median of correctly solved puzzles (83.90%).17
Figure 3.4 displays the destruction levels of type-B subjects with unjustified/justified
payments based on our classification (standard deviations in parentheses).
FIGURE 3.4: Destruction levels under “unjustified payments” and “justi-
fied payments”
A noticeable finding is that the destruction level is highest (2.39) for unjustified
workers in Discrimination. These subjects destroy significantly more than type Bs with a
justified payment in Competition (1.27) (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.045). The data reveal
a highly significant difference when comparing the destruction levels of unjustifiably-
paid workers in Discrimination to the destruction levels of all (justifiably-paid) subjects
in Competition (0.93) (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.007). When focusing on unjustifiably-
paid workers in the Random treatment, we find that the destruction levels are signifi-
cantly lower (0.70) than in Discrimination (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.051).
No treatment effect can be observed in the destruction levels of justifiably-paid sub-
jects between Discrimination and Random (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.898). As unjustifiably-
paid subjects destroy less in Random than in Competition, we conclude that unjustified
payments do not frustrate workers per se. Instead, workers become antisocial when
unjustified payments result from discriminatory pay regimes. This confirms Hypothe-
sis 2c.18
Result 3:
(a) Unjustifiably-paid workers behave more antisocially than justifiably-paid workers.
17The calibration is based on subjects’ precision in our control treatments Competition and Random.
18One might think that this difference occurs as workers in Random generally performed worse. How-
ever, we find in Random that type-B workers with a performance of at least 30 destroy less (1.00) than
justifiably-paid workers in Competition.
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(b) Unjustifiably-paid workers destroy more vouchers under a discriminatory pay regime com-
pared to a non-discriminatory pay regime.
3.3.4 Regression analyses
To better understand the functional interplay of discrimination, unjustified payments,
and individual inequality aversion, we now conduct ordered probit regressions on the
destruction levels of type Bs (Table 3.2). The dependent variable of our models corre-
sponds to the number of destroyed vouchers (0-6) by type Bs. The regressions include
treatment dummies (Discrimination, Random), which are positive for the correspond-
ing treatment. The omitted treatment is the Competition treatment where all payments
are justified. All regressions control for subjects’ aversion to disadvantageous inequal-
ity (Alpha) and advantageous inequality (Beta). Model (2) analyzes the effect of the
matched type A on B’s decision to destroy, i.e., Matched A15 is a dummy which is pos-
itive (zero) for a type A15 (A5). The model also adds interactions between Matched
15 and the treatment dummies. In Model (3) we incorporate dummies which analyze
the effect of receiving unjustified payments in Discrimination (Unj. Discrimination) and
Random (Unj. Random). We refer to our classification applied in section 3.3.3, i.e., the
dummies are positive (zero) for an above-median (below-median) precision in the task.
The regression also controls for the interaction effects of unjustified payments when
matched with a certain type A. Model (4) analyzes interactions between the inequality-
aversion parameters, the treatment dummies, and the unjustified dummies. Due to
space limitations we report these interactions in Appendix B. None of these interac-
tions are significant.
Models (1) and (2) show that type-B workers who received an unjustified payment
in Discrimination, destroy significantly higher levels than all type-B workers in Compe-
tition. In contrast, Random is never significant, i.e., no treatment effects can be found
between the destruction behavior of low-income workers in Random and Competition.
Model (2) finds that the treatment effect between Discrimination and Competition is ro-
bust when controlling for the income of matched type As. Generally, type Bs destroy
moderately more vouchers from type-A workers who earned e15. However, the in-
teractions of Matched A15 with Discrimination and Random are both insignificant. Thus,
only type Bs in Competition destroy more from A15s.19 In Model (3) we additionally
control for Unj. Discrimination, which is significant and positive. A conspicuous find-
ing is that the treatment dummy Discrimination becomes insignificant at the same time.
19This is emphasized by a Pearson’s rank correlation coefficient between the destruction level and
Matched A15 which is only significant in Competition but not in Discrimination and Random. Competition:
ρ = 0.267; p = 0.067; Discrimination: ρ = 0.112; p = 0.490; Random: ρ = 0.184; p = 0.268.
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TABLE 3.2: Treatment effects on destruction behavior of type B
destruction level of type-B workers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Discrimination 0.435* 0.771** 0.192 -0.201 -0.229
(0.259) (0.379) (0.463) (0.817) (0.847)
Random -0.082 0.121 -0.281 -0.721 -0.802
(0.280) (0.383) (0.437) (0.827) (0.843)
Unj. Discrimination 0.973** 1.749** 1.786**
(0.493) (0.850) (0.837)
Unj. Random 0.782 0.189 0.175
(0.513) (0.824) (0.844)
Inequality Aversion
Alpha 0.184*** 0.176*** 0.183*** 0.175 0.162
(0.063) (0.063) (0.065) (0.108) (0.106)
Beta -0.798** -0.794** -0.986** -1.366 -1.385
(0.358) (0.363) (0.386) (0.873) (0.863)
Matching with type A
Matched A15 0.649* 0.675* 0.707* 0.705*
(0.386) (0.397) (0.408) (0.404)
Matched A15 × Discrimination -0.588 -0.299 -0.309 -0.271
(0.520) (0.633) (0.646) (0.650)
Matched A15 × Random -0.348 1.039 1.003 0.175
(0.560) (0.658) (0.704) (0.844)
Matched A15 × Unj. Discrimination -0.453 -0.354 -0.399
(0.702) (0.757) (0.752)
Matched A15 × Unj. Random -2.411*** 0.189 -1.990
(0.881) (0.842) (0.880)
Pseudo R2 0.053 0.064 0.103 0.115 0.117
Obs. 126 126 126 126 126
Inequality-Aversion Interactions NO NO NO YES YES
Covariates NO NO NO NO YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Hence, the treatment effect reported in models (1) and (2) is obviously driven by type-
B workers who received an unjustified payment in Discrimination. This confirms our
previous results of section 3.3.3. Turning to the interactions with type As, we find that
the significant effect of unjustifiably-paid type Bs is independent of the matching type,
which we conclude from the insignificant interaction Matched A15 × Unj. Discrimina-
tion. By contrast, Matched A15 × Unj. Random is negative and highly significant. Thus,
unjustifiably-paid type-B workers in Random, who are matched with A15, destroy sig-
nificantly less than all other type-B workers.
Focusing on inequality aversion, we generally find in models (1)–(3) that type Bs,
who are averse to disadvantageous inequality, destroy more as Alpha is positive and
significant. At the same time, workers who are averse toward advantageous inequal-
ity destroy less, i.e., Beta is negative and significant. Importantly, this pattern vanishes
in Model (4) where we interact the inequality-aversion parameters with the treatment
dummies and the dummies of subjects who received unjustified payments. The treat-
ment effect between unjustifiably-paid workers in Discrimination and Competition is ro-
bust, that is, positive and significant. Model (5) highlights that the latter finding also
holds when controlling for covariates such as female, age, and economics students. None
of these covariates is significant. This confirms the results we observed in section 3.3.2.
In Discrimination, workers’ antisocial behavior is not motivated by inequality aversion.
Instead, unjustified payments matter.
3.3.5 Effects on cooperation
Our main results demonstrate that discrimination leads to more pronounced differ-
ences in antisocial behavior compared to Competition or Random. In this section, we
will test Hypothesis 3 and assess whether discrimination affects cooperative behavior
as well. Cooperative behavior is measured by using a sequential prisoner’s dilemma
game which we played after subjects made their decisions in the JoD. These results
might therefore be interpreted as long-term consequences on cooperative behavior and
the work climate in general. Figure 3.5 reports first-mover cooperation levels (standard
deviations in parentheses).
It can be seen that the average cooperation rate is not significantly different in the non-
discriminatory pay regimes, i.e., 64% of subjects cooperate in Competition and 63% of
subjects cooperate in Random (χ2(1) = 0.003, p = 0.959). In contrast, in Discrimination
workers show a lower degree of cooperation (51%). The difference is weakly significant
(χ2(1) = 3.330, p = 0.068). No treatment differences can be found for second-mover
cooperative behavior.20
20In Discrimination 65% of the second-movers cooperate, 66% in Competition, and 68% in Random.
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FIGURE 3.5: Share of cooperating subjects (in %) across treatments
Result 4:
After experiencing a discriminatory pay regime, workers show lower cooperation levels com-
pared to non-discriminatory pay regimes.
3.3.6 Post-experimental questionnaire
After the experimental session, we conducted an ex-post questionnaire where subjects
had to rate their fairness perception of the payment procedure. Moreover, we asked
subjects for their motivations to destroy.
Fairness perception
To elicit fairness perceptions of payment regimes we asked participants: “How fair did
you perceive your payment from stage 2 as being in the experiment (counting task)?
Decide on a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 signifies very unfair and 10 represents very fair.
You can grade your answer with the values in-between.” We find that type-A workers
report a higher degree of perceived fairness (Discrimination: 7.13; Competition: 7.54) as
compared to type-B workers (Discrimination: 3.45; Competition: 4.96) in all treatments
where workers’ performance could basically matter. The Mann-Whitney test of the
reported levels between type As and Bs is highly significant (p < 0.001). No treatment
differences can be found between the reported levels of type As (p = 0.393). Turning to
type-B workers, however, we find that subjects in the Discrimination treatment report
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a significantly lower perceived fairness than in Competition (Mann-Whitney test, p =
0.002). Hence, the reported perceptions indicate that type-B workers in Discrimination
might experience more frustration, which is in line with our previous findings that low-
income workers become more antisocial under a discriminatory pay regime compared
to a competitive pay regime.
Stated reasons to destroy
All participants were asked about their reasons for destroying or not destroying. We
adjusted the selection of answers for the two different actions. The reason the payment
was perceived as unfair was majorly stated by 36% of type-B workers under Discrimina-
tion. In the competitive environment, the majority of participant Bs (38%) justified their
decision by referring to the existence of the random destroy parameter as an excuse.
Hence, those subjects argued that even if they had not destroyed vouchers, it could
anyway have happened that the computer destroyed vouchers from the matched part-
ner. This behavior may be interpreted as pure “joy of destruction” where frustration
plays a less important role.
In all treatments, 30% of As and Bs explained not having destroyed vouchers be-
cause they were satisfied with their performance.
To learn more on the external validity of our findings, we now investigate whether de-
stroying vouchers in the JoD game may be a proxy for antisocial behavior in the field.
3.3.7 Personality traits and destructive behavior
Heterogeneity in personality traits can be an explanation for antisocial behavior. We
proxy different dimensions of personality with a reduced version of the widely used
measure called Big-5 or NEO Five Factor Inventory (Costa and McCrae, 1989). Meta-
analyses from empirical studies have demonstrated that the traits conscientiousness,
agreeableness, and neuroticism can be linked to antisocial behavior at the workplace
(Jones et al., 2011, Miller and Lynam, 2001). Based on these studies, we briefly describe
the traits and the predicted effect of antisocial behavior in the following paragraph.
Persons that score high in conscientiousness have increased control over themselves
and act planned rather than spontaneously (Caspi et al., 2005). Our hypothesis is there-
fore that the more conscientious people are the less they will destroy. We predict a
similar effect for the trait agreeableness, as it reflects kindness, empathy, and trusting
behavior. We expect a negative relationship for the trait neuroticism since a high score
suggests emotional instability and a tendency to experience anger and anxiety.
Table 3.3 presents ordered probit regressions on the impact of Big-5 personality traits
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TABLE 3.3: The effect of personality traits on antisocial behavior
destruction level of type-B workers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
BIG-5 neuroticism 0.026** 0.030**
(0.013) (0.013)
BIG-5 agreeableness -0.046** -0.055***
(0.018) (0.019)
BIG-5 conscientiousness -0.014 -0.012
(0.017) (0.017)
Random -0.224 -0.236 -0.291 -0.327
(0.280) (0.278) (0.279) (0.283)
Discrimination 0.424* 0.480* 0.436 0.493*
(0.253) (0.265) (0.278) (0.288)
Pseudo R2 0.017 0.048 0.036 0.048
Observations 126 126 126 126
Covariates NO YES NO YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
on destructive behavior for type-B workers. The dependent variable is the amount
of vouchers destroyed of the matched partner. Spearman’s rank correlation coeffi-
cient tests reveal that the trait neuroticism is correlated with agreeableness (ρ = −0.271,
p < 0.001). Therefore, we run separate regressions for these traits. We include treat-
ment dummies in all regressions and control for age, gender, and economics student in
model specifications (2) and (4).
Regressions (1) and (2) confirm that higher emotional stability (lower score in neu-
roticism) leads to more destructive behavior. Higher ranks in the traits agreeableness
lead to significantly less destruction in the JoD game. Also, higher ranks in consci-
entiousness lead to less antisocial behavior in our set-up, but not significantly so. All
personality effects are in line with findings from empirical studies. This suggests that
the destruction behavior in our experimental set-up may indeed be linked to similar
channels like antisocial behavior in companies (Jones et al., 2011, Miller and Lynam,
2001).
Result 4:
The Big-5 personality traits of neuroticism and agreeableness predict destructive behavior in the
JoD game.
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3.4 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze the impact of discrimination at the workplace on employee
frustration and ultimately on employees’ engagement in antisocial behavior. Gener-
ally, we find that a substantial fraction of workers engage in antisocial behavior, which
is in line with other experiments in this area (e.g., Abbink and Sadrieh, 2009, Abbink
and Herrmann, 2011, Charness et al., 2013, Fehr, 2016). Our novel result is that bonus
schemes may lead to more pronounced antisocial behavior when they have discrim-
inatory effects on workers. Particularly, discriminated workers who receive unjusti-
fied payments relieve their resentment in destructive behavior that hurts better-off co-
workers. Only the payment procedure itself triggers more antisocial behavior. Hence,
the findings highlight the importance of the appropriate design of institutional factors
such as pay regimes to maintain worker satisfaction.
A closer look at our data reveals that in non-discriminatory pay regimes, antiso-
cial behavior can be partly predicted by individual social preferences in the form of
inequality aversion (Zizzo, 2003). More precisely, low-income workers who are highly
inequality averse destroy more vouchers from high-income workers in a setting where
discrimination is absent. In a regime with discrimination, however, inequality aver-
sion is not the driving factor. Here, unjustifiably-paid workers, that is, workers who
received a lower payment than deserved by performance, become particularly fed up
with the pay regime and act more antisocially.
We are aware that we are reporting the findings of a stylized laboratory experi-
ment. However, since the pay procedure is exogenously varied by the experimenter
and antisocial behavior is harmful for the co-worker, we can exclude that the motive
of retaliating intentional discriminatory actions by a superior explains the behavior. In
our Discrimination treatment, it is a random process which selects employees who par-
ticipate in the promotion mechanism. Although one may argue that this procedure is
somewhat artificial, we believe that in reality it nevertheless resembles many promo-
tion mechanisms. An important reason is that promotion decisions are often the out-
come of institutions in the form of promotion boards where many persons are involved
in the decision-making. Thus, it is likely that employees are not able to trace back the
source of decisions that come into effect. Hence, employees may be frustrated at the
outcome of this institutional promotion mechanism, but it is hardly possible to retaliate
against a (responsible) superior. Moreover, to strengthen the external validity of antiso-
cial behavior, we successfully linked personality traits, i.e., the Big-5 personality traits,
in our analysis with subjects’ destructive actions. Taken together with the insights from
empirical studies on the impact of personality traits on antisocial behavior (Hershcovis
et al., 2007, Jones et al., 2011, Miller and Lynam, 2001), we demonstrate that destructive
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behavior in our experiment may be similar to antisocial behavior in real life.
Our findings contribute to managerial economics and the design of fair procedures in
pay regimes to mitigate worker frustration. A large strand of the literature empha-
sizes that workers’ intrinsic motivation is sensitive to the inappropriate use of finan-
cial incentives (e.g., Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000, Benabou and Tirole, 2003, Bowles
and Polania-Reyes, 2012, Gneezy and Rey-Biel, 2014). We draw on this and show that
employees do not only respond negatively to the “wrong” use of financial incentives
per se. Instead, we emphasize the importance of the appropriate design of pay insti-
tutions and highlight that discriminatory pay regimes may cause antisocial behavior.
Due to the fact that antisocial behavior often raises high costs, these insights may help
to achieve higher workplace efficiency. For instance, our study may add interesting
new insights for the design and conduct of job promotion mechanisms. Our results
particularly emphasize the importance of transparency and equality of opportunities
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Chapter 4. Gender differences in honesty:
The role of social value orientation
4.1 Introduction
Honesty plays a key role in many spheres of life, such as purchasing tickets on buses,
returning excessive change in restaurants or accurately making a tax declaration. The
enforcement of honesty is imperfect and sometimes the norm is violated. In the no-
tation of Erat and Gneezy (2012), it can be differentiated between three different situ-
ations: Altruistic white lies, where dishonesty increases the payoff of somebody else
but not one’s own payoff; Pareto white lies where dishonesty pays off for all parties;
and selfish black lies where dishonesty benefits the liar, but comes at a cost for an-
other party. In this paper, we focus on selfish black lies. In such situations, rational
people are dishonest to the full extent to maximize their monetary payoff irrespective
of the negative externality. However, honesty is a social norm and people face psy-
chological costs when violating this norm since it might induce guilt (Battigalli and
Dufwenberg, 2007) or a disadvantageous change in self-perception (Bénabou and Ti-
role, 2011). Studies in the domain of the norm honesty confirm that psychological costs
affect behavior. Psychological costs can be varied in experiments and behavior differs
according to priming (Cappelen et al., 2013, Cohn et al., 2015), moral balancing (Ploner
and Regner, 2013, Clot et al., 2014) and contextual cues that allow for self-delusion/self-
justification (Mazar et al., 2008, Shalvi et al., 2011, Jiang, 2013, Kajackaite and Gneezy,
2017). However, in the majority of these studies individual-level motives are neglected
as an important determinant of honest behavior. In other words, if the context is varied
and honest behavior is compared between different contexts, it is not clear which char-
acteristics or preferences make people respond differently.
In this study, we fill this gap and examine how the individual-level motive of social
preferences affects honest behavior. Social preferences can reflect preferences for pay-
off distributions. In turn, engaging in dishonest behavior affects payoffs. As a con-
sequence, social preferences could explain why some people behave dishonestly and
some people act honestly in the same situation. People with more pronounced social
preferences, i.e., people who are relatively more prosocial, might face higher psycho-
logical costs when their immoral act has negative payoff consequences for another per-
son’s payoff. Thus, more pronounced social preferences might translate into behaving
more honestly to avoid a negative effect on somebody else’s payoff.
To test the link between social preferences and dishonest behavior, we run a laboratory
experiment. First, we elicit subjects’ social value orientation (SVO) with the measure
of Murphy et al. (2011). This measure reflects people’s magnitude of concern for other
people’s payoffs. Here, subjects make decisions on payoff distributions for themselves
and another person. Based on these decisions, an individual SVO angle can be calcu-
lated for each subject. A lower angle reflects a higher value put on one’s own monetary
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payoff, whereas a relatively high angle reflects concern for another person’s payoff.
Subsequent to the elictiation of SVO we use a die rolling game to elicit dishonest be-
havior (Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi, 2013). Subjects are asked to roll a die 10 times
and report the number after each cast. Reporting higher numbers is rewarded with
higher monetary gains. Dishonest behavior in this game can be called a selfish black
lie (Erat and Gneezy, 2012). The reason is that dishonesty guarantees gains for the liar
and bears costs for the experimenter. Using the mean of the 10 die rolls allows us to in-
vestigate individual-level dishonest behavior. When we refer to dishonest behavior in
our study, we mean that although people are supposed to tell the truth they misreport
the die roll. Regarding behavioral predictions, we expect that with an increasing SVO
angle, less misreporting will occur.
Our experimental design allows us to draw new insights for existing gender differences
in honest behavior and their origins. Overall, women have been found to be more hon-
est than men when it comes to selfish black lies (see for meta-analyses Abeler et al.,
2016, Capraro, 2017). Thus, in our set-up we expect that, on average, men will report
higher die rolls than women. An additional contribution of this paper is to explain this
commonly found gender effect in honesty by gender differences in social preferences.
According to Rosenbaum et al. (2014), “[..] it seems that the experimental agenda re-
garding honesty could greatly benefit from having a more precise understanding of un-
derlying individual-level motives and how they aggregate to prosocial norms, which
would provide a better understanding of how dishonest behavior may be impeded”
(p.194). We aim to fill this gap and our results show that individual social preferences
matter for explaining differences in honest behavior. With an increasing SVO angle,
subjects are more honest. In other words, prosocial subjects behave more honestly than
individualistic subjects. Besides this novel result we confirm previous findings of gen-
der differences, i.e., women are more honest than men. Focusing on gender and SVO
reveals that women’s SVO is indeed more pronounced than men’s. In a mediation anal-
ysis we find that the gender effect can be explained by a difference in the SVO between
men and women. As some studies found significant effects from individual risk tol-
erance, age and having an economics background on honest behavior (Childs, 2012,
Friesen and Gangadharan, 2012, Conrads et al., 2013, Kajackaite and Gneezy, 2017), we
control for these variables and find that our results are robust.
In the next section we will give an overview of the literature. In section 4.3, we will de-
rive our hypotheses. The experimental design will be explained in section 4.4. Results
are presented in section 4.5. Section 4.6 concludes with a discussion.
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4.2 Literature review
In recent years, there has been a fast-growing experimental research interest in eco-
nomics and psychology that study factors affecting dis/honest behavior. In the fol-
lowing, we will give an overview of related topics to emphasize the novelty of our
paper. For a more exhaustive literature review see Rosenbaum et al. (2014) and for
meta-analyses Abeler et al. (2016) and Capraro (2017).
Overall, the strength of norms vary on a societal level. Honest behavior differs across
countries, which has been attributed to economic growth rates and culture (Hugh-
Jones, 2016) as well as political systems (Ariely et al., 2015). There is only scarce lit-
erature on individual-level characteristics and factors influencing honesty. Experimen-
tal evidence indicates that individual risk aversion might impede dishonest behavior
(Friesen and Gangadharan, 2012, Kajackaite and Gneezy, 2017) since risk-averse indi-
viduals might be afraid of getting caught cheating and are therefore more reluctant to
behave dishonestly. People with an economics background have been found to be more
prone to acting dishonestly (Friesen and Gangadharan, 2012, López-Pérez and Spiegel-
man, 2012). Moreover, individual hormonal balance of testosterone and cortisol foster
dishonest actions (Lee et al., 2015). Shalvi and De Dreu (2014) demonstrate that higher
levels of the hormone oxytocin causes increased dishonesty to benefit members of an
in-group.
In contrast to the scarce literature on individual-level motives, there is vast research on
contextual variables and their effects on honest behavior. People have non-consequential
preferences meaning that the same monetary benefits are treated differently depend-
ing on the situation (Capraro, 2017). For example, there is evidence that people are
more honest in personal relationships (DePaulo et al., 1996, DePaulo and Kashy, 1998,
Chakravarty et al., 2011) and that people are also more willing to be dishonest to ben-
efit other people they feel close to (Cadsby et al., 2016). Perceived social closeness can
be decreased, in a competitive set-up where behaving dishonestly yields an advantage
over somebody else. Here, the amount of money at stake fosters dishonesty (Conrads
et al., 2014, Faravelli et al., 2015).
Apart from the absolute amount of money, the payoff consequences for oneself rela-
tive to another party are an important determinant of the situation. As depicted in the
introduction, it can be differentiated between selfish black lies, Pareto white lies, and
altruistic white lies. Overall, Erat and Gneezy (2012) have shown that people are most
willing to engage in Pareto white lies and least willing in altruistic white lies. Focus-
ing on gender effects the evidence is mixed. Erat and Gneezy (2012) find that women
are more dishonest than men in telling an altruistic white lie. However, Biziou-van
Pol et al. (2015) find the exact opposite. A recent meta-analysis from Capraro (2017)
4.2. Literature review 67
reveals that, overall, men are more willing to be dishonest than women in an altruistic-
white-lie situation. For Pareto white lies the experimental evidence suggests only weak
correlation, implying that women are more honest than men (Capraro, 2017). In con-
trast, several studies find that women are more honest than men in selfish-black-lie sit-
uations (Dreber and Johannesson, 2008, Friesen and Gangadharan, 2012, Houser et al.,
2012, Fosgaard et al., 2013, Cohn and Maréchal, 2015, Kajackaite and Gneezy, 2017) and
few studies that strive to replicate these gender effects have not been successful (Childs,
2012, Gylfason et al., 2013).1 Abeler et al. (2016) do not differentiate between different
types of lies but find that, in general, women are more honest than men. Capraro (2017)
confirms that women are more honest than men in a meta-analysis of selfish black lies.2
It is not clear yet why women behave differently compared to men. Kajackaite and
Gneezy (2017) find the common gender effect in the standard die rolling game from
Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013). They also implemented a modified version called
the “mind game” (Jiang, 2013) in which the gender effect vanishes. In this game, the
psychological costs of lying can be seen as reduced since there is room for self-delusion
and participants can be very certain of not getting caught lying. The result suggests that
women might exhibit higher costs of being dishonest due to fears of being caught. Erat
and Gneezy (2012) further point out that “it appears as if women have a higher cost of
lying, but at the same time are more sensitive to another person’s payoffs” (p.724).
There is only scarce literature on how social preferences affect dishonest behavior. Cap-
pelen et al. (2013) find that people who pass on a higher share in a dictator game are
more likely to communicate an honest message to a counterpart in a Pareto-white-lie
situation. In a study from Biziou-van Pol et al. (2015) the order of games is reversed
and they measure the effects from dishonesty on cooperation in a prisoner’s dilemma
game and altruism in a dictator game. Their results are in line with Cappelen et al.
(2013), i.e., Biziou-van Pol et al. (2015) find that altruism and cooperation are posi-
tively correlated with honest behavior when focusing on Pareto white lies. However,
in an altruistic-white-lie situation they find the opposite, that is, altruism and coopera-
tion are negatively correlated with honest behavior. A meta-analysis from Balliet et al.
(2009) points out that prosocial subjects are more sensitive to social norms and evalu-
ate social-dilemma situations in terms of morality. By contrast, individualistic subjects
assess such dilemmas in terms of strength and power (Van Lange and Kuhlman, 1994,
1There are many more studies with similar experimental designs that do not report any gender effects.
In this study, we will give one explanation as to why the gender effect has sometimes been found but not
in all cases.
2Groups seem to make similar decisions in terms of violating the norm of honesty than individuals
(Muehlheusser et al., 2015). Even the gender effect has been replicated in groups, i.e., female groups lie
less than male or mixed gender groups which has been shown in the lab (Muehlheusser et al., 2015) and
in the field (Azar et al., 2013).
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De Cremer and Van Lange, 2001). If we assume that men and women differ in their
SVO, this might explain honest behavior. To our knowledge, we are the first to investi-
gate the link of SVO on honesty as well as bridging gaps in the understanding of gender
differences in honest behavior.
4.3 Hypotheses
A situation where people have the opportunity to earn extra payoffs by being dishon-
est at the expense of the experimenter (selfish black lie) generates an ethical dilemma.
The decision to behave dishonestly is a rational calculation in which the individual
weighs the personal payoff against the expected costs and is dishonest if the net pay-
off is positive (Okeke and Godlonton, 2014). Since a dishonest act has implications for
both one’s own payoff and somebody else’s payoff, we expect that the SVO angle as
a general measure for distributional money preferences may predict dishonest behav-
ior. People who are more concerned about their own payoff might derive higher utility
from a higher own payoff (Erat and Gneezy, 2012). Therefore, people with relatively
low SVO angles benefit to a greater extent from being dishonest since their utility in-
crease from a larger payoff is relatively high. In contrast, people with relatively high
SVO angles place high valuation in other peoples’ payoff. They might face larger costs
when considering whether to be dishonest since it negatively affects somebody else’s
payoff. Based on this argumentation, we deduce our first hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1:
Dishonest reporting decreases with an increasing SVO angle.
According to gender theories in psychology, women tend to be more collectively-
oriented (Karau and Williams, 1993), more altruistic (Piliavin and Unger, 1985), and
are expected to possess higher levels of communal qualities (Bakan, 1966) than men.
Women often conform to these normative gender expectations as they might otherwise
be sanctioned and disliked (Heilman and Okimoto, 2007, Rudman and Phelan, 2008).
Many economic experiments confirm these findings and demonstrate that women com-
monly cooperate more often in social dilemmas (Cadsby and Maynes, 1998, Ortmann
and Tichy, 1999, Van den Assem et al., 2012), and may offer more in dictator games
(Eckel and Grossman, 1998, Andreoni and Vesterlund, 2001, Croson and Gneezy, 2009,
Rand et al., 2016). Some papers find mixed evidence. Croson and Gneezy (2009) argue
that experiments often differ in their design which may cause these results, as men’s
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decisions are less context-specific than women’s (Gilligan, 1982).3 Building on the psy-
chological and experimental economic evidence that women tend to cooperate more
and behave more altruistically, we expect that, on average, they hold higher SVO an-
gles than men. Apart from that, we expect women to behave more honestly. As pointed
out earlier, women are found to be more honest in selfish-black-lie situations (Abeler
et al., 2016, Capraro, 2017). We formulate Hypothesis 2.
Hypothesis 2:
(a) On average, women have a higher SVO angle than men.
(b) On average, women are more honest than men.
Building on hypotheses 1 and 2, we expect that individual SVO angles can (at least
partly) explain why women are more honest than men. When women hold on average
higher SVO angles than men, and higher SVO angles translate into more honest behav-
ior, the SVO angle might explain the predominantly observed gender effect. Therefore,
we formulate Hypothesis 3.
Hypothesis 3:
The individual SVO angle mediates the effect of gender on dishonest behavior.
There is evidence that women are less risk tolerant than men (Charness and Gneezy,
2012). People with a lower risk tolerance might be more afraid of getting caught be-
ing dishonest (Friesen and Gangadharan, 2012, Kajackaite and Gneezy, 2017). To con-
trol for this potential effect we will include risk tolerance in our analysis. In addition,
age has been found to increase dishonest behavior for men (Friesen and Gangadharan,
2012) and a professional economics background might increase dishonest behavior for
women (Friesen and Gangadharan, 2012). It is possible that economists might more
readily maximize their individual payoff. We will therefore include age and enroll-
ment in an econ program as additional covariates to check if our results are robust.
3Rand et al. (2016) add to this and demonstrate that women have internalized their gender role and
are more altruistic when acting intuitively. In a situation where women decide deliberately, salience of
the female gender role increases altruism. This may cause inconsistent findings as experimental settings
differ in design and cultural context.
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4.4 Experimental design
The experimental design for this study comprises two stages. In the first stage, we elicit
subjects’ individual Social Value Orientation (SVO). In the second stage, we apply a
modified version of the die rolling game introduced by Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi
(2013) to elicit dishonest behavior at an individual level. In the die rolling game, be-
havior affects payoff distributions between oneself and the experimenter. This simple
game rules out strategic concerns that might lead to heterogeneous effects.4 The elic-
itation of SVO at the very beginning of the experiment allows us to make inferences
from general distributional preferences on the domain of honesty where distributional
preferences could also play a role. As this experiment took less than 10 minutes we
embedded it in another experiment (Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi, 2013).5
To elicit SVO we use the measure by Murphy et al. (2011). Here, participants are
matched in dyads. There are two roles – an active decision-maker and a passive player
who has to accept the decision of the other person. Participants are confronted with
six different decision sets each consisting of nine different money distributions. In each
situation subjects have to choose the preferred money allocation for themselves and
their matched partner. For payoff decisions, we present the original amounts used in
Murphy et al. (2011). The exchange rate is 1 point = e0.03. At the end, one player
was randomly assigned the role of the active decision-maker and one out of the six
decision sets is randomly selected for payment. The other player is passive and has
to accept the allocation. An SVO angle can be calculated for each person by evaluat-
ing the participant’s decisions in the active role. The angle allows a classification into
four groups of altruistic, prosocial, individualistic, and competitive types. The types
differ in the magnitude of concern they have for other people’s payoff. For example,
individualistic types mainly maximize their own payoffs whereas prosocial types max-
imize the sum of earnings for themselves and the matched participant. Murphy et al.
(2011) advises preferably using the continuous measure of the SVO angle. We follow
this recommendation in our analysis but for illustrative reasons we refer to the categor-
ical classification as well.
4Strategic concerns can play a role in the so-called “sender-receiver games” often used to trace dis-
honesty (e.g., Gneezy, 2005, Cappelen et al., 2013). Here, person A has an information advantage and
can decide to forward some honest advice or dishonest advice to person B. Person B does not need to
follow the advice. The action of person B, however, has payoff consequences for both. Person A might
therefore form beliefs about person B’s response to the advice. These individual strategic considerations
could have confounding effects which is why we opted for a game that excludes this determinant.
5The experiment encompasses three treatments and focuses on the role of distributive justice on anti-
social behavior (Grosch and Rau, 2017b). The data of the die rolling game do not significantly differ
between the treatments (for all pairwise comparisons we find for two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests
that p > 0.6).
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In the die rolling game, subjects are asked to roll a die 10 times and report the number
afterwards. Reporting higher numbers is rewarded and participants receive the die roll
times e0.2, e.g., rolling a three yields e0.6. The only exception is the number six where
subjects earn zero. Note that, Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) demonstrate that
dishonest behavior is not affected by the level of stakes.6 Only one of the 10 die rolls
is randomly drawn for payment. To eschew that participants become too wary about
the die rolling game they are told that they can receive an extra payoff for completing
a questionnaire before reading the instructions of the die rolling game.
The experiment was conducted at the University of Goettingen and programmed us-
ing z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).7 Subjects from various fields were recruited with ORSEE
(Greiner, 2004). We ran 14 sessions with 268 subjects (129 male and 139 female subjects).
Subjects’ average payment in the main experiment wase12.65 (they earnede1.54 in the
SVO-elicitation task and e0.63 in the die rolling game). Participants were told that they
would earn at least e5 but that there would not be an additional show-up fee.
4.5 Results
In this section we present our results on the relation of subjects’ SVO and honesty. In
a next step, we will focus on gender differences in honesty and SVO. We close the
results section with a mediation analysis. We always report two-sided p− values when
applying non-parametric tests.
4.5.1 The influence of SVO on dishonest behavior
In the analysis, we first focus on the general influence of subjects’ SVO on dishonest
behavior. Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of reported profit levels (left panel). Profit
levels range from 0 to 5. The lowest level (e0) is paid when subjects report a 6 whereas
profit levels 1–5 increase for a die roll of 1 (e0.2) to 5 (e1). The correlation between
the mean reported profit levels and SVO angles is illustrated in the right panel. The
reported mean is calculated at an individual level based on the 10 observations of die
rolls we obtained per participant.
If we assume fair dice and honest behavior, the reported profit levels should follow
a uniform distribution. The predicted average profit level reported, i.e., the average of
6Moreover, there is evidence that low-stake sizes do not impact the replication of standard results in
ultimatum, dictator, trust, public-good games (Amir et al., 2012, Kocher et al., 2008), and social prefer-
ences (Müller and Rau, 2016).
7The z-Tree code, the resulting data, and the analysis scripts can be permanently downloaded at
https://www.uni-goettingen.de/de/485779.html
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FIGURE 4.1: Reported profit levels (left panel) and the influence of SVO
(right panel).
the 10 reported outcomes, should be 2.5. On average, however, subjects report a profit
level of 3.19.8 The mean of 3.19 is clearly higher than the predicted mean of 2.5. More-
over, the left panel of Figure 4.1 shows that the observed distribution is not uniform
(one sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, p < 0.001). Hence, we find evidence of dishon-
est behavior.
We now focus on the influence of SVO on dishonest behavior. The scatter plot (right
panel) illustrates a highly significant negative correlation between SVO angle and re-
ported profit levels (Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient, ρ = −0.198, p = 0.001).9
This result emphasizes that subjects’ SVO affects their dishonest behavior in the die
rolling game. That is, individualistic subjects characterized by a low angular degree
of SVO report higher profit levels, whereas prosocial subjects report relatively lower
profit levels. We therefore find support for Hypothesis 1.
Result 1
SVO significantly affects dishonest behavior: with an increasing SVO angle subjects report
lower profit levels.
In the next section, we focus on gender differences in SVO and dishonesty to test Hy-
pothesis 2.
8The result is similar to previous findings of Conrads et al. (2013) who played a die rolling game with
higher stakes. In their paper they find that subjects report an average profit level of 3.31 in the individual
treatment. Thus, our setting replicates common data on die rolling games although the stake size is
lower.
9The result is also supported by a significant Pearson’s correlation coefficient (ρ = −0.229, p < 0.001).
4.5. Results 73
4.5.2 Gender differences in dishonest behavior and SVO
In this section we focus on gender differences in dishonest behavior and SVO. Figure
2 depicts the frequency of reported profit levels (left panel) and compares the CDFs of
the SVO angles (right panel). Both illustrations are conditioned on gender.
FIGURE 4.2: Reported profit levels conditioned on gender (left panel) and
CDFs on SVO angles of women and men (right panel).
The bar chart demonstrates that the distribution of reported payoffs is right-shifted
for both gender. More precisely, one sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests reject the hy-
pothesis that the distributions are uniform (both gender: p < 0.001). Thus, both gender
apparently behave dishonestly. However, men report a significantly higher average
profit level (3.29) than women (3.10) (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.035). Men’s distribu-
tion is clearly more right-shifted and significantly differs from women’s distribution.
This is confirmed by a two sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test on average reported profit
levels (p = 0.047). Hence, we support the gender differences predominantly found in
the literature (Abeler et al., 2016, Capraro, 2017).
At the same time, the cumulative distribution function (right panel) shows that the
distribution of SVO angles significantly differs between women and men (two sample
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, p = 0.025). More precisely, we find that women have a
higher mean SVO angle (28.10) than men (24.63) (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.065). Put
together, the gender effects in mean reported profit levels and the significant difference
between women’s and men’s distributions in SVO support Hypothesis 2.
Result 2
(a) Male subjects behave more dishonestly than female subjects.
(b) The distributions of women’s and men’s SVO angles are significantly different.
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So far, the data have shown that a significant negative correlation exists between SVO
angles and reported profit levels. At the same time, we find gender differences in dis-
honest behavior and subjects’ SVO angles. It will be interesting to analyze whether
gender differences in dishonest behavior are mediated by gender differences in SVO.
Before we conduct a mediation analysis in the next section, we summarize our findings
in Table 4.1.
women (n = 139) men (n = 128) aggregate data (n = 267)
mean reported profit level 3.10 (0.71) 3.29 (0.89) 3.19 (0.77)
SVO angle 28.10 (11.79) 24.63 (14.35) 26.44 (13.17)
risk tolerance 5.14 (1.92) 5.60 (2.16) 5.36 (2.04)
age 24.40 (4.89) 25.11(4.16) 24.74 (4.56)
econ student (in %) 0.41 (0.49) 0.47 (0.50) 0.44 (0.50)
TABLE 4.1: Summary statistics. Standard deviations in parentheses.
The table also reports subjects’ sociodemographics. In this respect, risk tolerance cor-
responds to the mean of subjects’ self-reported risk tolerance.10 Age represents subjects’
average age in years, and econ student reports the share of subjects studying economics
or business economics. Overall, the average data suggests that women are less risk
tolerant than men (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.057) which confirms common gender dif-
ferences in risk-taking (Charness and Gneezy, 2012). Female and male participants are
almost the same age. It can be seen that 44% of the sample are econ students.
4.5.3 Mediation analysis on the influence of SVO
In this section, we test whether the gender effect is mediated by different levels of SVO
between men and women. For this purpose, we make use of a mediation analysis by
using Structural Equation Modeling (SEM).11 We used the command “sem” with the
STATA 13 software package. First, we only include the gender dummy and the SVO
angle. Second, we run an SEM where we take into account factors which have been
found to influence dishonesty. In addition to the gender dummy we include subjects’
risk tolerance and subjects’ age. We also include a dummy called econ student which is
positive for students studying economics or business economics. Figure 4.3 presents
the results of the SEM in a path model. Panel A is computed with an OLS regression.
The panel illustrates the effect of female subjects compared to male subjects on mean
reported profit levels. Panel B is computed with the SEM and focuses on the direct and
10We elicited risk in a questionnaire before the main experiment by asking: “Are you generally a
person who is fully prepared to take risks or do you try to avoid taking risks?” Participants could
answer on a scale from 1 (risk-averse) to 10 (risk-seeking) (Dohmen et al., 2012).
11We thank the editor, Susann Fiedler, for raising this point.
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indirect effects of female subjects’ on mean reported profit levels. See Table C.1 in the
appendix for a detailed illustration of regression results.
FIGURE 4.3: Schematic diagram of mediation analysis results.
Reported path values are unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.
Data in grey color represent results when including covariates (age, risk tolerance, and econ student) in
the model. Significance levels are: **: p < 0.05; ***: p < 0.01; n.s.: non-significant.
It turns out that the coefficient of female subject is negative and significant when ig-
noring a potential mediator (Panel A). That is, women, on average, report profits which
are 0.19 profit levels lower than the reported profit levels of men. If we include the pos-
sible mediator (SVO angle) and the control variables in the path model, we find that this
effect becomes smaller and non-significant (Panel B).12 None of the control variables are
significant. We find that the proportion of variance in reported profit level is 0.548 and
the standard error is 0.047. It can be seen that female subjects have a significant positive
effect on the level of SVO angle. More precisely, on average, women have a 3.5 degree
higher SVO angle than men. At the same time, it turns out that the SVO angle negatively
affects the mean reported profit level. The influence is highly significant and it can be
seen that each (positive) angular degree of the SVO scale reduces the reported profit
level by 0.013. That is, only the subjects’ SVO has a significant influence on dishonest
behavior in the form of mean reported profit levels. A conspicuous finding is that the
indirect path from female subject through SVO angle to reported profit level is significant.
In this case, we find that the coefficient of female subject is negative (-0.045) and sig-
nificant at the 10-percent level (p = 0.062). Hence, we find that the gender effect on
dishonest behavior is mediated by the subjects’ SVO angle.
12We observe similar results if we exclude the control variables.
76
Chapter 4. Gender differences in honesty:
The role of social value orientation
Result 3
(a) Subjects’ SVO is a significant predictor of mean reported profit levels.
(b) Subjects’ SVO mediates the gender difference in dishonest behavior.
4.6 Discussion and conclusion
In our simple experiment we analyzed how individual SVO relates to honest behavior
in a situation where dishonesty pays off but comes at a cost for somebody else (selfish
black lie). First, we demonstrated that people with relatively high SVO angles, which
reflect higher concern about somebody else’s payoff, are more honest than people with
a relatively low SVO angle. Second, we confirmed a predominant gender finding in
honest behavior which is that women are more honest than men (Abeler et al., 2016,
Capraro, 2017). At the same time, on average, women have higher SVO angles than
men, i.e., they care more about another person’s payoff than men do. In a mediation
analysis, we showed that individual SVO angles explain the gender effect.
Our results make two contributions to the existing literature. We can isolate the effect
of individual social preferences on honest behavior for selfish black lies. Moreover, we
can link the commonly found gender difference in honesty (Abeler et al., 2016, Capraro,
2017) to gender differences in social preferences. In the following, we will embed these
findings into the existing literature and highlight the novelty of our results. We will
also discuss limitations and suggest extensions of our study for future research.
Only few studies investigate individual-level motives such as social preferences for be-
ing honest. Our study especially relates to the papers from Cappelen et al. (2013) and
Biziou-van Pol et al. (2015). People have been shown to behave more honestly with in-
creasing altruism in a sender-receiver game where strategic considerations might play
a role (Cappelen et al., 2013). Biziou-van Pol et al. (2015) find that engaging in altruistic
white lies leads to higher cooperation and higher altruism levels than being honest in
the same situation. This could imply that people with high pronounced social pref-
erences have lower psychological costs for being dishonest. However, Biziou-van Pol
et al. (2015) find reversed effects from being dishonest in a Pareto-white-lie situation.
The interpretation of these opposing results is not straightforward. It could be that
people with rather selfish attitudes behave dishonestly in Pareto-white-lie-situations
where they can increase their own monetary payoff but not in an altruistic-white-lie
situation where dishonesty benefits only another person. In contrast to the existing lit-
erature, we use the SVO angle rather than dictator or prisoner’s dilemma games as an
instrument to elicit distributional preferences. Furthermore, we reverse the order and
measure general preferences first and then honest behavior. Moreover, we focus on
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selfish-black-lie situations and not on Pareto or altruistic white lies.
This paper also contributes to the explanation of gender differences in honesty by con-
sidering differences in the social preferences of men and women. Looking at the re-
gression analysis it seems at first glance that the gender difference is fully mediated by
individual SVO angles. We acknowledge that statistical power issues might account
for completely non-significant gender effects when controlling for SVO. Furthermore,
the translation of social preferences into honest behavior might be context-dependent.
Across different contexts women and men might be affected differently (Gilligan, 1982)
and might face different levels of the psychological costs of being dishonest. For exam-
ple, our study is characterized by a high degree of anonymity since data was generated
in an experimental laboratory. This may affect the magnitude of gender differences in
SVO and honest behavior. In an anonymous set-up the salience of gender roles is at-
tenuated. In a setting where gender roles are made salient women might conform to
normative gender expectancies because they fear being sanctioned and disliked other-
wise (Heilman and Okimoto, 2007, Rudman and Phelan, 2008). In regard to altruism,
Rand et al. (2016) demonstrate in a meta-analysis of lab experiments that women be-
have more altruistically after they have been made aware of their gender role, whereas
men do not change in altruism level. The awareness of the gender role can affect be-
havior, for instance, in negotiations at the workplace. Female negotiators are punished
when claiming high shares as this violates gender roles (Bowles et al., 2007). When
women anticipate this, it is possible that they “don’t ask” for too much in negotia-
tions (Babcock and Laschever, 2009). If we consider these insights when interpreting
our anonymous experimental findings, it is likely that the lab setting underestimates
the gender difference in SVO. However, it is not quite clear in which way more pro-
nounced social preferences would affect the level of honest behavior. This might be
highly context-dependent. For example, in settings with a strong probability of getting
caught red-handed being dishonest, individual risk preferences might overwrite social
preferences and might be more predictive for dis/honest behavior. Another contex-
tual variable that could influence behavior is the absolute amount of money at stake.
Moreover, people might face varying psychological costs to violate the norm honesty
depending on the strength of the norm in society (Ariely et al., 2015, Hugh-Jones, 2016)
and the level of the externality inflicted on somebody else’s payoff.
We conclude that social preferences correlate with honest behavior in a situation where
being honest inheres little opportunity costs. Although differences in SVO can explain
differences in honest behavior in our setting, it might be less informative in situations
with, for instance, higher levels of risk involved. It is especially relevant to learn more
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about individual preferences which may correlate with dishonest behavior. In this re-
gard, experimental economics is a powerful discipline as one of its evident strengths
is the elicitation of subjects’ preferences and the consequences of their choices. Sev-
eral studies successfully applied simple experiments such as the die rolling game, to
predict dishonest behavior in the field, such as corrupt behavior (Hanna and Wang,
2013), school misconduct (Cohn and Maréchal, 2015), refrain from reporting overpay-
ments (Potters and Stoop, 2016) and the free riding of public transport (Dai et al., 2017).
Therefore, it might be promising to further scrutinize the interplay of individual (social)
preferences, gender, and payoff consequences in future experimental lab studies.
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Chapter 5
Contract compliance under biased
expectations
This chapter is joint work with Sabine Fischer. We were equally involved at all stages of
the project: the development of the idea, literature review, programming of the study,
field work in Ghana, the analysis of data and writing up the paper.
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5.1 Introduction
Encouraging contract compliance can be challenging especially when legal enforce-
ment mechanisms do not function properly (Chemin, 2012). Particularly, in develop-
ing countries legal systems are often absent, corrupt or too slow to be usable (Dixit,
2003). Therefore, contract conclusion is a risky endeavor in terms of post-contractual
opportunistic behavior although contracts hold potentially high returns on investment
(Klein et al., 1978). The uncertainty may shy away potential investors from building
business relationships. Consequently, countries do not achieve their full potential since
contract repudiation is one major problem why poor countries fail to catch up (Keefer
and Knack, 1997). Positively expressed, contracts can be an important tool to stimulate
growth (Reardon et al., 2009). North (1990) asserts “the inability of societies to develop
effective, low-cost enforcement of contracts is the most important source of both his-
torical stagnation and contemporary underdevelopment”. Therefore, it is important
to better understand the drivers of contract compliance in contexts where enforcement
mechanisms do not function properly.
In behavioral economics, there is extensive evidence that people’s judgment under un-
certainty is often misguided, i.e., people often do a poor job in processing probabilities
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1975), and people fail in assessing their performance and are
overconfident about their performance (e.g. Moore and Healy, 2008). Moore and Healy
(2008) provide an excellent survey on recent work on overconfidence and introduce the
following three categories: relative overconfidence (thinking that you are better than
others), overestimation (thinking that you are better than you actually are), and over-
precision (thinking that your beliefs are more accurate than they actually are). Our
paper’s focus is on overestimation (absolute overconfidence).
Crucial consequences might occur for compliant behavior if contract conditions re-
sult from misjudged performance since overconfident agents may form unrealistically
high payoff expectations. Payoff expectations can influence economic decision-making.
Camerer et al. (1997) found evidence that New York taxi drivers only provide services
until they have reached their payoff expectations for that day. Even if it is a rainy day
and circumstances promise higher benefits, taxi drivers will stop working once they
reached their payoff expectations. Here, it has been show that payoff expectations can
serve as a reference point. That is, people strive to earn the amount of money that they
expected to earn.
In this study, our main hypothesis is that individual overestimation of performance
fosters contract breach. The channel that we want to test is reference-dependent pref-
erences. More precisely, payoff expectations resulting from performance misjudgment
may serve as a reference point. This means, after materialization of the contract, agents
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compare the status quo (real payoff from the contract) with their expected payoff. If
agents overestimate their performance, the expected payoff exceeds the real payoff.
Similar to Camerer et al. (1997), agents may strive to meet their expectations. Breach-
ing the contract allows agents to eradicate the divergence between payoff expectations
and the status quo. Hence, we expect that the more agents overestimate their perfor-
mance/output, the more they engage in breaching actions.
Furthermore, we want to examine possible moderators that may bolster reference-
dependent behavior. It has been shown that people may evaluate payoffs as gains
and losses rather than as a detached state of wealth (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).
In the moment of realizing that expectations do not materialize, agents might sense a
loss. Along the lines of the model on reference-dependent preferences from Koeszegi
and Rabin (2006), sensed losses may resonate more intensely the more pronounced
individual loss aversion is. To counteract the relatively high utility loss when overcon-
fident and highly loss averse, agents might engage in contract breaching to a higher
extent. Another channel that we want to test are the influence of potential produc-
tion shocks. Production shocks are prevalent in many businesses. For example, in the
farming context, weather shocks (positive or negative) can occur and affect production
outcomes. In such an environment, agents are able to attribute outcome/performance
to external factors according to their ex-ante beliefs (Grossman and Owens, 2012). Own
accountability from failing to meet the performance goal can be (partly) shifted to the
occurrence of a shock. This way, agents can utilize the shock to legitimate contract
breach while keeping up their self-image. Therefore, breaching might be facilitated if
the environment is non-deterministic, i.e., production shocks can occur, compared to a
deterministic environment.
We investigate our hypotheses with a lab-in-the-field experiment with students in Ghana.
Since our research questions are particularly interesting for developing economies, we
consider our subject pool from Ghana as a major strength of this study.1 We use a
multi-stage investment game where an agent and a principal conclude a contract with
an inherent hold-up problem. We designed the experiment in a way that targets the
investigation if payoff expectations are used as reference points in contract situations.
Here, our focus is on the formation of payoff expectations, the alleged reference point.
Payoff expectations vary by individual misjudgment of performance/output. In the
final stage of the experiment, agents can decide to comply or not to comply. Payoff
expectations are made salient at this stage as we want to provoke that agents compare
1The majority of laboratory experiments in economics and psychology are conducted with partici-
pants from WEIRD (Western, educated, industrialized, rich and democratic societies. Experimental find-
ings indicate considerable behavioral differences among societies in diverse domains such as analytic
reasoning, fairness or cooperation (Henrich et al., 2010, Jones, 2010).
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the expected payoff with the status quo. The design is described in detail in Section 3.
We establish the following results: With increasing overestimation sellers breach con-
tracts to a higher extent. We can also confirm that individual loss aversion moderates
the effect of sensed losses on breaching contracts. Interestingly, these results only hold
within a non-deterministic environment. In order to identify whether the effect from
overestimation is causal, we manipulate expectations by an experimental treatment,
where performance/output guesses are raised by an anchor (Tversky and Kahneman,
1975). We find that the effect on contract breach remains significant once overesti-
mation is instrumented by this treatment implying that the effect is causal.2 Apart
from our main experimental results, we find further convincing evidence for reference-
dependent behavior. Data analysis from an ex-post questionnaire reveals that agents
with similar final payoffs are less satisfied if payoff expectations were not met initially.
Moreover, overconfident agents state more often that they felt disappointed when in-
formed about their real payoff compared to non-overconfident agents.
5.2 Related literature
Our study builds on the idea that people have reference-dependent preferences. Previ-
ous studies have predominantly focused on ex-ante behavioral change due to reference
points. For instant, it has been shown that costumers adjust their consumption behav-
ior (Huang and Liu, 2017) and gambler their lottery choices (Kahneman and Tversky,
1979) to avoid anticipated losses. Abeler et al. (2011) demonstrate experimentally the
impact of reference points on effort provision. By exogenously varying expectations of
earnings, workers adjust effort levels to avoid anticipated losses. An empirical study
from Camerer et al. (1997) find that cab drivers in New York set a daily income target
and use it as a reference point. Once this target is reached, they stop working and spurn
the opportunity of potentially high-income days.
In the contract literature, there are few studies that focus on reference points and con-
tract compliance. Hart and Moore (2008) demonstrated theoretically and Fehr et al.
(2011) showed experimentally that agents breach less under a rigid contract, i.e., a
contract where the price for the agent’s output is fixed ex ante, than under a flexible
contract, i.e., the price is not fixed ex ante but can vary within a certain range. Un-
der flexible contracts, agents engage in costly punishment if the principal pays a lower
price than expected. These studies demonstrate that people alter their behavior and
costly punish when their reference payoff is not realized.
2This approach is comparable to (Hill et al., 2012), who examine if observing peers alters the decision
to reciprocate in a trust game. By using a treatment, they instrument their explanatory variable of interest
and justify therewith that their reported effect is indeed causal.
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The empirical evidence on reference points is hard to reconcile with standard economic
assumptions. However, the findings are consistent with the idea that people hold
reference-dependent preferences. Here, utility is not only dependent on a factual payoff
per se but also on a reference payoff to which the factual payoff is compared to (e.g. Bell,
1985, Loomes and Sugden, 1986, Gul, 1991, Hart and Moore, 2008, Koeszegi and Rabin,
2006). That means, an individual derives less utility in a situation where the real payoff
falls short of expectations compared to a situation in which payoff expectations are met.
Generally, there are few studies testing reference-dependent behavior experimentally
or empirically since it is a challenging endeavor to clearly identify reference-dependent
preferences.
Beside the literature on reference-dependent preferences, we draw and contribute to the
literature on performance misjudgment and especially overestimation/overconfidence.
There are several reasons why people fail to correctly assess their own performance
under uncertainty (e.g. Moore and Healy, 2008). A large stream of literature focuses
on cognitive mechanisms such as the use of judgmental heuristics and faulty integra-
tion of relevant information in the assessment process (e.g. Tversky and Kahneman,
1975, Fischhoff et al., 1978). Another reason might be that people are incompetent in
a task and too incompetent to even realize their incompetency (Kruger and Dunning,
1999, Ehrlinger et al., 2016). Such miscalibration of own abilities can affect economic
outcomes. The majority of literature examines effects of overconfidence for financial
markets and managerial decision making (e.g. Barber and Odean, 2001, Scheinkman
and Xiong, 2003). It has been shown that overconfidence can lead to deadweight losses
in markets. Since overconfident agents are prone to overestimate future market shares,
they excessively enter these markets (Camerer and Lovallo, 1999). Overconfidence can
also affect contract outcomes. Overconfident job-seekers may underestimate risks in-
volved in certain contracts, misjudge effort that has to be exerted, and the wage that will
be gained. This way, contract and incentive designs are adjusted on the employer’s
side, and sorting decisions and effort provision are affected on the employee’s side
by overconfidence (De la Rosa, 2011, Sautmann et al., 2011, Larkin and Leider, 2012,
Santos-Pinto, 2012, Hoffman and Burks, 2017).
We can contribute to the above literature on overconfidence and reference-dependent
behavior. We test how overconfidence affects compliant behavior in contract situations.
The mechanism we examine is via payoff expectations that result from performance
overestimation and may be used as a reference point. Reference points in our set-
up emerge endogenously as a result of (mis-)judgment of own performance/output,
which is the major novelty of our study.
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5.3 Study design
5.3.1 Experimental design and survey
A study session comprises a short pre-survey, an experiment with two parts and an ex-
post questionnaire.3 In the experiment’s first part, we elicit (social) preferences, such as
social value orientation, risk preferences, inequality aversion and loss aversion, which
will be used to check if our main variable of interest (overestimation) is independent of
individual characteristics. Moreover, we will use the measure on loss aversion to test
Hypothesis II. Afterwards, subjects exert a “trial phase” of a real-effort task, where all
participants can practice the task. Details about the experiment’s first part can be found
in D.2 in the Appendix.
In part two, participants engage in an investment game in either the role of a seller,
that is a person who produces goods, or a buyer, that is a person who invests in a
seller’s production to enhance the goods’ value. Sellers exert the real-effort task (pro-
duce goods) again and assess their performance afterwards. Based on their guess, sell-
ers make an offer about a certain number of goods to sell to the buyer. If the buyer
accepts the contract, a contract is concluded. At this time, sellers are informed about
their expected payoff from the contract – the alleged reference point. Next, sellers, who
concluded a contract, are informed about their real payoff if they honored the contract
(status quo). Here, status quo and expected payoff are juxtaposed to push sellers to
compare these two payoffs. Sellers can then decide to comply, to breach or even to
“over-fulfill” the contract. This way, sellers can offset the divergence between status
quo and expected payoff.
Complete instructions can be found in Appendix D. The experiment was programmed
on tablets with the software “otree” (Chen et al., 2016). Sessions lasted approximately
120 minutes and students were paid in total about GHS 44 ($11), including a show-
up fee of GHS 20. Payments varied between GHS 22 and GHS 90. In the following
paragraph, we will elaborate on the experiment’s main part.
Experiment’s main part (investment game)
At the beginning, subjects are matched in dyads and are randomly assigned either to
the role of a seller or to the role of a buyer. In the following, we describe the different
steps in the contract phase. The steps 2 to 5 are illustrated in Figure 5.1.
1. Real-effort task and performance guess: Sellers are confronted with 25 puzzles with
3As well as that, we played a modified version of the die rolling game from Fischbacher and Föllmi-
Heusi (2013). Since we played it at the very end of the experimental session, it cannot have influences
any of the experimental data. For brevity, we will therefore not explain the game’s details.
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four possible answers each. We explain to subjects that correctly solved tasks corre-
spond to produced goods. Each correctly solved puzzle is worth GHS 0.20. We decided
for a rather difficult task, as it has been demonstrated that such difficult tasks generate
higher overestimation (Larrick et al., 2007). Time was limited to 15 seconds per task
and the first answer was always logged in as a default.4 Afterwards, sellers are asked
to estimate their performance and earn an additional GHS 5 if the guess turns out to be
exactly correct.
2. Contract offer: Sellers can decide whether they want to offer the buyer a contract and
if so how many goods they want to offer. The maximum of goods that can be offered is
limited to their performance guess. We inform participants about the values of goods:
Sellers earn GHS 1 for each good sellers sell to the buyer. Goods can also be sold to
an alternative market for a unit price of GHS 2.5. However, only if the buyer accepts
the seller’s offer, these prices come into effect. Buyers receive an endowment of GHS
4, which they can decide to invest in the seller’s production to enhance the value of
produce. If buyers decide not to invest, the value of the seller’s production cannot be
“enhanced” and goods are only worth GHS 0.20 at the alternative market. If the seller
decides not to offer any contract, buyers keep their endowment of GHS 4 and the seller
earns GHS 0.20 per good. We provide sellers with a calculation table to facilitate payoff
calculations and to ensure that sellers make reasonable decisions.
In real life for example, contract farming can manifest such a price structure. Since the
buyer invests in the seller’s production, buyers may pay lower prices to redeem the
investment compared to prices offered at the spot market. Therefore, farmers can be
tempted to sell to the alternative market. Other than that, farmers might be present-
biased and value buyer’s money they have to wait for less than instantly obtainable
money.
3. Contract acceptance: Buyers are informed about sellers’ performance in the real-
effort task in the “trial phase”. They can decide to accept or to reject the seller’s offer. If
the buyer accepts the contract, GHS 4 are invested in the seller’s production. The buyer
receives GHS 1 for each good the seller sells to the buyer (ysold). Payoffs for sellers are
as described in step 2. If the buyer rejects the offer, the buyer keeps the endowment. In
this case, buyer and seller are informed about their payoffs and the game ends.
The buyer’s payoff (πB) is as follows:
4We decided for a default answer as there might be strategically acting participants not working at all
on the task, who are then perfectly able to assess their performance otherwise.
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πB(ysold) =
GHS 1 ∗ ysold −GHS 4, if contract is concludedGHS 4, otherwise
4. Information about total output and occurrence of a production shock: After con-
tract conclusion, sellers and buyers are informed about the total output produced. The
total output equals the real performance in the real-effort task if no shock affected “the
production”. A shock affects the production with a 50% chance and output is either
topped up by 2 goods or reduced by 2 goods (each case is equally likely). The two
parties learn if a shock has occurred or not and the resulting total output is displayed.
In the shock condition, subjects are not informed about the real performance but only
about the resulting total output.
5. Selling goods: To remind parties on the agreement made, the contract is summarized
and displayed. Then, sellers can decide on the amount of goods they ultimately want
to sell to the buyer (ysold). Here, the seller is provided (again) with a calculation table
while this time the payoff expectation and the real payoff if the contract will be honored
is saliently displayed at the top of the screen. This way, we make sellers to pay attention
to their payoff expectations and stress the difference to the status quo. The seller then
decides how many goods of their total output (yreal) to sell to the buyer and how many
goods to sell to the alternative market. The seller’s payoff (πS) can be described as:
πS(yreal, ysold) =
GHS 2.5 ∗ (yreal − ysold) +GHS 1 ∗ ysold, if contract is concludedGHS 0.20 ∗ yreal, otherwise
In our set-up, sellers break the contract by selling less goods to the buyer than of-
fered. Breaching the contract and selling more goods to the alternative market is al-
ways monetary beneficial for the seller. Similar moral-hazard situations exist in real-
life. For example, in a contract-farming situation: Once a principal has invested in the
production, farmers reduce their effort exerted in the production or only sell low qual-
ity produce. In the experiment, this step is the crucial step where our outcome variable
(breach (absolute)) is generated. We observe which sellers comply to the contract (sell
the amount offered to the buyer), breach the contract (sell fewer goods than offered) or
even over-fulfill the contract (sell more goods than offered).
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FIGURE 5.1: Sequence of actions in the modified investment game
General procedures and ex-post survey
Before starting a session, we ensured to have an even number of participants in the
session to guarantee one-to-one interactions in the investment game. Subjects are fully
informed about the entire course of action before they took actual decisions. We ex-
plained the game twice, one time with text on time mainly with pictures, and used
control questions to make sure that participants understood the sequence of actions.
The ex-post questionnaire started off with questions about the experiment such as pay-
off satisfaction and seller’s feelings when learning about the real payoff from the con-
tract. This survey-data we will use to scrutinize the reference-point hypothesis. We
also collected data on experience in experiments and on how many other persons they
knew in the room. At the very end, we asked about socio-demographic background
such as education and income.
Manipulation of overestimation
We use an experimental treatment to exogenously manipulate performance guesses to
increase payoff expectations. For that purpose, we use a simple yes-no question serv-
ing as an anchor which is “Do you think you have produced more than 20 goods?”.
Recall that sellers worked on 25 puzzles in total. Less than 1% of participants actually
reached a total performance of over 20 goods. Therefore, the anchor set is extremely
high and effectively not reachable by the majority of participants. However, partici-
pants use this initial number of 20 to make their subsequent performance guess and
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start iterating downwards until they reach their final guess (Tversky and Kahneman,
1975). The number of 20 goods might sound arbitrary but we chose the number for at
least two reasons. First, we wanted to implement a substantially high anchor to raise
performance guesses and second we wanted to avoid that participants contemplate
about the question.
Discussion of design decisions
Common in real life is that an investor makes an offer to a producer. Then, the seller
can agree and starts producing. In our set-up, sellers (and not buyers) offer the con-
tract. With this procedure, we want to assure a certain level of agents’ commitment and
counteract potential non-compliance with contracts because agents might perceive the
contract as unfair.5 It would have been a major challenge to capture fairness perceptions
within the investment game, if it would not have been impossible. Therefore, we de-
cided to turn the more intuitive order of offer and acceptance of buyer and seller around
and let the seller make the offer. For the same reason we allowed for self-selection into
contracts. That is, sellers could decide to offer a contract and buyers could decide to
accept the contract. Not allowing for voluntary agreements and assigning predefined
contracts could have leaded to a situation in which sellers breach primarily because
they do not feel committed to the contract and perceive the contract as unfair. Allowing
subjects to choose their preferred contract (if any) is common practice when studying
behavior after contract conclusion (e.g. Fehr et al., 2011, Bartling and Schmidt, 2015).
5.3.2 Recruitment and sample
The sample consists of students recruited at the two largest cities in Ghana – the capital
Accra and the university town Kumasi. Our study was publicly announced without
any reference to the content of the study and students could register in advance for a
particular session. To attract participants, we announced a show-up fee of GHS 20 and
used non-monetary incentives such as certificates for participation and a free drink for
each participant.
Overall, the majority of participants are male (about 70 % men and 30 % women). On
5Let us imagine that the buyer makes the offer. In this case, sellers might accept the offer mainly
because the buyer’s investment enhances the value of sellers’ goods and holds substantial benefits in
any case. However, the seller might perceive the buyer’s offer as unfair and because of that behaves
non-compliantly. In such a set-up, the perceived unfairness effect may superimpose an effect from unmet
payoff expectations.
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average, participants are 21 years old and state to have GHS 200 a month for free dis-
posal (corresponds to about US$ 40). Most of the students participated in a lab experi-
ment for the first time.
The data was collected in November and December 2016. In total, we conducted 52
sessions over the course of five weeks and at the aforementioned two locations. The
sessions comprised between 16 to 24 participants each. We implemented four different
treatments. Treatments and shock conditions were randomized within sessions. We
analyze data only from two treatments in this paper – from the control treatment ex-
plained in Section 5.3.1 and the treatment with the anchor.6 In these two treatments
478 participants took part, that is 239 sellers and 239 buyers. We received an ethical
approval for this study by the ethical board of Social Sciences of the University of Goet-
tingen.
5.3.3 Hypotheses
In this section, we will derive our main hypotheses on reference points and contract
compliant behavior. Before that, we will briefly discuss expected compliant behavior
under the assumption that sellers are solely profit-maximizers and under the assump-
tion that sellers have other-regarding preferences.
According to standard economic theory, profit-maximizing sellers will breach the con-
tract (once accepted by the buyer) to the full extent. In other words, profit-maximizers
sell their total output to the alternative market independent of any promises made to
the buyer ex ante. However, behavioral economics has shown that people are con-
cerned with other-regarding preferences and do reward pro-social actions by recipro-
cating (Berg et al., 1995, Fehr et al., 1998, 2002)7, which has also been demonstrated for
agents in contract situations (Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2004, Fehr et al., 2011, Hack-
ett, 1994). Based upon the discussion above, we will expect that a substantial share of
agents will comply to contracts.
In this study, we are primarily interested if agents orientate on their payoff expectations
6In addition to the anchor and control Treatment we implemented two other treatments in which we
gave performance feedback; an exact and a noisy feedback. As we use a between-subjects design and
randomized treatments within sessions, we do not have any concerns to analyze data from different
treatments separately.
7In trust games (and our set-up is comparable to a trust game) people violate the tenets of neoclas-
sical economic analysis pervasively. The first mover in the trust game trusts responders at substantial
rates, even if a favorable response is very uncertain and identities are not known to the responder or
experimenter. Similar to the sellers are the responders in trust games: They often turn out to be trust-
worthy, returning money to the first mover when they have no compelling economic reason to do so
(Berg et al., 1995, Croson and Buchan, 1999, Johnson and Mislin, 2011). Besides that, Vanberg (2008) has
demonstrated that people have a preference to hold promises, which is comparable to commitments to
contracts, in a modified trust game.
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and are even willing to breach a contract to reach initial expectations. Camerer et al.
(1997) have shown that people work until they have reached their payoff expectations.
Mapping that result into utility theory, peopl maximize their utility by working until
they meet their payoff expectations. They derive less utility when they stop working
before they reached their initial goal. Similarly, evidence from psychology suggests that
the marginal utility increase below a target is strictly higher than the marginal utility
increase above a target (Heath et al., 1999). In contrast to the taxi-driver situation from
Camerer et al. (1997), balancing off the utility loss cannot be resolved by exerting more
effort in our contract setting but only by breaching the contract. When sellers learn
about their real payoff from the contract (status quo), they experience an utility loss
(−∆U ) depending on the divergence between expected payoff and status quo:
−∆U = [Q ∗ 1 + (Ys,exp −Q) ∗ 2.5] − [Q ∗ 1 + (Ys,real −Q) ∗ 2.5],
where Q is the number of goods offered to the buyer, Ys,exp the estimated perfor-
mance/output and Ys,real the real performance/output. The first square bracket corre-
sponds to seller’s expected payoff whereas the second square bracket corresponds to
the status quo. Simplification of the previous equation results in −∆U = Ys,exp − Ys,real.
The larger seller’s overestimation (Ys,exp − Ys,real), the larger will be the utility loss
(−∆U ).8 The utility loss can be counteracted by selling less goods to the buyer than
offered since the alternative market holds prices that are 2.5 times higher than when
selling goods to the buyer. Based on this argumentation we derive our first hypothesis:
Hypothesis I: With increasing overestimation sellers will breach contracts to a higher extent.
In our contract setting, there is uncertainty about the future status quo when con-
cluding the contract. This is a major difference to the study from Camerer et al. (1997)
where uncertainty does play an inferior role. That said, sellers might not only try to
reach payoff expectations in contract situations. Sellers who overestimate sense a loss
since they compare expected payoff with the status quo. Koeszegi and Rabin (2006)
explain in their model of reference-dependent preferences that losses loom larger with
an increasing aversion to losses, i.e., with increasing loss aversion (λ). Transferring that
to our setting, when sellers are informed about the status quo they experience an abso-
lute loss which is their individual overestimation (Ys,exp − (Ys,real). This loss is sensed
to a larger extent with increasing aversion towards losses (λ). We formalize that in the
following equation:
8The utility equation is obviously very simplified and only focuses on the main mechanism we want
to test. We are aware that we ignore other important determinants such as other-regarding preferences.
However, we will control for other-regarding preferences in all regressions.
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−∆U = λ(Ys,exp − Ys,real)
With increasing overestimation and individual loss aversion the utility loss becomes
larger. To make up for the utility loss, sellers can engage in contract breach and raise
their utility by increasing their monetary gains. Therefore, our next hypothesis is the
following.
Hypothesis II: With increasing individual loss aversion, sellers engage in more contract breach
conditional on overestimation.
In our set-up, opportunistic behavior pays off but people might still want to keep
up their positive self-image and may try to delude themselves for the profitable action
(Mazar et al., 2008). A production shock gives the seller the possibility to avoid negative
self-signals from failing to meet expectations and to avoid updating their self-concept
(Sackeim and Gur, 1979, Dana et al., 2007). Therefore, we expect that sellers in the
shock condition will breach the contract to a higher extent than sellers in the no-shock
condition. Similarly, contract breach might be amplified under the shock for sellers
with a high utility loss from overestimation and individual loss aversion. We deduce
the following hypotheses.
Hypothesis III: a) Sellers in the shock condition will breach the contract to a higher extent than
sellers in the no-shock condition. b) The effect of sensed losses on contract breach is stronger in
the shock condition than in the no-shock condition.
5.4 Data and results
5.4.1 Descriptive statistics
In Table 5.1, we summarize observations and differentiate between under-/correct es-
timators and overestimators. Participants are categorized as under-/correct estimator
either if their performance guess is below the real performance or if their performance
guess was exactly correct. Sellers categorized as overestimators have a guess that ex-
ceeds their real performance.
The majority of sellers, 67.20%, overestimate their performance in the real-effort task
whereas 32.80% of sellers correctly assess or underestimate their performance.
In total 186 contracts are concluded from which 143 contracts are fulfillable, i.e., the
real performance/output was higher than the offer. Observation numbers in different
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TABLE 5.1: Estimation types and compliant behavior
under-/correct overestimator Total
estimator
compliance 32 (52.46%) 38 (30.40%) 70 (37.63%)
breach1 15 (24.59%) 86 (68.80%) 101 (54.30%)
over-fulfillment 14 (22.95%) 1 (0.80%) 15 (8.06%)
total 61 (32.80%) 125 (67.20%) 186 (100.00%)
breach2 14 (23.33%) 44 (53.01%) 58 (40.56%)
1whole sample; 2only fulfillable contracts
stages and treatments can be looked up in Table D.1 and in Table D.2 in the Appendix.
Generally, we see that close to 38% of sellers comply to their contracts whereas the
majority breaches the contract and a small fraction over-fulfills the contract.9 Strik-
ingly, sellers who overestimate breach the contract significantly more often than under-
/correct estimators (χ2(1) = 19.759, p < 0.001).10 To avoid skewing results, we will
focus only on the sample of “fulfillable” contracts from now on. In total, our analysis is
based on 132 observations.11
We will now briefly describe means and results of non-parametric tests from outcome
variables of the investment game. The average performance/output in the real-effort
task was 12.43 and does not significantly differ between under-/correct estimators
(12.63) and overestimators (12.89). Sellers who overestimate are off the mark by on
average 4.13 goods. The absolute breach rate, which we define as the difference of of-
fered goods and sold goods, among overconfident agents is on average 2.20 whereas
under-/correct estimators shortchange on average 0.23 goods. The difference in breach-
ing among the two estimation types is statistically significant (Mann-Whitney test,
p < 0.001).
Result I: Overall, we find that a share of 38% of sellers complied to contracts. Sellers who
overestimate their performance breach contracts more often and to a higher extent than under-
/correct estimators.
9Sellers who underestimate their performance have a higher income than expected. By comparing
their real payoff with the expected payoff, these sellers might feel elated (Bell, 1985). The unexpected
gain might feel like windfall money and make people more willing to share this income (Carlsson et al.,
2013, Kameda et al., 2002).
10Focusing only on fulfillable contracts, sellers who overestimate still breach significantly more often
than under-/correct estimators (χ2-test, p = 0.011).
11Due to power outages in the field we have missing values for certain covariates. In order to keep
the sample constant we had to remove in total 14 observations of the 228 in which contracts were offered
(resulting in 214 offers, 172 accepted contracts and 132 fulfillable contracts).
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In the following, we will check if individual overestimation is independent of indi-
vidual characteristics and preferences which could potentially distort results. In Table
5.2, we present results of OLS regressions from different characteristics on overestima-
tion; standard errors in parentheses. Only one regressor was included at a time. The
TABLE 5.2: Test of independence for overestimation
age income alpha loss aversion risk seeking SVO angle
Overestimation -0.0141 5.635 0.00927 -0.0136 0.0574 0.0367
(0.0399) (4.024) (0.0109) (0.0416) (0.0373) (0.330)
Constant 21.46 245.8 0.234 3.857 3.211 26.44
(0.177) (17.88) (0.0486) (0.185) (0.166) (1.466)
Observations 132 132 132 132 132 132
Standard errors in parentheses
variable Overestimation is a continuous measure and calculated by the difference be-
tween performance guess and real performance. None of the coefficients is significant
implying that different levels of overestimation are independent of fairness preferences
such as Social Value Orientation (SVO angle) or inequality aversion (alpha). Literature
suggests that men might be more overconfident than women (e.g. Barber and Odean,
2001). We do not find a gender difference in overestimation. Moreover, students en-
rolled in an econ program are not different from students enrolled in other programs in
respect to performance overestimation (both Mann-Whitney test, p > 0.4384).
In the next section, we test our hypotheses from Section 5.3.3 with regression analyses.
5.4.2 Estimation results
Does overestimation affect contract breach?
First, we will resume graphically the effect from overestimation on contract breach. In
Figure 5.2 sellers who underestimate their performance range left from 0 on the x-axis.
In contrast, sellers who overestimate their performance range right from 0 on the x-axis.
Sellers with a guess spot-on can be found on the y-axis. The upward trend of the fitted
line suggests that with rising overestimation contract breach increases, which is in line
with Hypothesis I. In the following, we will prove if estimation results confirm this first
impression.
The underlying OLS Model we use is of the following form:
Yi = β0 + β1Xi + β3Si + β2Pi + β4Ci + εi,
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FIGURE 5.2: Effect of overestimation on contract breach (N=132)
where Yi is the level of contract breach and measured by the difference of sellers’
offered and sold goods (contract breach (absolute)). Note, that Yi is zero when sellers
comply, becomes positive when sellers shortchange and negative when sellers over-
fulfill the contract. Xi represents the level of overestimation and is measured by the
difference between performance guess and real performance (overestimation). Si is an
indicator variable which is positive if a shock affected output and 0 otherwise (shock);
Pi is sellers’ performance (performance)12; Ci represents a vector of covariates at the in-
dividual level and εi is the error term.
In the IV approach, we use the anchor treatment as an instrumental variable to estimate
overestimation. In Table 5.3, we present results based on OLS regressions in Models (1),
(3) and (5) and we used an IV approach in the presented Models (2) and (4). Results
from all models demonstrate that with rising overestimation contract breach signifi-
cantly increases. This is in line with Hypothesis I. The IV regressions (Model (2) and
(4)) reveal that the reported effects from overestimation are causal.13 Results from the
first stage regression demonstrate highly significant effects from the anchor treatment
on overestimation and can be looked up in Table D.3 in the Appendix.14
12We control for performance in all our regressions since sellers with very high performances cannot
overestimate themselves as strongly as sellers with very low performances.
13The instrument has an F-statistic close to 10 indicating that the instrument is strong (Staiger and
Stock, 1997). As well, the Wu-Hausman test (tested for non-robust standard errors) reveals that we can
reject the hypothesis that the variable overestimation is endogenous.
14On average, sellers guesses are 2.2 units higher under the anchor treatment compared to the no-
anchor treatment. This difference is significant (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test p = 0.012). The anchor did
not alter the distribution of overestimation. To prove that, we reduce individual overestimation under
the anchor by the mean of 2.201. When comparing the adjusted anchor distribution with the no-anchor
distribution of overestimation, there is no significant difference (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test p = 0.255).
This way, we showed that the anchor increases guesses to a similar extent at all different performance
levels.
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Without including covariates (Models (1) and (2)), performance has a significant positive
TABLE 5.3: Effect of overestimation on contract breach (OLS and IV results)
contract breach (absolute)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(OLS) (IV) (OLS) (IV)
Overconfidence 0.270*** 0.492** 0.259*** 0.476***
(0.048) (0.199) (0.048) (0.174)
Shock 0.007 -0.073 -0.009 -0.109
(0.384) (0.406) (0.392) (0.410)
Performance 0.066 0.100* 0.033 0.082
(0.050) (0.058) (0.059) (0.068)
Inverse mills ratio 2.421*** 2.347*** 2.428*** 2.325***
(0.246) (0.261) (0.261) (0.279)
Constant 0.187 -0.466 1.647 0.463
(0.739) (0.880) (2.648) (3.301)
Observations 132 132 132 132
Adjusted R2 0.512 0.420 0.518 0.431
Covariatesa No No Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
aCovariates: SVO angle, alpha, risk seeking, loss aversion,
dummy for female, dummy for experiment’s location (Ku-
masi or Accra), income per month (in real life), age in years,
dummy for enrollment in an econ program
effect. A reason can be that with rising performance/output, opportunity costs of com-
pliance with the contract increase. Therefore, sellers with a high performance/output
might be more prone to breach the contract to secure a high payoff from the lucrative
alternative market. Covariates are included in Models (3) to (5). In general, none of
the included covariates are significant at a 5%-level. In these models, the effects from
overestimation remain similar. However, the effect of performance vanishes in the OLS-
regressions. Since there could be sellers planning to breach the contract when making
an exorbitant offer, we check in Model (5) if our results of overestimation are robust
when including the number of offered goods. Although the coefficient of overestima-
tion loses in magnitude, it remains highly significant. The highly significant effect from
offered goods suggests that some sellers offer a high number of goods to successfully
conclude a contract but probably plan to breach the contract in advance.
The presented results are in accordance with the assumption of reference-dependent
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preferences since sellers mitigate the divergence between payoff expectations, the al-
leged reference point, and the status quo. We formulate our finding from the first re-
gressions in the following Result II.
Result II: With increasing overestimation sellers breach the contract to a higher extent.
Is the effect of subjective losses on contract breach conditional on loss aversion?
We test Hypothesis II in the following. We expect that sellers with a more pronounced
individual loss aversion sense a loss from falling short of the payoff expectations more
severely. To counteract this sensed loss, we hypothesize that sellers with a pronounced
loss aversion will breach to a higher extent to increase monetary gains than sellers with
a less pronounced loss aversion. To test this link, we include an interaction term be-
tween loss aversion (λi) and overestimation.
Yi = β0 + β1Xi + β2λi + β3λiXi + β6Pi + β7Si + β8Ci + εi,
Results for this model specification are presented in Table 5.4. When including the
interaction term, overestimation becomes insignificant (Model (1)). However, the in-
teraction effect with loss aversion is significant at a 10%-level. This result indicates
that indeed sellers with a relatively high loss aversion experience falling short from the
reference outcome more severely.
Result III: With increasing individual loss aversion sellers breach the contract to a higher
extent conditional on overestimation.
Does the occurrence of shocks facilitate contract breach?
We investigate how the occurrence of a shock affected contract breach (Hypothesis III)
now. In general, when focusing at the frequency of breaching, 43.42% sellers breach the
contract in the shock condition whereas only 35.71% of sellers engage in breaching in
the no-shock condition. However, this difference is not significant (χ2(1) = 0.806, p =
0.668). Moreover, the dummy of the shock condition has neither been significant in any
of the models presented in Table 5.3 nor in the first model in Table 5.4. Therefore, we
reject Hypothesis IIIa.
In the following, we test Hypothesis IIIb and examine if the effect from loss aversion is
more pronounced when a shock occurred compared to a situation without a produc-
tion shock. For this purpose, we will rerun the specification presented in the precedent
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TABLE 5.4: Effect of loss aversion on contract breach (pooled, shock and
no shock condition)
contract breach (absolute)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(pooled) (shock) (shock) (no shock) (no shock)
Overestimation 0.124 -0.0525 -0.111 0.540** 0.502**
(0.109) (0.121) (0.122) (0.248) (0.243)
Loss aversion -0.104 -0.0305 -0.0157 -0.263 -0.313
(0.124) (0.179) (0.156) (0.212) (0.201)
Overestimation × loss aversion 0.0487* 0.106*** 0.0895** -0.0394 -0.0565
(0.0291) (0.0347) (0.0370) (0.0497) (0.0525)
Performance 0.110 0.105 -0.134 0.126 0.0142
(0.0847) (0.123) (0.123) (0.143) (0.185)
Shock 0.217
(0.549)
Offered goods 0.409*** 0.326
(0.0955) (0.278)
Constant -0.203 -3.327 -2.661 5.414 3.643
(3.328) (5.068) (5.152) (4.960) (5.081)
Observations 132 76 76 56 56
R-squared 0.262 0.321 0.417 0.340 0.364
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
In all regressions, we control for the following covariates: SVO angle, alpha, risk seeking,
dummy for female, dummy for experiment’s location (Kumasi or Accra), income per month
(in real life), age in years, dummy for enrollment in an econ program
section but run the regressions separately for the two shock conditions.
The results are presented in Table 5.4. Model (2) reveals that the effect from loss aver-
sion is amplified under a production shock. The coefficient gains in magnitude and in
significance compared to results in the pooled sample (Model (1)). When additionally
controlling for offered goods, the effect remains robust (Model (3)). Interestingly, when
no production shock affects output, sellers breach more with increasing overestimation
but there is no effect from individual loss aversion (Model (4)). This result remains
significant when controlling for offered goods (Model (5)). None of the covariates is
significant at a 5%-level.
Recall that the shock can be negative or positive and sellers are not informed about the
direction of the shock. Still, the shock can extend the moral wiggle room for those who
overestimate their performance (Dana et al., 2007). However, results indicate that only
sellers with a high loss aversion who fall short of their reference payoff make use of
the moral wiggle room. The fact that the effect from loss aversion is only significant
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in non-deterministic environments might have several reasons for instance might these
types have a strong preference to hold a promise if accountability is assured.
Result IV: The occurrence of shocks does not increase the level of contract breach in general.
The effect of overestimation on contract breach is conditional on loss aversion and only holds in
non-deterministic environments.
5.4.3 Evidence for reference-dependent behavior
In this section, we will discuss evidence for expectation-based reference-dependent
preferences in our experiment. For this purpose, we will first recall the results pre-
sented in the previous section. Moreover, data from the ex-post questionnaire on feel-
ings when learning about the status quo and sellers’ satisfaction with the payoff from
the contract support the idea of reference-dependent behavior. All test results pre-
sented are based on data from the reduced sample used in the previous section which
excludes non-fulfillable contracts.
Estimation results
We find an effect of overestimation on contract breach even when we control for offers
made. Surely, we cannot disentangle this effect impeccably from strategic behavior,
meaning that sellers might have anticipated breaching the contract when making an
(exorbitant) offer. There are several compelling reasons that this might not be the case:
offered goods only affect compliant behavior significantly in non-deterministic envi-
ronments. Moreover, if offers and performance were too far-off, buyers would not have
accepted the contract in the first place. Additionally, we have shown that the effect of
overestimation on contract breach is conditional on loss aversion and particularly pro-
nounced in non-deterministic environments. This result clearly demonstrates that a
deviation from payoff expectations, the alleged reference point, is perceived as a loss.
The perception of a loss can only eventuate if sellers indeed compared the status quo
with the reference payoff.
Disappointment
In the ex-post questionnaire, we asked sellers how they felt after they learned how
much they produced and preset the following four answers “I felt disappointed”, “I
felt joyful”, “I was surprised” and “something else”. We would expect that overesti-
mators would feel more disappointed than under/correct estimators. And this is ex-
actly what we find. From 76 overestimators, 39.47% stated that they are disappointed,
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28.95% were surprised and 14.47% joyful. In contrast, only 4 subjects (7.14%) of the
under/correct estimators felt disappointed, 41.07% surprised and 33.93% joyful. Over-
all, about 17% stated that they felt “something else” than our preset anwers. The dis-
tribution of stated feelings is significantly different between the two estimation types
(χ2(1) = 19.855, p < 0.001). Disappointment is an emotion and it has been shown that
emotions can directly affect decision-making. Sellers feeling disappointed might want
to discharge this negative emotion by taking what Loewenstein and Lerner (2003) call
an “emotion-relieving action”. In our set-up, sellers might counteract disappointment
from unmet payoff expectations by breaching the contract. Breaching the contract gives
them the opportunity to make up for the experienced subjective loss. We indeed find
that disappointed sellers shortchange on average 1.77 goods more compared to non-
disappointed sellers. This difference is statistically significant using a Mann-Whitney
test (p = 0.007).15
Income dissatisfaction
If sellers compared their real payoff with the alleged reference point, they might be
less satisfied if they had failed to reach it. In other words, the higher the experienced
subjective loss, the less satisfied might sellers be with their actual payoff.
In the following, we test the effect from overestimation on payoff satisfaction stated
in the ex-post questionnaire of the experimental session. We asked sellers "How sat-
isfied are you with your final payoff from the production phase (part 3)?" They could
grade their answer on a scale from 1 to 10 whereas 1 meant very low satisfaction and
10 very high satisfaction. Results are presented in Table 5.5. The variable payoff entails
the final payoff from the investment game. In both Models, we control for sex, location,
income in real life, age and enrollment in an econ program in both regressions. Gener-
ally, econ students are significantly less satisfied with their payoff from the investment
game. The other covariates, that are not presented in the table, are not significant.
To examine if overestimation reduces payoff satisfaction for a given payoff level, we in-
clude an interaction term of overestimation and payoff in Model (1). Interestingly, the
payoff itself does not significantly increase payoff satisfaction. Here we see that over-
estimation increases payoff satisfaction overall. However, the interaction effect is neg-
ative and highly significant. This suggests that indeed overestimators are less satisfied
15To test if disappointed sellers breach more, we created a dummy variable that takes on the value 1 if
sellers stated that they were disappointed and takes on the value zero if seller stated “joyful”, “surprised”
or “something else”. We tested if the means of absolute breach rates are different between the two groups
with a Mann-Whitney test.
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Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
In all regressions, we control for female, location, income
(in real life), age, econ-dummy
with their payoff.16 It might be that breaching the contract affect income satisfaction.
To test this link, we include the variable breach (absolute) in Model (2). However, the
effects reported above are robust and breach (absolute) has no significant effect.
5.5 Conclusion
In contract situations, overestimating one’s own performance can lead to inflated pay-
off expectations. If overconfident agents use payoff expectations as a reference point,
they might sense a loss as soon as they realize that their performance falls short of
this reference payoff. As a consequence, agents may try to balance off these losses by
breaching contracts and selling their goods to a more profitable alternative market. In
16We can rule out that this effect originates from general differences in the distribution of payoffs
between the estimation types. The distributions of payoffs from the investment game do not significantly
differ between under-/correct estimators and overestimators (pairwise comparison with a Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test p = 0.408).
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this study, we find evidence for this linkage. Results from our lab-in-the-field experi-
ment show that the more agents overestimate the more they breach contracts. By ma-
nipulating overestimation in a treatment with a performance anchor, we can show that
the reported effect is causal. Moreover, there are several indications that this effect can
be explained by reference-dependent preferences. These indicators reveal that agents
compared their status quo with the alleged reference point – their payoff expectations.
First, we find evidence that higher levels of loss aversion stimulate contract breach for
overconfident agents. This implies that loss-averse agents who fail to meet their per-
formance goal compare their status quo with their payoff expectations. Second, our
post-experimental questionnaire reveals that agents with high payoff expectations are
more often disappointed in the moment of learning about their status quo than agents
with rather low expectations. Third, we find that agents become less satisfied with their
payoff from the contract with rising overestimation.
A novelty of our study is that we show how a common heuristic such as overconfidence
(e.g. Barber and Odean, 2001) may lead to non-compliant behavior in contract settings
by forming inflated payoff expectations. In our set-up, the reference point forms en-
dogenously based on one’s own performance misjudgment. Furthermore, in contrast to
the majority of studies that focus on ex-ante behavioral change under reference points
(e.g. Camerer et al., 1997, Rabin, 2000, Abeler et al., 2011), we focus on an ex-post impact
of unmet expectations. Moreover, this study contributes to the scarce empirical and ex-
perimental literature on reference-dependent preferences. Particularly, we investigated
the theoretical idea of Koeszegi and Rabin (2006) that overestimated expectations may
lead to a utility loss. According with this theory, we find that individual loss aversion
increases contract breach when the status quo falls short of the reference payoff.
There are obviously different reasons why and when people respond to reference pay-
offs. Payoff expectations might simply serve as a goal that agents want to achieve
(Camerer et al., 1997, Oettinger, 1999, Fehr and Goette, 2007). In contract situations,
agents’ feelings of entitlement to a reference payoff has been found to play a role: If
principals “withdraw” part of the reference payoff, agents feel betrayed and punish
principals by breaching the contract (Fehr et al., 2011). Another reason for responding
to a reference payoff may be negative emotions such as disappointment (e.g. Bell, 1985,
Loomes and Sugden, 1986) or dissatisfaction with the status quo. Breaching the con-
tract might serve as an “emotion-relieving action” (Loewenstein and Lerner, 2003) that
can counteract the source of disappointment. Our results support that emotions such as
disappointment and dissatisfaction play a role. The discussed motives for responding
to reference payoffs may be intertwined. Depending on the context of the situation and
depending on individual characteristics/preferences some motives may play a more
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prominent role than others.
Apart from the results on payoff expectations in general, we find that the occurrence
of production shocks alters behavior of specific types of agents. More precisely, over-
confident agents who are loss averse are more likely to breach a contract under a pro-
duction shock compared to a situation where no shock hit the production output. The
shock might serve as a convenient justification to breach the contract since here sell-
ers can shift accountability for the failure in performance judgment to the random
event. Accordingly, Blanton et al. (2001) found that people are concerned about their
self-image and want to avoid cognitive dissonance. Therefore the cognitive bias from
overconfidence might be self-sustaining via a confirmation bias. Real life is full of non-
predictable events: The farmer might complain about the weather, the manager of a
factory about soaring supplier prices and the head of a service center about unreliable
staff. The examples illustrate that it is hard to imagine a situation where there is no
opportunity to delude oneself and shift accountability of own failure to another event
or persons.
We are careful in making strong inferences for policy makers since we used a lab exper-
iment and external validity may be constrained. Still, our results suggest that support-
ing people to judge own abilities correctly, especially those who are highly loss averse,
can reduce contract breach. Even though overconfident agents gain experiences in cer-
tain tasks, it has been shown that overconfidence reduces very slowly over time if at all
(Hoffman and Burks, 2017). In a different study, we will examine to what extent feed-
back mechanisms can enhance performance judgment (Fischer and Grosch, 2017). Fur-
thermore, policies should make sure to not raise unrealistic expectations. Such policies
may backfire in fostering opportunistic behavior if agents fail to meet these payoff ex-
pectations. To curb the temptation of self-delusion in non-deterministic environments,
bookkeeping and documenting meaningful events at everyday work could support
contract compliance.
Loss aversion plays a major role for effort provision. It has been shown that agents with
a high loss aversion exert fewer effort once they have reached their reference payoff as
from this point on marginal utility increase is lower for high loss-averse people than for
low loss-averse people (Kahneman and Tversky, 2000, Fehr and Goette, 2007). In turn,
when loss-averse agents fear to fall short of a reference payoff, they will exert more
effort to avoid a sensed loss (Abeler et al., 2011). Since overconfidence triggers high ref-
erence points, overconfidence may spur higher effort levels – especially for loss-averse
agents. We cannot test this potential positive effect of overconfidence with our data set




104 Chapter 6. Conclusion
This dissertation focuses on (social) preferences and how they influence behavior
in different work settings. We have shown that pay institutions, such as competitive
or discriminatory pay, can have negative effects on social capital in an organization.
Paying workers competitively, i.e., announcing bonuses for best workers in a com-
pany, may lead to more pronounced perceived rivalry among workers resulting in
less prosocial behavior. Apart from competitive bonus schemes, it is not uncommon
that pay regimes in companies may discriminate groups of workers. Managers might
not deliberately discriminate these workers but jobs within a company are complex
and therefore it may be difficult to monitor work and pay all workers objectively. We
demonstrated that workers, who are discriminated by the pay regime, become resent-
ful which triggers antisocial behavior towards colleagues who are better-off.
In another experiment, we illuminated why, on average, women have been found
more honest than men. This question is of importance in many labor-market con-
texts since honesty and compliance are the basis for trustful business relationships. We
demonstrated that social preferences can (partly) predict dishonest behavior in a con-
text where being dishonest benefits oneself but harms somebody else. We also show
that women behave more prosocial than men. As a consequence, our data can ex-
plain the commonly found gender effect in honesty by differing social preferences of
men and women. In the final study of this thesis, we focus on compliance behavior in
contracting situations. In this paper, we show that individual overconfidence affects
compliance of signatories. Overconfidence in individual performance leads to exagger-
ated payoff expectations when contracts are concluded before actual production. We
find evidence that these payoff expectations serve as a reference point and agents are
willing to breach contracts to reach these self-set targets.
These insights may be valuable for agri-food companies and smallholder farmers espe-
cially when they try to integrate into international value chains to increase margins (e.g.
Reardon et al., 2009). To integrate successfully, the first step is to build up a good rep-
utation and trustful business relationships. Our data shows that overconfidence may
hamper contract compliance. Especially when foreign investors promise high outcomes
and benefits, producers may become disappointed when their initial expectations are
not be met. Side-selling produce or using other marketing channels can hold higher
prices in the short term. Since smallholder farmers are often poor and make rather
myopic decisions (Haushofer and Fehr, 2014), they may breach contracts and forgo the
benefits of long-term business relationships in order to reduce the divergence between
payoff expectations and status quo from the contract. A conspicuous finding in our
lab-in-the-field experiment is that agents characterized by a high degree of loss aver-
sion are more prone to contract breach. We find that contract breach is frequent of these
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types particularly in non-deterministic environments. This confirms our reasoning that
agents search for an excuse to justify their immoral action of breaching the contract.
Especially loss-averse agents may feel the urge to breach but only if they can shift ac-
countability to an outside event.
In agriculture, there are weather shocks that affect the quantity of agricultural pro-
duce. There may be rain and drought at different times of the year – from sowing to
harvesting. It may not always be clear if the weather shocks were mainly harmful or
rather advantageous during that period for the quantity and quality of harvest. Yet,
our data suggest that independent of the real weather effect, farmers, who conclude
contracts before the harvest, may argue that the weather was rather harmful to jus-
tify non-compliant actions. Our results cannot exclude, however, that overconfidence
has also positive effects on, e.g., exerted work put into crops. It is possible that (per-
formance) goals in contracts stimulate farmers’ work motivation. In our experiment,
the sequence of actions is reversed and, moreover, the time sequence is short. In real
life, farmers may first conclude a contract and afterwards start to produce and as well,
more time will pass by between the different events in the contract cycle. They can ad-
just their effort level depending on different contextual variables. If they do not reach
their payoff expectations, they may be disappointed and unsatisfied. Unlike in our ex-
periment, however, these emotions can cool down in real life and agents may decide
more prudently. That means, there may be less contract breach if emotions are one ma-
jor factor driving contract breach when payoff expectations are not met.
When farmers or agri-food companies decide to reach out for other sales markets and,
e.g., tap into the export market, they face a higher degree of competition in the market.
That is, there is more pricing pressure and exporters need to boast high productivity
to prevail in the global market. This requires that incentives are correctly set: improve
worker’s motivation and mitigate potential costs from negative side effects. The thesis
demonstrates that incentives can have detrimental side effects on social capital at the
workplace. Depending on the type of work, social capital can be a crucial factor for
the organization’s success. It follows that managers should be careful in implement-
ing competitive incentives since workers may reflect from how they are paid on their
coworkers relations. Similarly, our data implies that managers should also make sure
that pay procedures are non-discriminatory. Otherwise, workers may become frus-
trated and more antisocial when they are paid on unfair grounds. Managers should
therefore be careful when implementing pay incentives and weigh up the benefits from
higher work motivation with the potential harm for social capital within the organiza-
tion.
In real life, job seekers have a choice between different jobs at the market. Also, already
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hired by a company, workers have the chance to resign and search for another vacancy.
It might be that people, who dislike certain payment schemes, do not choose to work
for an employer who applies that payment scheme in the first place. However, the
workers particularly disliking a competitive or discriminatory pay regime may be the
ones responding most notably to the incentives in the lab. Therefore, we might over-
estimate the effect from incentives on social capital. However, in developing countries,
the situation may be a bit different. Many workers, especially in rural areas, are not
mobile for several reasons such as lack of money, obligations within the family or they
are bound to land they own. Furthermore, labor demand is relatively low, which binds
workers to their employer once they found a job (ILO, 2016). Thus, these workers are
at the company’s mercy and cannot freely choose under which incentive scheme they
want to work. Randomizing workers into different payment schemes may therefore be
relatively accurate in estimating relative effects in regions where workers are bound to
work for a certain company.
Behavioral economics is a well-suited research method to examine the kind of questions
we have posed. It is a powerful discipline to investigate how individuals behave under
different institutions since experiments can help to understand underlying mechanisms
of behavior, i.e., which types of people respond in which way to different institutional
environments. This can allow to deduce more concrete predictions for planned pol-
icy interventions. Moreover, the lab allows to capture a variety of behavior which is
difficult or cost-intense to measure with other research methods. However, critics say
that data from lab experiments lack external validity. Experimental studies with a field
component demonstrate that lab measures are externally valid in different realms. For
example, cheating data from the lab have been shown to predict cheating behavior in
real life (Hanna and Wang, 2013, Potters and Stoop, 2016, Dai et al., 2017). Social pref-
erences and loss aversion measured in the lab have been successfully linked to effort
provision in the field (Carpenter and Seki, 2011, Fehr and Goette, 2007). Karlan (2005)
proved that trustworthy people in the lab are more likely to repay their loans. How-
ever, pure lab studies might sometimes lead to wrong conclusions. For example, it has
been shown that students in a lab respond to higher wages with higher effort levels
(e.g. Hannan et al., 2002, Charness, 2004). However, field experiments support positive
reciprocity only weakly (Gneezy and List, 2006, Cohn et al., 2009, Kube et al., 2012).
To further extend our research and to scrutinize external validity, combined studies of
lab and field measures could shed light on other important topics regarding the effec-
tiveness of institutions. For instant, unequal labor opportunities for women still persist
and can be an important aspect for fostering economic growth (ILO, 2017). Gender gaps
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are created by discriminating women in terms of payment, hiring procedures or pro-
motions. Our data has shown that discrimination can inhere detrimental side effects on
social capital. As well, we found some evidence that women internalize their gender
role and act accordingly. Pay institutions and internalized gender roles may interrelate
meaning that certain payment procedures may provoke women to behave stereotypi-
cally and may partly explain gender gaps at the workplace. Therefore, an interesting
topic for further research could be to investigate how institutions can counteract inter-
nalized gender-specific behavior.
In this dissertation, we touched important research realms of how institutions can sup-
port processes to keep up compliance to contracts and to improve productivity. As
well, we shed light on commonly found gender differences for being honest. In this re-
gard, the behavioral results may add valuable insights for the design and improvement
of institutions. I hope that some of the research presented in this dissertation inspires
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Akbaş, M., D. Ariely, and S. Yuksel (2016). When is inequality fair? an experiment on
the effect of procedural justice and agency. Working Paper.
Akerlof, G. A. (1982). Labor contracts as partial gift exchange. The Quarterly Journal of
Economics 97(4), 543–569.
Akerlof, G. A. and J. L. Yellen (1990). The fair wage-effort hypothesis and unemploy-
ment. The Quarterly Journal of Economics (Vol. 105; No. 2), 255–283.
Algan, Y. and P. Cahuc (2010). Inherited trust and growth. The American Economic
Review 100(5), 2060–2092.
Amir, O., D. G. Rand, et al. (2012). Economic games on the internet: The effect of $1
stakes. PloS one 7(2), e31461.
Anderson, L., R. Fryer, and C. Holt (2006). Discrimination: Experimental evidence from
psychology and economics. Handbook on the Economics of Discrimination, 97–118.
110 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Andreoni, J. and L. Vesterlund (2001). Which is the fair sex? gender differences in
altruism. Quarterly Journal of Economics 1(116), 293–312.
Ariely, D., X. Garcia-Rada, L. Hornuf, and H. Mann (2015). The (true) legacy of two
really existing economic systems. Working paper.
Ashraf, N. and O. Bandiera (2017). Social incentives in organizations. Working paper.
Ashraf, N., O. Bandiera, and B. K. Jack (2014). No margin, no mission? a field experi-
ment on incentives for public service delivery. Journal of Public Economics 120, 1–17.
Azar, O. H., S. Yosef, and M. Bar-Eli (2013). Do customers return excessive change
in a restaurant?: A field experiment on dishonesty. Journal of Economic Behavior &
Organization 93, 219–226.
Babcock, L. and S. Laschever (2009). Women don’t ask: Negotiation and the gender divide.
Princeton University Press.
Bakan, D. (1966). The duality of human existence: An essay on psychology and religion. Rand
McNally.
Balliet, D., C. Parks, and J. Joireman (2009). Social value orientation and cooperation
in social dilemmas: A meta-analysis. Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 12(4),
533–547.
Bandiera, O., I. Barankay, and I. Rasul (2010). Social incentives in the workplace. The
Review of Economic Studies 77(2), 417–458.
Bandiera, O., I. Barankay, and I. Rasul (2011). Field experiments with firms. Journal of
Economic Perspectives 25(3), 63–82.
Bandiera, O., I. Barankay, and I. Rasul (2013). Team incentives: Evidence from a firm
level experiment. Journal of the European Economic Association 11(5), 1079–1114.
Barber, B. M. and T. Odean (2001). Boys will be boys: Gender, overconfidence, and
common stock investment. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 116(1), 261–292.
Bartling, B., E. Fehr, M. A. Maréchal, and D. Schunk (2009). Egalitarianism and com-
petitiveness. The American Economic Review 99(2), 93–98.
Bartling, B. and K. M. Schmidt (2015). Reference points, social norms, and fairness in
contract renegotiations. Journal of the European Economic Association 13(1), 98–129.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 111
Battigalli, P. and M. Dufwenberg (2007). Guilt in games. American Economic Re-
view 97(2), 170–176.
Beal, D. J., R. R. Cohen, M. J. Burke, and C. L. McLendon (2003). Cohesion and perfor-
mance in groups: a meta-analytic clarification of construct relations.
Bell, D. E. (1985). Disappointment in decision making under uncertainty. Operations
Research 33(1), 1–27.
Benabou, R. and J. Tirole (2003). Intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. The Review of Eco-
nomic Studies 70(3), 489–520.
Bénabou, R. and J. Tirole (2011). Identity, morals, and taboos: Beliefs as assets. Quarterly
Journal of Economics 126(2), 805–855.
Berg, J., J. Dickhaut, and K. McCabe (1995). Trust, reciprocity, and social history. Games
and Economic Behavior 10(1), 122–142.
Berger, J., C. Harbring, and D. Sliwka (2013). Performance appraisals and the impact of
forced distribution. an experimental investigation. Management Science 59(1), 54–68.
Biziou-van Pol, L., J. Haenen, A. Novaro, A. O. Liberman, and V. Capraro (2015). Does
telling white lies signal pro-social preferences? Judgment and Decision Making 10(6),
538–548.
Blanco, M., D. Engelmann, A. K. Koch, and H.-T. Normann (2014). Preferences and
beliefs in a sequential social dilemma: a within-subjects analysis. Games and Economic
Behavior 87, 122–135.
Blanco, M., D. Engelmann, and H. T. Normann (2011). A within-subject analysis of
other-regarding preferences. Games and Economic Behavior 72(2), 321–338.
Blanton, H., B. W. Pelham, T. DeHart, and M. Carvallo (2001). Overconfidence as dis-
sonance reduction. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 37(5), 373–385.
Bornstein, G. and I. Erev (1994). The enhancing effect of competition on group coordi-
nation. International Journal of Conflict Management 5(3), 271–283.
Bornstein, G., U. Gneezy, and R. Nagel (2002). The effect of intergroup competition on
group coordination: an experimental study. Games and Economic Behavior 41(1), 1–25.
Bowles, H. R., L. Babcock, and L. Lai (2007). Social incentives for gender differences in
the propensity to initiate negotiations: Sometimes it does hurt to ask. Organizational
Behavior and Human Decision Processes 103(1), 84–103.
112 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bowles, S. and S. Polania-Reyes (2012). Economic incentives and social preferences:
substitutes or complements? Journal of Economic Literature 50(2), 368–425.
Bowles, S. and S. Polanía-Reyes (2012). Economic incentives and social preferences:
Substitutes or complements? Journal of Economic Literature 50(2), 368–425.
Bracha, A., U. Gneezy, and G. Loewenstein (2015). Relative pay and labor supply. Jour-
nal of labor economics 33(2), 297–315.
Brandts, J., A. Riedl, and F. van Winden (2009). Competitive rivalry, social disposition,
and subjective well-being: An experiment. Journal of Public Economics 93(11-12), 1158–
1167.
Breza, E., S. Kaur, and Y. Shamdasani (2016, August). The morale effects of pay inequal-
ity. Working Paper 22491, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Brief, A. P. and S. J. Motowidlo (1986). Prosocial organizational behaviors. The Academy
of Management Review (Vol. 11, No. 4), 710–725.
Bright, D. S., K. S. Cameron, and A. Caza (2006). The amplifying and buffering effects
of virtuousness in downsized organizations. Journal of Business Ethics 64(3), 249–269.
Buckley, E. and R. Croson (2006). Income and wealth heterogeneity in the voluntary
provision of linear public goods. Journal of Public Economics 90(4), 935–955.
Buser, T. and A. Dreber (2015). The flipside of comparative payment schemes. Manage-
ment Science 62(9), 2626–2638.
Cadsby, C. B., N. Du, and F. Song (2016). In-group favoritism and moral decision-
making. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 128, 59–71.
Cadsby, C. B. and E. Maynes (1998). Gender and free riding in a threshold public goods
game: experimental evidence. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 34(4), 603–
620.
Cai, W. and M. Pandey (2015). The agricultural productivity gap in europe. Economic
Inquiry 53(4), 1807–1817.
Camerer, C., L. Babcock, G. Loewenstein, and R. Thaler (1997). Labor supply of new
york city cabdrivers: One day at a time. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 112(2),
407–441.
Camerer, C. and D. Lovallo (1999). Overconfidence and excess entry: An experimental
approach. The American Economic Review 89(1), 306–318.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 113
Cappelen, A. W., A. D. Hole, E. Ø. Sørensen, and B. Tungodden (2007). The pluralism
of fairness ideals: An experimental approach. The American Economic Review 97(3),
818–827.
Cappelen, A. W., J. Konow, E. Ø. Sørensen, and B. Tungodden (2013). Just luck: An
experimental study of risk-taking and fairness. The American Economic Review 103(4),
1398–1413.
Cappelen, A. W., E. Ø. Sørensen, and B. Tungodden (2013). When do we lie? Journal of
Economic Behavior & Organization 93, 258–265.
Capraro, V. (2017). Who lies? a meta-analysis of the effect of sex, age, and education on
honesty. Working Paper.
Card, D., A. Mas, E. Moretti, and E. Saez (2012). Inequality at work: The effect of peer
salaries on job satisfaction. The American Economic Review 102(6), 2981–3003.
Carlsson, F., H. He, and P. Martinsson (2013). Easy come, easy go. Experimental Eco-
nomics 16(2), 190–207.
Carpenter, J. and E. Seki (2011). Do social preferences increase productivity? field
experimental evidence from fishermen in toyama bay. Economic Inquiry 49(2), 612–
630.
Caspi, A., B. W. Roberts, and R. L. Shiner (2005). Personality development: Stability
and change. Annual Review of Psychology 56(56), 453–484.
Chakravarty, S., Y. Ma, and S. Maximiano (2011). Lying and friendship. Working Paper
1007, Department of Consumer Sciences, Purdue University.
Chan, K. S., S. Mestelman, R. Moir, and R. A. Muller (1999). Heterogeneity and the
voluntary provision of public goods. Experimental Economics 2(1), 5–30.
Charness, G. (2004). Attribution and reciprocity in an experimental labor market. Jour-
nal of labor Economics 22(3), 665–688.
Charness, G. and U. Gneezy (2012). Strong evidence for gender differences in risk
taking. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 83(1), 50–58.
Charness, G. and P. Kuhn (2011). Lab labor: What can labor economists learn from the
lab? Handbook of Labor Economics 4, 229–330.
Charness, G., D. Masclet, and M. C. Villeval (2013). The dark side of competition for
status. Management Science 60(1), 38–55.
114 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Charness, G. and A. Viceisza (2015). Three risk-elicitation methods in the field: Evi-
dence from rural Senegal. Review of Behavioral Economics (forthcoming).
Chemin, M. (2012). Does court speed shape economic activity? evidence from a court
reform in india. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 28(3), 460–485.
Chen, D. L. (2011). Markets and morality: How does competition affect moral judg-
ment? Working paper, ETH Zurich.
Chen, D. L., M. Schonger, and C. Wickens (2016). otree - an open-source platform
for laboratory, online, and field experiments. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental
Finance 9, 88–97.
Cherry, T. L., S. Kroll, and J. F. Shogren (2005). The impact of endowment heterogeneity
and origin on public good contributions: evidence from the lab. Journal of Economic
Behavior & Organization 57(3), 357–365.
Childs, J. (2012). Gender differences in lying. Economics Letters 114(2), 147–149.
CIMA (2016). Bonuses cause resentment at two-thirds of uk firms.
http://www.cimaglobal.com/Press/Press-releases/2016/Bonuses-cause-resentment-at-two-
thirds-of-UK-firms/ . [online accessed 13th December 2016].
Clark, A. E. and A. J. Oswald (1996). Satisfaction and comparison income. Journal of
public economics 61(3), 359–381.
Clot, S., G. Grolleau, and L. Ibanez (2014). Smug alert! exploring self-licensing behavior
in a cheating game. Economics Letters 123(2), 191–194.
Coffin, B. (2003). Breaking the silence on white collar crime. Risk Management 50(9), 8–9.
Cohn, A., E. Fehr, and L. Goette (2009). Fairness and effort: Evidence from a field
experiment. Working paper.
Cohn, A. and M. Maréchal (2015). Laboratory measure of cheating predicts school
misconduct. CESifo Working Paper Series No. 5613.
Cohn, A., M. A. Maréchal, and T. Noll (2015). Bad boys: How criminal identity salience
affects rule violation. Review of Economic Studies 82(4), 1289–1308.
Conrads, J., B. Irlenbusch, R. M. Rilke, A. Schielke, and G. Walkowitz (2014). Honesty
in tournaments. Economics Letters 123(1), 90–93.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 115
Conrads, J., B. Irlenbusch, R. M. Rilke, and G. Walkowitz (2013). Lying and team incen-
tives. Journal of Economic Psychology 34, 1–7.
Costa, P. T. and R. R. McCrae (1989). The neo-pi/neo-ffi manual supplement. Odessa,
FL: Psychological Assessment Resources 40.
Crosby, F. (1976). A model of egoistical relative deprivation. Psychological Review 83(2),
85.
Croson, R. and N. Buchan (1999). Gender and culture: International experimental evi-
dence from trust games. American Economic Review 89(2), 386–391.
Croson, R. and U. Gneezy (2009). Gender differences in preferences. Journal of Economic
Literature 47(2), 448–474.
Cullen, Z. and B. Pakzad-Hurson (2017). Equilibrium effects of pay transparency. Work-
ing paper, Harvard Business School.
Dai, Z., F. Galeotti, and M. C. Villeval (2017). Cheating in the lab predicts fraud in the
field: An experiment in public transportation. Forthcoming in Management Science.
Dana, J., R. A. Weber, and J. X. Kuang (2007). Exploiting moral wiggle room: experi-
ments demonstrating an illusory preference for fairness. Economic Theory 33(1), 67–80.
Davis, J. A. (1959). A formal interpretation of the theory of relative deprivation. Sociom-
etry 22(4), 280–296.
De Cremer, D. and P. A. Van Lange (2001). Why prosocials exhibit greater cooperation
than proselfs: The roles of social responsibility and reciprocity. European Journal of
Personality 15(S1).
De la Rosa, L. E. (2011). Overconfidence and moral hazard. Games and Economic Behav-
ior 73(2), 429–451.
Dechenaux, E., D. Kovenock, and R. M. Sheremeta (2015). A survey of experimental
research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments. Experimental Economics 18(4),
609–669.
DePaulo, B. M. and D. A. Kashy (1998). Everyday lies in close and casual relationships.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 74(1), 63.
DePaulo, B. M., D. A. Kashy, S. E. Kirkendol, M. M. Wyer, and J. A. Epstein (1996).
Lying in everyday life. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 70(5), 979.
116 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Dirks, K. T. and D. L. Ferrin (2003). The use of rewards to increase and decrease trust:
Mediating processses and differential effects. Organization Science 14(1), 18–31.
Disselkamp, M. (2004). Kostenersparnis durch faire verhandlungsfuehrung und medi-
ation. pp. 171–202. Frankfurt a. M., Germany: Bund.
Dixit, A. (2003). Trade expansion and contract enforcement. Journal of Political Econ-
omy 111(6), 1293–1317.
Dohmen, T., A. Falk, D. Huffman, and U. Sunde (2012). The intergenerational trans-
mission of risk and trust attitudes. Review of Economic Studies 79(2), 645–677.
Dorward, A. (2013). Agricultural labour productivity, food prices and sustainable de-
velopment impacts and indicators. Food Policy 39, 40–50.
Drago, R. and G. T. Garvey (1998). Incentives for helping on the job: Theory and evi-
dence. Journal of Labour Economics 16(1), 1–25.
Dreber, A. and M. Johannesson (2008). Gender differences in deception. Economics
Letters 99(1), 197–199.
Eckel, C. C. and P. J. Grossman (1998). Are women less selfish than men?: Evidence
from dictator experiments. Economic Journal 108(448), 726–735.
Eckel, C. C. and P. J. Grossman (2002). Sex differences and statistical stereotyping in
attitudes toward financial risk. Evolution and Human Behavior 23(4), 281–295.
Ehrlinger, J., A. L. Mitchum, and C. S. Dweck (2016). Understanding overconfidence:
Theories of intelligence, preferential attention, and distorted self-assessment. Journal
of Experimental Social Psychology 63, 94–100.
Ellingsen, T. and M. Johannesson (2004). Promises, threats and fairness. The Economic
Journal 114(495), 397–420.
Erat, S. and U. Gneezy (2012). White lies. Management Science 58(4), 723–733.
Erev, I., G. Bornstein, and R. Galili (1993). Constructive intergroup competition as a
solution to the free rider problem: A field experiment. Journal of Experimental Social
Psychology (29), 463–478.
Erkal, N., L. Gangadharan, and N. Nikiforakis (2011). Relative earnings and giving in
a real-effort experiment. American Economic Review 101(7), 3330–3348.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 117
Falk, A. and M. Kosfeld (2006). The hidden costs of control. The American Economic
Review, 1611–1630.
Faravelli, M., L. Friesen, and L. Gangadharan (2015). Selection, tournaments, and dis-
honesty. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 110, 160–175.
Fehr, D. (2016). Is increasing inequality harmful? experimental evidence. Working
Paper.
Fehr, E., H. Bernhard, and B. Rockenbach (2008). Egalitarianism in young children.
Nature 454(7208), 1079–1083.
Fehr, E., U. Fischbacher, and S. Gächter (2002). Strong reciprocity, human cooperation,
and the enforcement of social norms. Human Nature 13(1), 1–25.
Fehr, E. and S. Gächter (2000). Fairness and retaliation: The economics of reciprocity.
The Journal of Economic Perspectives 14(3), 159–181.
Fehr, E. and L. Goette (2007). Do workers work more if wages are high? evidence from
a randomized field experiment. The American Economic Review 97(1), 5.
Fehr, E., L. Goette, and C. Zehnder (2009). A behavioral account of the labor market:
The role of fairness concerns. Annual Review of Economics 1(1), 355–384.
Fehr, E., O. Hart, and C. A. Zehndera (2011). Contracts as reference points?experimental
evidence. The American Economic Review 101(2), 493–525.
Fehr, E., G. Kirchsteiger, and A. Riedl (1993). Does fairness prevent market clearing? an
experimental investigation. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 108(2), 437–459.
Fehr, E., G. Kirchsteiger, and A. Riedl (1998). Gift exchange and reciprocity in competi-
tive experimental markets. European Economic Review 42(1), 1–34.
Fehr, E. and K. M. Schmidt (1999). A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation.
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 817–868.
Fischbacher, U. (2007). z-tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments.
Experimental Economics 10(2), 171–178.
Fischbacher, U. and F. Föllmi-Heusi (2013). Lies in disguise an experimental study on
cheating. Journal of the European Economic Association 11(3), 525–547.
Fischer, S. and K. Grosch (2017). Belief update: Can feedbacks counteract contract
breach? mimeo.
118 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Fischhoff, B., P. Slovic, S. Lichtenstein, S. Read, and B. Combs (1978). How safe is safe
enough? a psychometric study of attitudes towards technological risks and benefits.
Policy Sciences 9(2), 127–152.
Fosgaard, T. R., L. G. Hansen, and M. Piovesan (2013). Separating will from grace: An
experiment on conformity and awareness in cheating. Journal of Economic Behavior &
Organization 93, 279–284.
French, S., K. Kubo, D. Marsden, et al. (2000). Why does performance pay de-motivate:
Financial incentives versus perfrormance appraisal. Technical report, Centre for Eco-
nomic Performance, LSE.
Frey, B. S. and R. Jegen (2001). Motivation crowding theory. Journal of Economic Sur-
veys 15(5), 589–611.
Frey, B. S. and F. Oberholzer-Gee (1997). The cost of price incentives: An empirical
analysis of motivation crowding-out. The American Economic Review 87(4), 746–755.
Friesen, L. and L. Gangadharan (2012). Individual level evidence of dishonesty and the
gender effect. Economics Letters 117(3), 624–626.
Gächter, S., E. J. Johnson, and A. Herrmann (2007). Individual-level loss aversion in
riskless and risky choices.
Geddes, D. and R. A. Baron (1997). Workplace aggression as a consequence of negative
performance feedback. Management Communication Quarterly 10(4), 433–454.
Gee, L. K., M. Migueis, and S. Parsa (2016). Redistributive choices and income inequal-
ity: Experimental evidence for income as a signal of deservingness. Working paper,
Tufts University.
Giacalone, R. A. and J. Greenberg (1997). Antisocial behavior in organizations. Sage.
Gill, D., V. Prowse, and M. Vlassopoulos (2013). Cheating in the workplace: An experi-
mental study of the impact of bonuses and productivity. Journal of Economic Behavior
& Organization 96, 120–134.
Gilligan, C. (1982). In a different voice. Harvard University Press.
Glaeser, E. L., D. I. Laibson, J. A. Scheinkman, and C. L. Soutter (2000). Measuring trust.
The Quarterly Journal of Economics 115(3), 811–846.
Gneezy, U. (2005). Deception: The role of consequences. American Economic Re-
view 95(1), 384–394.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 119
Gneezy, U., K. L. Leonard, and J. A. List (2009, 09). Gender Differences in Competition:
Evidence From a Matrilineal and a Patriarchal Society. Econometrica 77(5), 1637–1664.
Gneezy, U. and J. A. List (2006). Putting behavioral economics to work: Testing for gift
exchange in labor markets using field experiments. Econometrica 74(5), 1365–1384.
Gneezy, U., M. Niederle, and A. Rustichini (2003). Performance in competitive envi-
ronments: Gender differences. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 118(3), 1049–1074.
Gneezy, U. and P. Rey-Biel (2014). On the relative efficiency of performance pay and
noncontingent incentives. Journal of the European Economic Association 12(1), 62–72.
Gneezy, U. and A. Rustichini (2000). Pay enough or don’t pay at all. Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 791–810.
Gollin, D., D. Lagakos, and M. E. Waugh (2014). The agricultural productivity gap. The
Quarterly Journal of Economics 129(2), 939–993.
Gollin, D., S. Parente, and R. Rogerson (2002). The role of agriculture in development.
American Economic Review, 160–164.
Gómez, M., C. Barrett, L. Buck, H. De Groote, S. Ferris, H. Gao, E. McCullough,
D. Miller, H. Outhred, A. Pell, et al. (2011). Research principles for developing coun-
try food value chains. Science 332(6034), 1154–1155.
Greiner, B. (2004). The online recruitment system orsee 2.0-a guide for the organization
of experiments in economics. Working paper, University of Cologne 10(23), 63–104.
Greiner, B. (2015). Subject pool recruitment procedures: organizing experiments with
orsee. Journal of the Economic Science Association 1(1), 114–125.
Griffin, R. W. and Y. P. Lopez (2005). ï£¡bad behaviorï£¡ in organizations: A review and
typology for future research. Journal of Management 31(6), 988–1005.
Grosch, K., M. Ibañez, and A. Viceisza (2017). Competition and prosociality: A field
experiment in ghana. Working Paper.
Grosch, K. and H. Rau (2017a). Gender differences in honesty: The role of social value
orientation. Discussion Papers, Center for European, Governance and Economic Develop-
ment Research No. 308.
Grosch, K. and H. A. Rau (2017b). Do discriminatory pay regimes unleash antisocial
behavior. Working Paper.
120 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Grossman, Z. and D. Owens (2012). An unlucky feeling: Overconfidence and noisy
feedback. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 84(2), 510–524.
Gul, F. (1991). A theory of disappointment aversion. Econometrica: Journal of the Econo-
metric Society, 667–686.
Gurr, T. R. (1970). Why men rebel princeton. NJ: Princeton University.
Gylfason, H. F., A. A. Arnardottir, and K. Kristinsson (2013). More on gender differ-
ences in lying. Economics Letters 119(1), 94–96.
Hackett, S. C. (1994). Is relational exchange possible in the absence of reputations and
repeated contact? Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 360–389.
Hanna, R. and S.-Y. Wang (2013). Dishonesty and selection into public service. Technical
report, Nber.
Hannan, R. L., J. H. Kagel, and D. V. Moser (2002). Partial gift exchange in an exper-
imental labor market: Impact of subject population differences, productivity differ-
ences, and effort requests on behavior. Journal of Labor Economics 20(4), 923–951.
Harbring, C. and B. Irlenbusch (2011). Sabotage in tournaments: Evidence from a labo-
ratory experiment. Management Science 57(4), 611–627.
Harrison, G. W. and J. A. List (2004). Field experiments. Journal of Economic Literature,
1009–1055.
Hart, O. and J. Moore (2008). Contracts as reference points. The Quarterly Journal of
Economics 123(1), 1–48.
Haushofer, J. and E. Fehr (2014). On the psychology of poverty. Science 344(6186),
862–867.
Heath, C., R. P. Larrick, and G. Wu (1999). Goals as reference points. Cognitive Psychol-
ogy 38(1), 79–109.
Heilman, M. E. and T. G. Okimoto (2007). Why are women penalized for success at
male tasks?: the implied communality deficit. Journal of Applied Psychology 92(1), 81.
Henrich, J., S. J. Heine, and A. Norenzayan (2010). Most people are not weird. Na-
ture 466(7302), 29–29.
Hershcovis, M. S., N. Turner, J. Barling, K. A. Arnold, K. E. Dupré, M. Inness, M. M.
LeBlanc, and N. Sivanathan (2007). Predicting workplace aggression: A meta-
analysis. Journal of Applied Psychology 92(1), 228–238.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 121
Hill, R. V., E. Maruyama, and A. Viceisza (2012). Breaking the norm: An empiri-
cal investigation into the unraveling of good behavior. Journal of Development Eco-
nomics 99(1), 150–162.
Hoffman, M. and S. V. Burks (2017). Worker overconfidence: Field evidence and im-
plications for employee turnover and returns from training. Working paper nber no.
w23240.
Holmström, B. (2017, July). Pay for performance and beyond. American Economic Re-
view 107(7), 1753–77.
Holzapfel, S. and M. Wollni (2014). Is globalgap certification of small-scale farmers
sustainable? evidence from thailand. Journal of Development Studies 50(5), 731–747.
Houser, D., S. Vetter, and J. Winter (2012). Fairness and cheating. European Economic
Review 56(8), 1645–1655.
Huang, G. and H. Liu (2017). Expectation-based reference-dependent preferences: Ev-
idence from the used-car retail market. Working paper.
Hugh-Jones, D. (2016). Honesty, beliefs about honesty, and economic growth in 15
countries. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 127, 99–114.
ILO (2016). World employment and social outlook: Trends 2016. Technical report,
International Labour Office.
ILO (2017). World employment and social outlook: Trends for women 2017. Technical
report, International Labour Office.
Irlenbusch, B. and G. K. Ruchala (2008). Relative rewards within team-based compen-
sation. Labour Economics 15(2), 141–167.
Jauernig, J., M. Uhl, and C. Luetge (2016). Competition-induced punishment of winners
and losers: Who is the target? Journal of Economic Psychology 57, 13–25.
Jiang, T. (2013). Cheating in mind games: The subtlety of rules matters. Journal of
Economic Behavior & Organization 93, 328–336.
Johnson, N. D. and A. A. Mislin (2011). Trust games: A meta-analysis. Journal of Eco-
nomic Psychology 32(5), 865–889.
Jones, D. (2010). A weird view of human nature skews psychologists’ studies. Sci-
ence 328(5986), 1627–1627.
122 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Jones, S. E., J. D. Miller, and D. R. Lynam (2011). Personality, antisocial behavior, and
aggression: A meta-analytic review. Journal of Criminal Justice 39(4), 329–337.
Kahneman, D. and A. Tversky (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under
risk. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 263–291.
Kahneman, D. and A. Tversky (2000). Choices, values, and frames. Cambridge University
Press.
Kajackaite, A. and U. Gneezy (2017). Incentives and cheating. Games and Economic
Behavior 102, 433–444.
Kameda, T., M. Takezawa, R. S. Tindale, and C. M. Smith (2002). Social sharing and
risk reduction: Exploring a computational algorithm for the psychology of windfall
gains. Evolution and Human Behavior 23(1), 11–33.
Karau, S. J. and K. D. Williams (1993). Social loafing: A meta-analytic review and
theoretical integration. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 65, 681–706.
Karlan, D. S. (2005). Using experimental economics to measure social capital and pre-
dict financial decisions. The American Economic Review, 1688–1699.
Keck, S. and N. Karelaia (2012). Does competition foster trust? the role of tournament
incentives. Experimental Economics 15(1), 204–228.
Keefer, P. and S. Knack (1997). Why don’t poor countries catch up? a cross-national test
of an institutional explanation. Economic Inquiry 35(3), 590–602.
Keser, C. and F. Van Winden (2000). Conditional cooperation and voluntary contribu-
tions to public goods. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics 102(1), 23–39.
Kilduff, G. J., A. D. Galinsky, E. Gallo, and J. J. Reade (2016). Whatever it takes to win:
Rivalry increases unethical behavior. Academy of Management Journal 59(5), 1508–1534.
Klein, B., R. G. Crawford, and A. A. Alchian (1978). Vertical integration, appropriable
rents, and the competitive contracting process. The Journal of Law and Economics 21(2),
297–326.
Kocher, M. G., P. Martinsson, and M. Visser (2008). Does stake size matter for coopera-
tion and punishment? Economics Letters 99(3), 508–511.
Koeszegi, B. and M. Rabin (2006). A model of reference-dependent preferences. The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1133–1165.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 123
Konow, J. (2000). Fair shares: Accountability and cognitive dissonance in allocation
decisions. The American Economic Review 90(4), 1072–1091.
Kosfeld, M. and S. Neckermann (2011). Getting more work for nothing? symbolic
awards and worker performance. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 3(3),
86–99.
Kruger, J. and D. Dunning (1999). Unskilled and unaware of it: how difficulties in
recognizing one’s own incompetence lead to inflated self-assessments. Journal of Per-
sonality and Social Psychology 77(6), 1121.
Kube, S., M. A. Maréchal, and C. Puppe (2013). Do wage cuts damage work morale?
evidence from a natural field experiment. Journal of the European Economic Associa-
tion 11(4), 853–870.
Kube, S., M. A. Maréchal, and C. Puppea (2012). The currency of reciprocity: Gift
exchange in the workplace. The American Economic Review 102(4), 1644–1662.
Kuznets, S. S. et al. (1971). Economic growth of nations.
Larkin, I. and S. Leider (2012). Incentive schemes, sorting, and behavioral biases of
employees: Experimental evidence. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 4(2),
184–214.
Larrick, R. P., K. A. Burson, and J. B. Soll (2007). Social comparison and confidence:
When thinking you?re better than average predicts overconfidence (and when it does
not). Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 102(1), 76–94.
Lazear, E. P. (1989). Pay equality and industrial politics. Journal of Political Econ-
omy 97(3), 561–580.
Lazear, E. P. (2000a). Performance pay and productivity. American Economic Re-
view 90(5), 1346–1361.
Lazear, E. P. (2000b). The power of incentives. American Economic Review 90(2), 410–414.
Lazear, E. P. and S. Rosen (1981). Rank-order tournaments as optimum labor contracts.
The Journal of Political Economy 89(5), 841–864.
Leana, C. R. and H. J. Van Buren (1999). Organizational social capital and employment
practices. Academy of Management Review (24), 538–555.
124 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Lee, J. J., F. Gino, E. S. Jin, L. K. Rice, and R. A. Josephs (2015). Hormones and ethics:
Understanding the biological basis of unethical conduct. Journal of Experimental Psy-
chology: General 144(5), 891.
Loewenstein, G. and J. S. Lerner (2003). The role of affect in decision making. Handbook
of Affective Science 619(642), 3.
Loomes, G. and R. Sugden (1986). Disappointment and dynamic consistency in choice
under uncertainty. The Review of Economic Studies 53(2), 271–282.
López-Pérez, R. and E. Spiegelman (2012). Do economists lie more? Working Papers in
Economic Analysis.
Mazar, N., O. Amir, and D. Ariely (2008). The dishonesty of honest people: A theory of
self-concept maintenance. Journal of Marketing Research 45(6), 633–644.
Miceli, M. P. and P. W. Mulvey (2000). Consequences of satisfaction with pay systems:
Two field studies. Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society 39(1), 62–87.
Milkman, K. L., L. Huang, and M. E. Schweitzer (2014). Teetering between coopera-
tion and competition: How subtle cues unexpectedly derail coopetitive workplace
relationships. Working paper, University of Pennsylvania.
Miller, J. D. and D. Lynam (2001). Structural models of personality and their relation to
antisocial behavior: a meta-analytic review. Criminology 39(4), 765–798.
Moore, D. A. and P. J. Healy (2008). The trouble with overconfidence. Psychological
review 115(2), 502.
Muehlheusser, G., A. Roider, and N. Wallmeier (2015). Gender differences in honesty:
Groups versus individuals. Economics Letters 128, 25–29.
Müller, S. and H. A. Rau (2016). The relation of risk attitudes and other-regarding
preferences: A within-subjects analysis. European Economic Review 85, 1–7.
Murphy, R. O., K. A. Ackermann, and M. Handgraaf (2011). Measuring social value
orientation. Judgment and Decision Making 6(8), 771–781.
Neuman, J. H. (2004). Injustice, stress, and aggression in organizations. In R.W. Griffin & A.
M. O’Leary-Kelly (Eds.), The dark side of organizational behavior. John Wiley & Sons.
Niederle, M. and L. Vesterlund (2007). Do women shy away from competition? do men
compete too much? The Quartely Journal of Economics (122), 1067–1101.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 125
North, D. C. (1990). Institutions, institutional change and economic performance. Cambridge
university press.
Nunn, N. and L. Wantchekon (2011). The slave trade and the origins of mistrust in
africa. The American Economic Review 101(7), 3221–3252.
Ockenfels, A., D. Sliwka, and P. Werner (2015). Bonus payments and reference point
violations. Management Science 61(7), 1496–1513.
Oettinger, G. S. (1999). An empirical analysis of the daily labor supply of stadium
venors. Journal of political Economy 107(2), 360–392.
Okeke, E. N. and S. Godlonton (2014). Doing wrong to do right? social preferences and
dishonest behavior. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 106, 124–139.
Ortmann, A. and L. K. Tichy (1999). Gender differences in the laboratory: evidence
from prisonerŠs dilemma games. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 39(3),
327–339.
Piliavin, J. A. and R. K. Unger (1985). The helpful but helpless female: Myth or reality.
Women, Gender, and Social Psychology, 149–189.
Ploner, M. and T. Regner (2013). Self-image and moral balancing: An experimental
analysis. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 93, 374–383.
Potters, J. and J. Stoop (2016). Do cheaters in the lab also cheat in the field? European
Economic Review 87, 26–33.
Pratto, F., J. Sidanius, L. M. Stallworth, and B. F. Malle (1994). Social dominance ori-
entation: A personality variable predicting social and political attitudes. Journal of
personality and social psychology 67(4), 741.
Prendergast, C. (1999). The provision of incentives in firms. Journal of Economic Litera-
ture 37(1), 7–63.
Price, C. R. (2012). Gender, competition, and managerial decisions. Management Sci-
ence 58(1), 114–122.
Putnam, R. D. (1995). Bowling alone: America’s declining social capital. Journal of
democracy 6(1), 65–78.
Rabin, M. (1993). Incorporating fairness into game theory and economics. The American
Economic Review, 1281–1302.
126 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Rabin, M. (2000). Risk aversion and expected-utility theory: A calibration theorem.
Econometrica 68(5), 1281–1292.
Rand, D., V. Brescoll, J. Everett, V. Capraro, and H. Barcelo (2016). Social heuristics
and social roles: Intuition favors altruism for women but not for men. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: General 145(4), 389–396.
Reardon, T., C. B. Barrett, J. A. Berdegué, and J. F. Swinnen (2009). Agrifood industry
transformation and small farmers in developing countries. World Development 37(11),
1717–1727.
Rhoades, L. and R. Eisenberger (2002). Perceived organizational support: a review of
the literature.
Riach, P. A. and J. Rich (2002). Field experiments of discrimination in the market place.
The Economic Journal 112(483).
Rosenbaum, S. M., S. Billinger, and N. Stieglitz (2014). Let’s be honest: A review of
experimental evidence of honesty and truth-telling. Journal of Economic Psychology 45,
181–196.
Rudman, L. A. and J. E. Phelan (2008). Backlash effects for disconfirming gender stereo-
types in organizations. Research in Organizational Behavior 28, 61–79.
Sackeim, H. A. and R. C. Gur (1979). Self-deception, other-deception, and self-reported
psychopathology. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology 47(1), 213.
Santos-Pinto, L. (2012). Labor market signaling and self-confidence: wage compression
and the gender pay gap. Journal of Labour Economics 30(4), 873–914.
Sautmann, A. et al. (2011). Contracts for agents with biased beliefs: Some theory and
an experiment. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics.
Savikhin, A. C. and R. M. Sheremeta (2013). Simultaneous decision-making in compet-
itive and cooperative environments. Economic Inquiry 51(2), 1311–1323.
Scheinkman, J. A. and W. Xiong (2003). Overconfidence and speculative bubbles. Jour-
nal of Political Economy 111(6), 1183–1220.
Schurr, A. and I. Ritov (2016). Winning a competition predicts dishonest behavior. Pro-
ceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 113(7), 1754–
1759.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 127
Schwartz, S. H. (1992). Universals in the content and structure of values: Theoretical
advances and empirical tests in 20 countries. Advances in Experimental Social Psychol-
ogy (25), 1–65.
Shalvi, S., J. Dana, M. J. Handgraaf, and C. K. De Dreu (2011). Justified ethicality:
Observing desired counterfactuals modifies ethical perceptions and behavior. Orga-
nizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 115(2), 181–190.
Shalvi, S. and C. K. De Dreu (2014). Oxytocin promotes group-serving dishonesty.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 111(15), 5503–5507.
Shearer, B. (2004). Piece rates, fixed wages and incentives: Evidence from a field exper-
iment. The Review of Economic Studies 71(2), 513–534.
Skarlicki, D. P. and R. Folger (2004). Broadening our understanding of organizational retalia-
tory behavior. In R.W. Griffin & A. M. O’Leary-Kelly (Eds.), The dark side of organizational
behavior. John Wiley & Sons.
Sliwka, D. (2007). Trust as a signal of a social norm and the hidden costs of incentive
schemes. The American Economic Review 97(3), 999–1012.
Staiger, D. and J. H. Stock (1997). Instrumental variables regression with weak instru-
ments. Econometrica 65(3), 557–586.
Teyssier, S. (2012). Inequity and risk aversion in sequential public good games. Public
Choice 151(1–2), 91.
Tirole, J. (2006). Incentives and prosocial behavior. The American Economic Review 96(5),
1652–1678.
Trivers, R. L. (1971). The evolution of reciprocal altruism. The Quarterly Review of Biol-
ogy 46(1), 35–57.
Tversky, A. and D. Kahneman (1975). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and
biases. In Utility, probability, and human decision making, pp. 141–162. Springer.
Van den Assem, M. J., D. Van Dolder, and R. H. Thaler (2012). Split or steal? cooperative
behavior when the stakes are large. Management Science 58(1), 2–20.
van Dijk, F., J. Sonnemans, and F. van Winden (2001). Incentive systems in a real effort
experiment. European Economic Review 45(2), 187–214.
van Dijk, F., J. Sonnemans, and F. van Winden (2002). Social ties in a public good
experiment. Journal of Public Economics 85(2), 275–299.
128 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Van Lange, P. A. and D. M. Kuhlman (1994). Social value orientations and impressions
of partner’s honesty and intelligence: A test of the might versus morality effect. Jour-
nal of Personality and Social Psychology 67(1), 126.
Vanberg, C. (2008). Why do people keep their promises? an experimental test of two
explanations. Econometrica 76(6), 1467–1480.
Zizzo, D. J. (2003). Money burning and rank egalitarianism with random dictators.
Economics Letters 81(2), 263–266.
Zizzo, D. J. (2004). Inequality and procedural fairness in a money-burning and stealing
experiment. In Inequality, Welfare and Income Distribution: Experimental Approaches, pp.
215–247. Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
Zizzo, D. J. and A. J. Oswald (2001). Are people willing to pay to reduce others’ in-
comes? Annales d’Economie et de Statistique, 39–65.
129
Appendix A
Appendix of Chapter 2
130 Appendix A. Appendix of Chapter 2
A.1 Tables
TABLE A.1: Heterogeneous effects on change in PGG and SVO (low dis-
persion; C vs. T )a
(1) (2)







not inequality averse -0.0056 -0.7307
(0.0737) (3.4142)
inequality averse 0.0353 1.6570
(0.0983) (4.3247)
risk seeking 0.0137 0.4230
(0.0144) (0.3580)
dislikes competition 0.0228 -0.7872
(0.0845) (3.6898)
likes competition 0.0069 1.7135
(0.0848) (4.0513)
Work-related variables
does not work in teams -0.0052 -0.1767
(0.0723) (4.0470)
works in teams -0.0350 1.1029
(0.0949) (3.8855)
is not aware of bonus -0.0258 2.1395
(0.0951) (5.1746)





+ Robust standard errors clustered at the session level
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
a This table presents contrasts acrossC and T , i.e. (βC +
βCX)−(β0+βX) as discussed in Section 2.3.3. Contrasts
across R and T are not shown.
b Covariates: PGG or SVO (stage 1), age, female, risk,
preference for competition, months employed, bonus
awareness, job satisfaction, close relations, order of
PGG and SVO, day and time of the session.
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A.2 Experimental Instructions
Information for the reader of the experiment’s instructions:
• The experimental instructions were read out loud by a proctor in the English lan-
guage.
• Reminders for the proctor are marked by square brackets and italics. This infor-
mation is not read aloud but was only meant as a reminder for the proctor.
• Posters were used for illustration which can be found in Appendix A3.
• The “Ballpoint-Activity” is the stage where we implemented treatments. Remem-
ber that we have a high and a low dispersion treatments. In the instructions, num-
bers for the low dispersion are in brackets. To avoid that the proctor reads wrong
numbers out loud, we had separate printed-out instructions for each treatment
(in total six) and blacked numbers that did not belong to the respective treatment.
• Participants received answering sheets and a pen to answer control question and
for actual decision making.
Introduction
Hello. We would like to welcome you to today‘s workshop. This workshop is part of
a study from the University of Goettingen. Kerstin Grosch is part of a study program
called Global Food. The objective of that program is to understand how globalization
affects the living conditions of local communities and how local communities adapt to
deal with the challenges of globalization. Today’s workshop aims at investigating those
questions.
Before we get started, I would like you to stand-up and come to the front. Please bring
all your personal belongings with you as you might sit at a different place.
Now we will give you a participation number. This number will identify you during
the whole workshop. On the tables, you will find the numbers 1 to 15. Please draw a
number from the bag and sit down at the table with the corresponding number.
The workshop will be given in the English language. However, we have individual
question rounds where you can ask questions to our assistants in your local language.
What is this workshop about? During the workshop you will have the opportunity to
earn money. The money that you earn during the workshop will be paid in cash at the
end of the activity. How much you earn will depend on your decisions and luck - so
please listen carefully to the instructions.
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How is your payment calculated? You will receive 2 Cedi for participating in the work-
shop. You will get this payment no matter how you take your decisions in the activities.
[Show at the Poster TW] The workshop is divided into five activities. During each activ-
ity you can earn Cedi. Activity three will be paid for sure as we will explain below. For
the other four activities we will only select ONE decision that will be paid at the end.
To decide which activity will be the one to be paid we will draw one of these four cards.
[Show the cards numbered 1 to 5 – except 3]. After the workshop, you will be asked some
questions by our assistants and do some individual activities.
Before we start, let me explain you something else. This study is designed in a way that
anonymity of participant’s decisions and cash earnings can be assured. To preserve this
anonymity, we ask you that from this point on, you do not talk or try to communicate
with other participants and that everybody takes precautions to maintain the confiden-
tiality of their materials. Please do NOT talk to other participants or use your mobile
phone during the workshop. This said, if at any point you have questions, please do
not hesitate to raise your hand and ask us.
It is very important that if you have any question, please ask us. We will answer your
questions individually. Please wait until one of the assistants comes to you before you
ask your question out loud. We ask you for your understanding regarding this rule.
Before we begin, please verify that you have the following items on your desk:
1. Sheets (held together by a paperclip) turned upside down
2. Six bowls with the individual parts of a ballpoint pen
3. A pen
Please do not turn around the sheets until we say so. You will only turn around ONE
sheet at a certain time. Don’t worry; we make sure that everybody gets the information
WHEN to turn around the next sheet. Your earnings will not only depend on your own
decisions but also on the decisions of somebody else in this room.
[Show at the bottom part of poster TW] You will be paired with another participant. We
will call this other person participant B.
During all five activities in the workshop the pairings will remain fixed and you will
always interact with that exact same person. [Example: point at one participant and say
that this participant is participant no. 2. He could be the one paired with participant no. 8.]
Then those two participants will play all five activities together.)
During or after the workshop, you will not get to know who participant B is and par-
ticipant B will also not learn who you are. However, you will do all five activities with
him or her.
We really want to make sure that everybody understands all activities. Therefore, be-
fore you make your real decision in each activity, we do trivia quizzes and ask you
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control questions to check for your understanding. Please, try to answer those as well
as you can.
Now, we will start with the first activity.
1 Investment Activity (PGG)
[Poster I1] You and participant B are paired together. Each of you receives 10 Cedi for
your individual account. You have to decide how many Cedi you want to transfer to a
joint account. You can put all, some or none of your Cedi into the joint account. The dis-
tribution of Cedi between your individual account and the joint account can be freely
chosen. However, you can only invest in 1 Cedi units. So you can invest 0, 1 Cedi, 2
Cedi, etc. up to 10 Cedi.
Your income from the individual account: [Poster IA1] Each Cedi you do not invest in
the joint account, you can keep for yourself. Nobody except you earns Cedi from your
individual account.
Your income from the joint account: The total amount of money in the joint account
is the money you invested plus the money participant B invested. Each of you receives
0.7 times of the money in the joint account back. You and participant B receive there-
fore the same outcome from the joint account. You will benefit from the money that
participant B put into the joint account. For each joint member, the income from the
joint account will be determined as follows:
Income from the joint account = Money in the joint account x 0.7
Your total income: Your total income consists of the income from your individual ac-
count plus the income from the joint account. Let’s see some examples on how the
payments are calculated.
[Poster I1; 1st example] In this first example somebody invested 2 Cedi in the joint ac-
count and participant B invested 4 Cedi. That means that this person keeps 8 Cedi in
his individual account. Each Cedi in the individual account gives 1 Cedi back. Hence,
the payment in the individual account is 8 Cedi. In total there are 6 Cedi in the joint
account, 2 Cedi that this person invested plus 4 Cedi that participant B invested. Each
Cedi invested in the joint account gives him/her and participant B 0.7 Cedi back. So
the income from the joint account is 6 times 0.7 that is 4.2 Cedi for each person in the
joint account.
The total payment is the sum of the income in the individual account and the income
from the joint account. In total this person would receive 4.2 Cedi from the joint account
plus 8 Cedi from the individual account summing up to a total earning of 12.2 Cedi.
[Poster I2] In order to facilitate the calculations, we prepared this table. The numbers in
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bold in the rows indicate your possible investments in the joint account. The numbers in
bold in the columns indicate the investment of participant B. Coming back to our exam-
ple, if somebody invested 2 Cedi and participant B invested 4 Cedi in the joint account,
the payment is 12.2 Cedi: That is the amount you are earning when you invest 4 and
participant B 2. In the table you can look up what your outcome will be depending on
your decision and participant B’s decision. The outcome in the table corresponds with
the outcome we calculated before.
Example 2
Let’s have a look at another example. How much would participant B receive? [Poster
I1; 2nd example] In this example you invested 4 Cedi in the joint account and kept 6 Cedi
in the individual account. Participant B invested 2 Cedi in the joint account. The total
investment in the joint account is therefore 6 Cedi: 4 that this person invested plus 2
that the other person invested. Each Cedi in the individual account gives 0.7 Cedi back
to each person. Hence the earning from the joint account is 6 Cedi times 0.7 that is 4.2
Cedi. The total earnings are composed of the earnings from the individual account and
the earnings from the joint account, so in total this person receives 6 from the individual
account plus 4.2 from the joint account. In total this person earns 10.2 Cedi.
[Poster I2] Let’s take a look at the table now. This person invested 4 Cedi in the joint
account and participant B invested 2 Cedi [show numbers with the hands] The income for
this participant sums up to 10.2 Cedi.
Let’s compare the earnings of the two participants. The participant who invested 2 Cedi
in the joint account earns 12.2 Cedi when participant B invested 4 Cedi. The participant
who invested 4 Cedi earns 10.2 Cedi when participant B invested 2 Cedi.
Let us take a look at the last example on this poster [show at poster I1; 3rd example]. There,
one person invests 4 Cedi and participant B also invests 4 Cedi. In the joint account are
therefore 8 Cedi that get multiplied by 0.7. The outcome you receive from the joint
money is therefore 8 Cedi times 0.7 which is 5.6. As well as that you kept 6 Cedi in
your individual account. When we sum up the outcome from the joint account 5.6 and
the outcome from the individual account 6, we get your total outcome for that situation
which would be 5.6 plus 6 equals 11.6. We do not need to calculate that – we can also
quickly look the outcome up in the table [show at 4/4 at the Poster I2].
Let’s take a look at another example: How much would participants in a match receive
if both invest nothing [show at the table 0/0] in the joint account? When both you and
participant B invest nothing, both you and participant B keep all your money in your
individual account and keep your 10 Cedi. When both invest all their money, they both
end up with 14 Cedi. [Show at the table with outcomes for “10/10”] Therefore, as both
invest more in the joint account, the earnings increase for both players. If one person
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invests nothing in the joint account at all and participant B puts all his money in the
joint account [Show at the table 0/10], participant A will benefit from his contribution to
the joint account and the earning for participant A would be 17 Cedi. [Show at the table
10/0] If participant 1 contributes all his money to the joint account and participant B
contributes nothing at all – then participant A earns only 7.0 from the joint account and
nothing is left in his individual account as he invested all his money in the joint account.
We are now to do a little trivia quiz! Please, I ask two people of you to come to the
front. Any volunteers? Please raise your hand! [If there are no volunteers, then just call out
two random numbers from 1 to 12. Place them in a way in the front, so they can see the poster
with the payoff table]. Welcome to today’s first trivia quiz. I will ask you questions one
after another. I will call you participant 1, and you participant 2 [look at the respective
persons]. I will start with a first question for participant 1:
Participant 1, what is your payoff if you chose to invest 1 Cedi and participant 2 chose
to invest 8 Cedi in the joint account? [Answer: 15.3 Cedi. If the right answer is given, say
“well done” and if no answer or a wrong answer is given, ask the audience for help].
Participant 2, what is your payoff if you chose to invest 5 Cedi and participant 1 invests
4 Cedi? [Answer: 11.3 Cedi. If the right answer is given, say “well done” and if no answer or
a wrong answer is given, ask the audience for help].
Participant 1, what is your payoff if you chose to invest 3 Cedi and participant 2 invests
10 Cedi? [Answer: 16.1 Cedi. If the right answer is given, say “well done” and if no answer or
a wrong answer is given, ask the audience for help].
Participant 2, what is your payoff if you chose to invest 8 Cedi and participant 1 invests
2 Cedi? [Answer: 9 Cedi. If the right answer is given, say “well done” and if no answer or a
wrong answer is given, ask the audience for help].
Thank you very much, participant 1 and participant 2, for being candidates in our trivia
quiz.
Before we continue, we would like to verify that we had been sufficiently clear with
the explanation of the task. Therefore, we will ask you some questions. Please turn
around the page from your sheet package [Take your “show package” and show how to do
that]. [Show the sheet control questions and point at the respective positions you are talking
about]. We ask you here what your outcome would be if someone called participant A
chose a certain amount as a contribution in the joint account and participant B chose
a certain contribution for the joint account. We ask you to write down the outcome
for participant A in the gaps on the right for those different situations. Similar to the
examples we showed you, you can look up your outcome in the table that you find at
the bottom of your sheet. [show that in front of you on the “show answering sheet”] Put
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your finger on the row that shows your investment, for instant 2 Cedi, and the other
finger in the column that shows your partners contribution, for instant 4 Cedi. Now
look at the cell where the row and the column cross and you can read the outcome for
this combination. [Show again on the respective position on the control sheet] This outcome
is the outcome you write down in the gap right next to each question on your sheet.
Control Questions for ’Investment Activity’
Please start now with answering the questions. Please turn around your sheets as
soon as you have answered all questions. Our assistants will then collect the sheets.
Has everybody answered the questions? We will then now collect the sheets. [Assis-
tants collect sheets]. Now, the assistants will check for your understanding. If we see,
that many of you have not completely understood this activity, we will explain it to you
again. If there are only some that have problems, we will explain it to you individually.
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Now we are ready to start. Nor you or participant B will receive any information on
any investment decisions until the very end of the workshop. We will walk around
now and distribute the envelopes while you turn around the next sheet. There you see
the outcome table again that should help you making your decision. [Wait a little until
everybody has turned around the sheet] Please take now the white envelope and take out
the coins copied on paper. Count if you have 10 coins [wait until everybody has done so].
Remember, use the table to decide how much you want to put in the joint account. The
money you want to invest in the joint account, you put in the brown envelope. The
left-over coins, you keep in your individual account. Those coins you please put in the
white envelope. Make sure that at the end no coin is left on your table.
Does anybody have questions? If yes, please raise your hand now and an assistant will
come individually to you!
Now, all questions are answered and we are ready to start. Please distribute the coins
now in the respective envelopes.
(After ca. 2 minutes): Has everybody made their decisions? Please raise your hand if
you need some additional time. [If somebody does so, wait for another minute – then collect
envelopes.]
Now your task is to guess how much participant B invested in the joint account. If your
guess is right, you earn another 2 Cedi. If your guess deviates 1 unit from the actual
investment of participant B you receive 1 Cedi. If your guess deviates 2 units from par-
ticipant B’s investment, you receive 0.5 Cedi.
[Show the respective sheet and point at the row where to make the cross] Please indicate on
the vertical axis with a cross how much you expect participant B will invest in the joint
account.
Does anybody have questions? If yes, please raise your hand now and an assistant
will come individually to you!
Please take your decision now!
Please turn around your sheet when you finished this activity.
We will now collect the envelopes and the answering sheets.
1 Money Allocation Activity (SVO)
In this activity there are two roles: role A and role B. The person in role A has to actively
decide how to allocate Cedi between participant B and himself/herself. The person in
role B has to accept the preferred allocation by the participant in role A.
You will all actively decide on your preferred allocations (this would be the role A) –
however for which role you will be paid will be determined at the end of the workshop
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Answering sheet for expected contribution of participant B in “investment
Activity”
by luck.
You will be presented a series of decisions like this one [Poster MA; point at 1st decision
set]. Each of the middle lines determines how much you and participant B receive.
Looking at the first middle line, the person in role A receives 7.5 Cedi and participant
B receives 15 Cedi. As we move to the right, the payment for the person in the role A
increases to 8.1, 8.9 up to 12.8. The payment of participant B decreases from 15 to 12.8
at the same time.
The task of the person in role A is to decide on the preferred allocation by marking the
midline with a cross on the preferred distribution [show at 2nd illustration on poster MA].
The marked distribution will determine the payments of the person in Role A and per-
son B in Role B. Only ONE distribution can be marked in each question. In our example
on this poster the person marked the midline for the allocation where he gets 11.4 Cedi
whereas participant B receives 13.4.
After you marked your preferred allocation with the cross, we write in the upper gap
to the right of the question the amount that you would receive if you are selected in
role A (which is 11.4) and the amount that participant B will receive (which is 13.4).
What should you avoid? [Point at the poster with the crossed question] Please do not make
more than one cross. You can only decide on ONE money allocation that is determined
by the mid line that connects the two boxes with the corresponding outcomes. If you
decided for that ONE allocation, please write the CORRESPONDING outcomes in the
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right gaps. Do not make allocations up that are not an option in this activity. You cannot
mark the boxes on the top and bottom, but only the point in the middle line.
We will now do a little trivia quiz! Please, I ask two people of you to come to the front.
Any volunteers? Please raise your hand! [If there are no volunteers, then just call out two
random numbers from 1 to 12. Place them in a way in the front, so they can see the poster with
the decision set]. Welcome to today’s first trivia quiz. I will ask you questions one after
another. I will call you participant 1, which means that you are in role A, and you par-
ticipant 2, which means that you take up the passive role B [look at the respective persons].
I will start with a first question for participant 1:
Participant 1, take a look at the first question on the poster. Choose one allocation and
point with your finger on the respective middle line. In that allocation you chose: How
much would you earn?
Participant 2, in that chosen allocation from participant A, how much would you get?
[if no answer or a wrong answer is given, ask the audience for help].
Participant 1, take another look at the first question on the poster. Choose one alloca-
tion and point with your finger on the respective middle line. In that allocation you
chose: How much would you earn?
Participant 2, in that chosen allocation from participant A, how much would you get?
[if no answer or a wrong answer is given, ask the audience for help].
Thank you very much, participant 1 and participant 2, for being candidates in our trivia
quiz.
Before we continue, we would like to verify that we had been sufficiently clear with the
explanation of the task. Therefore, we will ask you some questions.
[Point at the bottom of the poster]: If a participant who is selected in role A, has taken the
following decision [made the cross at a certain position], how much would he receive?
How much would participant B receive?
Please turn around the next sheet from your sheet package for answering the control
questions [wait for some seconds until everybody has done so]. Have a look at what are the
preferred allocations of that person in that example you can see in front of you. That
person marked his preferred allocation with a cross at the midline. What are the out-
comes for that person and participant B? Please write down the missing outcomes to
the right of each of the three questions for the person and participant B.
Do you have any questions? Please raise your hand! Do you have any other questions?
Start now with answering the control questions! [After a while ask everybody if they have
finished. If not they should raise their hands. Then control sheets get collected.]
We will now collect your answering sheets. Our assistants will quickly check if every-
body in the room has understood the task. If there are some people that are still a little
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Control Questions for “Allocation Activity”
unsecure with the task, they will be approached by one of our assistants. [Look to the
assistants and see if there is a person that needs further explanation – if so, wait until assistant
approached that person and explained the task again to him/her].
In this activity there are not right or wrong answers. That is all about your personal
preferences.
In this activity you will make six decisions. If this activity is chosen for payment, we
will randomly select one question for payment at the end of the workshop. Remember
that only one activity will be selected for payment.
After you have made your decision, write the resulting distribution of Cedi if you were
selected in role A in the gaps on the right. As you can see, your choices influence both
the amount of Cedi you receive as well as the amount participant B receives.
Please turn around the next sheet now. [Wait some seconds until everybody has done so.]
Remember how to approach the task [point again at the poster]: Look at each of the six
different questions carefully. Decide for your preferred allocation and make your cross
at the respective midline. Then fill out the gaps to the right and write down the respec-
tive outcomes for yourself and participant B.
Ballpoint-Activity - Comp
In this activity, your task is to put together ballpoint pens. On your table, you find 6
boxes with the different parts of a pen. [Take the different parts and show each of the parts to
the participants]. To assemble the pen, you need a spring, the refill, the upper brass tube
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and the lower brass tube. First, put the spring on top of the refill. Then insert the refill
with the spring into the upper brass tube. The last step is to set the lower brass tube on
top and turn it until it is fixed on the lower part. Now we see that the pen is working –
that means that if we push the button the ballpoint pen is retractable.
You will have eight minutes for accomplishing this task. Afterwards, your ballpoint
pens will be collected and we will count how many of your assembled ballpoint pens
work. Only pens that are functioning [pressing the push button either exposes or retracts
the ballpoint] will be counted. Please do not tell any other one in the room how many
ballpoint pens you managed to assemble.
Your earnings in this activity depend on the performance of participant B. The person
in the team who puts more ballpoint pens together will earn 15 Cedi (CL 12 Cedi). The
person who puts together less ballpoint pens than participant B will earn 5 Cedi (CL 8
Cedi). In case of a draw, we will randomly assign a “winner”. You will receive your
earnings depending on your performance in any case. Only ballpoint pens that work
will be counted. The average number of ballpoint pens that people had put in this task
is 40. After you accomplished that task, you will get an envelope with your payoff for
this task enclosed.
Are there any questions? Please raise your hand if so.
We will now do a little trivia quiz! Please, I ask two people of you to come to the front.
Any volunteers? Please raise your hand! [If there are no volunteers, then just call out two
random numbers from 1 to 12.]
Welcome to today’s trivia quiz. I will ask you now questions one after another. I will
call you participant 1 and you participant 2 [look at the respective persons]. I will start
with a first question for participant 1:
Participant 1, how much would you earn if you assembled 20 ballpoint pens and par-
ticipant 2 32 ballpoint pens? [Answer is 5 or 8 respectively. If no answer or a wrong answer
is given, ask the audience for help]. How much would participant B earn? 12 / 8
Participant 2, how much would you earn if you assembled 41 ballpoint pens and par-
ticipant 2 40 ballpoint pens? [Answer is 15 or 12 respectively. If no answer or a wrong
answer is given, ask the audience for help]. How much would participant B earn? 12 / 8
Participant 1, how much would you earn if you assembled 63 ballpoint pens and par-
ticipant 2 51 ballpoint pens? [Answer is 15 or 12 respectively. If no answer or a wrong
answer is given, ask the audience for help]. How much would participant B earn?
Participant 2, how much would you earn if you assembled 18 ballpoint pens and par-
ticipant 2 55 ballpoint pens? [Answer is 5 or 8 respectively. If no answer or a wrong answer
is given, ask the audience for help]. How much would participant 2 earn?
Thank you very much, participant 1 and participant 2, for being candidates in our trivia
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quiz.
Before we continue, we would like to verify that we had been sufficiently clear with
the explanation of the task. Therefore we will ask you some questions on the respective
outcomes depending on your own performance and the performance of participant B.
For that, please turn around the next sheet. [Wait some seconds until everybody has done
so]. We ask you to write down your respective outcome on the right gap for each of the
three questions. Remember: The participant that assembled more ballpoint pens in this
task will earn 15 Cedi (CL 12 Cedi) whereas the participant that assembles less earns 5
Cedi (CL 8 Cedi). Please start answering the questions now. [Wait until everybody has
done so and collect the answering sheets.]
If you have questions, please raise your hand and we will come to help you.
Control Questions for “Ballpoint Pen Activity”
Our assistants will now collect the answering sheets. They check if you got the answers
right. No problem if you did not get the answers right in the first place! The assistants
will approach participants that they feel need some further explanation.
Before we start with the task, you can try out how to assemble ONE ballpoint pen. You
will not receive any payment for the ballpoint pen that you put together in this practice
round.
We start now with the practice round. Please start now with practicing with only ONE
ballpoint pen!
Please check whether your ballpoint pen is working. Now, please disassemble the ball-
point pen you just assembled in the practice round. [Wait a bit until everybody has done
so].
We are now ready to start with this activity. I will start the stopwatch. As soon as the
time runs out I say stop. Please stop working then immediately and raise both hands
[show how to raise the hands]. Afterwards our assistants will bring you bags with your
participant number in which you can put the assembled ballpoint pens.
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Are there any questions? Please raise your hand and we will come to help you.
After our countdown, you will have eight minutes to work on the task. We tell you
when the time has run out. Please stop working when we say “Time is over”.
Please start after counting: 3, 2, 1, start
... (subjects work on the task)
“There is 1 minute left”/“There are 15 seconds left”
...“3, 2, 1... stop and raise your hands! Please do not work any longer. We collect and
count the assembled ballpoint pens now.”
[Go around, put ballpoint pens in the respective bags, bring them to the front, count pens with
the back facing the participants.]
We ask you now for some patience. The assistants will now count your assembled ball-
point pens. You will receive your payoff for this task in a white envelope then.
I will distribute some drinks now to shorten the time of waiting. Please, do not talk to
any other participant and stay at your seat.
[DO NOT CONTINUE THE ACTIVITY UNLESS FEEDBACK WAS GIVEN]
[Feedback is given: envelopes with money in it will be distributed]
Please look inside the envelope but do not let anybody in this room know how much
money is in there. This outcome you get for your performance in the ballpoint pen
activity. Leave the envelope on your table and take the money out as soon as we have
finished ALL activities.
Ballpoint-Activity - Threshold
In this activity, your task is to put together ballpoint pens. On your table, you find 6
boxes with the different parts of a pen. [Take the different parts and show each of the parts to
the participants]. To assemble the pen, you need a spring, the refill, the upper brass tube
and the lower brass tube. First, put the spring on top of the refill. Then insert the refill
with the spring into the upper brass tube. The last step is to set the lower brass tube on
top and turn it until it is fixed on the lower part. Now we see that the pen is working –
that means that if we push the button the ballpoint pen is retractable.
You will have eight minutes for accomplishing the task. Afterwards, your ballpoint
pens will be collected and we will count how many of your assembled ballpoint pens
work. Only pens that are functioning (pressing the push button either exposes or re-
tracts the ballpoint) will be counted. Please do not tell any other one in the room how
many ballpoint pens you managed to assemble.
What can you earn in this task? You can earn 15 Cedi (TL 12 Cedi) if you put together
equal or more ballpoint pens than the average person does. If you put less ballpoint
144 Appendix A. Appendix of Chapter 2
pens together than the average person then you earn 5 Cedi (TL 8 Cedi). You will re-
ceive your earnings depending on your performance in any case. Only ballpoint pens
that work will be counted. The average number of ballpoint pens that people had put
in this task is 40.
Are there any questions? Please raise your hand if so. We will now do a little trivia
quiz! Please, I ask two people of you to come to the front. Any volunteers? Please raise
your hand! [If there are no volunteers, then just call out two random numbers from 1 to 12.]
Welcome to today’s trivia quiz. I will ask you now questions one after another. I will
call you participant 1 and you participant 2 [look at the respective persons]. I will start
with a first question for participant 1:
Participant 1, how much would you earn if you assembled 20 ballpoint pens and par-
ticipant 2 32 ballpoint pens? [Answer is 5 or 8. If no answer or a wrong answer is given, ask
the audience for help]. How much would participant 2 earn? 5 / 8
Participant 2, how much would you earn if you assembled 41 ballpoint pens and par-
ticipant 1 40 ballpoint pens? [Answer is 12 or 15. If no answer or a wrong answer is given,
ask the audience for help]. How much would participant 2 earn? 12 / 15
Participant 1, how much would you earn if you assembled 63 ballpoint pens and par-
ticipant 2 51 ballpoint pens? [Answer is 12 or 15. If no answer or a wrong answer is given,
ask the audience for help]. How much would participant 2 earn? 12 / 15
Participant 2, how much would you earn if you assembled 18 ballpoint pens and par-
ticipant 1 55 ballpoint pens? [Answer is 5 or 8. If no answer or a wrong answer is given, ask
the audience for help]. How much would participant 1 earn? 12 / 15
Thank you very much, participant 1 and participant 2, for being candidates in our trivia
quiz.
Before we continue, we would like to verify that we had been sufficiently clear with
the explanation of the task. Therefore we will ask you some questions on the respective
outcomes depending on your own performance and the performance of participant B.
For that, please turn around the next sheet. [Wait some seconds until everybody has done
so]. We ask you to write down your respective outcome on the right gap for each of the
three questions. Remember: The person that assembled more or equal than 40 ballpoint
pens in this task will earn 15 Cedi (TL 12 Cedi) whereas the participant that assembles
less than 40 ballpoints will earn 5 Cedi (TL 8 Cedi). Please start answering the questions
now. [Wait until everybody has done so and collect the answering sheets.]
Before we start with the task, you can try out how to assemble ONE ballpoint pen. You
will not receive any payment on the ballpoint pen that you put together in this practice
round.
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We start now with the practice round. Please start now with practicing with only ONE
ballpoint pen!
Please check whether your ballpoint pen is working. Now, please disassemble the ball-
point pen you just assembled in the practice round. [Wait a bit until everybody has done
so.]
We are now ready to start with this activity. I will start the stopwatch. As soon as the
time runs out I say stop. Please stop working then immediately and raise both hands
[show how to raise the hands].
Are there any questions? Please raise your hand and we will come to help you.
After our countdown, you will have eight minutes to work on the task. We tell you
when the time has run out. Please stop working when we say “Time is over”.
Please start after counting: 3, 2, 1, start
(subjects work on the task)
...“There is 1 minute left”/“There are 15 seconds left”
...“3, 2, 1... stop and raise your hands! Please do not work any longer. We collect and
count the assembled ballpoint pens now.”
[Go around, put ballpoint pens in the respective bags, bring them to the front, count pens with
the back facing the participants.]
We ask you now for some patience. The assistants will now count your assembled ball-
point pens. Then, we will see if you managed to assemble more or less than 40. You
will receive your payoff for this task in a white envelope then.
I will distribute some drinks now to shorten the time of waiting. Please, do not talk to
any other participant and stay at your seat.
[DO NOT CONTINUE THE ACTIVITY UNLESS FEEDBACK WAS GIVEN]
[Feedback is given: envelopes with money in it will be distributed]
Please look inside the envelope but do not let anybody in this room know how much
money is in there. This outcome you get for your performance in the ballpoint pen
activity. Leave the envelope on your table and take the money out as we have finished
all activities.
Ballpoint-Activity - Random
In this activity, your task is to put together ballpoint pens. On your table, you find 6
boxes with the different parts of a pen. [Take the different parts and show each of the parts to
the participants]. To assemble the pen, you need a spring, the refill, the upper brass tube
and the lower brass tube. First, put the spring on top of the refill. Then insert the refill
with the spring into the upper brass tube. The last step is to set the lower brass tube on
top and turn it until it is fixed on the lower part. Now we see that the pen is working –
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that means that if we push the button the ballpoint pen is retractable.
You will have eight minutes for accomplishing the task. Afterwards, your ballpoint
pens will be collected and we will count how many of your assembled ballpoint pens
work. Only pens that are functioning (pressing the push button either exposes or re-
tracts the ballpoint) will be counted. Please do not tell any other one in the room how
many ballpoint pens you managed to ensemble.
Your earnings in this activity depend on participant B. One person in the team will earn
15 Cedi (RL 12 Cedi) whereas the other person will earn 5 Cedi (RL 8 Cedi). We will
randomly decide who will receive 15 Cedi (RL 12 Cedi) or 5 Cedi (RL 8 Cedi). You will
receive your earnings in any case. Only ballpoint pens that work will be counted. The
average number of ballpoint pens that people had put in this task is 40. After you ac-
complished that task, you will get an envelope with your payoff for this task enclosed.
Are there any questions? Please raise your hand if so.
We will now do a little trivia quiz! Please, I ask two people of you to come to the front.
Any volunteers? Please raise your hand! [If there are no volunteers, then just call out two
random numbers from 1 to 12.]
Welcome to today’s trivia quiz. I will ask you now questions one after another. I will
call you participant 1 and you participant 2 [look at the respective persons]. I will start
with a first question for participant 1:
Participant 1, how much would you earn if you assembled 20 ballpoint pens and par-
ticipant 2 32 ballpoint pens? [Answer: 5 or 15 (8 or 12). If no answer or a wrong answer is
given, ask the audience for help]. How much would participant 2 earn? 5 or 15 (8 or 12).
Participant 2, how much would you earn if you assembled 41 ballpoint pens and par-
ticipant 1 40 ballpoint pens? [Answer is 5 or 15 (8 or 12). If no answer or a wrong answer is
given, ask the audience for help]. How much would participant 2 earn? 5 or 15 (8 or 12).
Participant 1, how much would you earn if you assembled 63 ballpoint pens and par-
ticipant 2 51 ballpoint pens? [Answer is 5 or 15 (8 or 12). If no answer or a wrong answer is
given, ask the audience for help]. How much would participant 2 earn? 5 or 15 (8 or 12).
Participant 2, how much would you earn if you assembled 18 ballpoint pens and par-
ticipant 1 55 ballpoint pens? [Answer is 5 or 15 (8 or 12). If no answer or a wrong answer is
given, ask the audience for help]. How much would participant 1 earn? 5 or 15 (8 or 12).
Thank you very much, participant 1 and participant 2, for being candidates in our trivia
quiz.
Before we continue, we would like to verify that we had been sufficiently clear with
the explanation of the task. Therefore we will ask you some questions on the respective
outcomes depending on your own performance and the performance of participant B.
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For that, please turn around the next sheet. [Wait some seconds until everybody has done
so]. We ask you to write down your respective outcome on the right gap for each of the
three questions. Remember: We will randomly assign either you or participant a payoff
of 15 Cedi or 5 Cedi (RL 12 Cedi or 8 Cedi). Please start answering the questions now.
[Wait until everybody has done so and collect the answering sheets.]
Before we start with the task, you can try out how to assemble ONE ballpoint pen. You
will not receive any payment on the ballpoint pen that you put together in this practice
round.
We start now with the practice round. Please start now with practicing with only ONE
ballpoint pen!
Please check whether your ballpoint pen is working. Now, please disassemble the ball-
point pen you just assembled in the practice round. [Wait a bit until everybody has done
so.]
We are now ready to start with this activity. I will start the stopwatch. As soon as the
time runs out I say stop. Please stop working then immediately and raise both hands
show how to raise the hands.
Are there any questions? Please raise your hand and we will come to help you.
After our countdown, you will have eight minutes to work on the task. We tell you
when the time has run out. Please stop working when we say “Time is over”.
Please start after counting: 3, 2, 1, start
...(subjects work on the task)
“There is 1 minute left”/“There are 15 seconds left”
...“3, 2, 1... stop and raise your hands! Please do not work any longer. We collect and
count the assembled ballpoint pens now.”
[Go around, put ballpoint pens in the respective bags, bring them to the front and count pens
with the back facing the participants.]
We ask you now for some patience. The assistants will now count your assembled ball-
point pens. You will receive your payoff for this task in a white envelope.
I will distribute some drinks now to shorten the time of waiting. Please, do not talk to
any other participant and stay at your seat.
[DO NOT CONTINUE THE ACTIVITY UNLESS FEEDBACK WAS GIVEN]
[Feedback is given: envelopes with money in it will be distributed]
Please look inside the envelope but do not let anybody in this room know how much
money is in there. This outcome you get for your performance in the ballpoint pen
activity. Leave the envelope on your table and take the money out as we have finished
all activities.
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2 Investment Activity (PGG)
[Poster I1] We will now do the investment activity again. You have been already part of
the investment activity earlier on. We will quickly remind you what this activity was
about: You received 10 Cedi. This money you have in your individual account. [Poster
I1] You have to decide how much you want to keep and how much you want to invest
in the joint account with participant B. Each Cedi kept in your individual account, will
give you one Cedi back. Only you receive Cedi from the individual account. Each Cedi
that you contribute to the joint account will be summed up with the contribution of par-
ticipant B and multiplied by 0.7. Both you and participant B receive the same number
of Cedi from the joint account independently on how much each of you two invests.
Do you have any questions? Please raise your hand!
You can now turn around the next sheet which you use as an orientation for your out-
come only. Our assistants will now walk around and give you your envelopes back.
Remember, you will get the white one which represents your individual account and
you will get the brown envelope representing the joint account. [Wait until everybody got
their envelopes back]. Please take now the white envelope and take out the coins. Count
if you have 10 coins. Then, please put in the white envelope the amount of money
you want to keep in your individual account and in the brown envelope the amount of
money you want to invest in the joint account. Make your decision now.
Now your task is to guess how much participant B invested in the joint account. If your
guess is right, you earn another 2 Cedi. If your guess deviates 0.5 units from the actual
investment of participant B you receive 1 Cedi. If your guess deviates 10 units from
participant B’s investment, you receive 0.5 Cedi.
[Show the respective sheet and point at the row where to make the cross] Please indicate on
the vertical axis with a cross how much you expect participant B will invest in the joint
account.
Please turn around your sheet when you finished this activity.
We now collect your answering sheets.
2 Money Allocation Activity (SVO)
In this activity we repeat the money allocation activity. We will shortly summarize this
activity for you. [Show poster MA] In this activity one person is selected to take up
role A. This person has to decide on the preferred allocation of income between him-
self/herself and participant B. Participants in role B have to accept any Cedi allocation
chosen by the participant in role A.
A.2. Experimental Instructions 149
[Point at the respective places on the poster] Remember the approach for this task: First,
look carefully at the question and decide on your preferred allocation. Mark the mid-
line for that particular allocation. Then write down the respective outcome on the gaps
to the right of each decision set.
You will be making six decisions and you can only make ONE mark for each question.
If this activity is chosen for payment at the end, we will randomly select one for pay-
ment among the six questions.
Do you have any questions? Please raise your hand!
Now, we would like to start. Please turn around the last sheet for today. [Wait some
seconds.] Please mark the midline for the distribution you prefer for each question and
write down the corresponding outcomes on the right of each question. Please turn
around your sheet when you finished this activity.
Selection of activity for payment: This was the last activity for this workshop. Now
we will select which activity will be paid. Please select one of these four cards. [Show
the cards with the numbers 1 to 4] The activity selected for payment is the activity No. X
(If the selected activity is the allocation activity) In this activity, we have two roles. Ker-
stin will select who takes up the role A and who takes up the role B. [Select one card
for each pair.] In this activity you took six decisions. Now we will select which of the
decisions is paid [select one of six cards]. The selected decision for payment is the deci-
sion X. In this decision, the allocation decision was to distribute ... [Show the respective
answering sheet]
Material: We kindly ask you to leave all ballpoint pens here. We plan to run more
workshops the upcoming days and are reliant on all the material. Please, also take out
the money your earned in activity 3 from the white envelope and leave the envelope
on the table. Thank you for your understanding.
Confidentiality: We ask you not to talk to your colleagues or to anybody else about the
content of today’s workshop. As well as that, please keep the information that you can
earn money in this workshop confidential. Otherwise, you take away the nice surprise
from other potentially invited participants to this workshop. Furthermore, we ask you
not to talk even with the other people in the room about your earnings. How much you
will earn depends on your decisions but also on luck. If you talk to other participant’s
about your earning it does not say anything about how well you made your decisions.
Questionnaire: While we estimate the payments, we kindly ask you to help us filling
out a questionnaire. Our assistants will approach you one by one. Those who finished
filling out the questionnaire, please stay around for some time until Kerstin did the cal-
culations for your payments. Please bring the questionnaire with you. Those who are
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not yet ready, please wait until one of our enumerators approaches you. The ones that
are not filling out questionnaires are free to walk around in the room. Everybody is free
to take one package of biscuits and one soft drink.
End
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FIGURE A.1: Poster for ’Investment Activity’ (“IA”)
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Poster Payoff Matrix for ’Investment Activity’ (“I2”)
154 Appendix A. Appendix of Chapter 2
FIGURE A.2: Poster Money Allocation Activity (“MA”)
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A.4 Questionnaire
Information for the reader of the experiment’s questionnaire:
• We had eight enumerators who interviewed participants one by one.
• Questions in Section “A. Workshop” are about the experimental session. These
few questions were asked after the experimental session. All other questions (and
the little experiments for eliciting competitive, inequality and risk preferences)





Dear Respondent! My name is _________________________. This study has been organized by the University of Göttingen. 
Your cooperation in answering these questions is very much appreciated. There are no “right” or “wrong” answers to any of these 
questions and you will not be judged in any way based on your responses. Please answer all questions as accurately and truthfully 
as possible. The survey will take no more than 40 minutes. We assure you that your individual responses will not be disclosed to 
anyone. Your responses will be treated as completely confidential and will be used for research purposes only!  
 
INTERVIEW PROTOCOL 
1. Name of Enumerator  2. SNo./PNo. / 3. Employee No.  
 
A. WORKSHOP. Let me ask you some questions regarding the workshop. 
Question  Answers 
A1. How could you make most money in the 
investment activity?    
1 Investment of GHC 0  2 Investment of GHC 10  3 Investment of an amount 
between GHC0 and GHC 10  4 It depends on participant B’s decision 
 
Questions Not at all  Not very Somehow Quite Very 
A2. How interesting were the activities for you?          
A3. How hard have you tried to do the activities to the best of your  
ability?      
 
We will now ask you two questions about the activity where you assembled ballpoint pens: 
Items Not at all 
 Small 





A4. To what extent does your outcome reflect the effort you have put into 
your work?      
A5. To what extent is your outcome justified, given your performance?      
A6. Please rate now how closely attached you felt to participant B 
throughout the experiment?      
A7. How rival have you felt towards participants B?      
 
A8. How many people do you know of the 
other participants who sat in this room? 
 
 
               A9. Of those people you know: How many  
would you say you have a close relationship with? 
 
 No. of  Girls and Boys 
Before, we continue with the other questions, we will now do some activities again (see extra sheet). You will be only paid  paid      
for one of the next two activities.      
A10 !!! FEHR-ALLOCATION-ACTIVITY: You will now take some decisions on how to allocate money 
between yourself and a matched partner in this room. Who the matched partner is, will Kerstin randomly decide by 
drawing a number card with a participant number. You will be either selected in role A or role B like in the 
allocation activity during the workshop.  
We ask you in total three questions. You have to decide between two different allocation options in each question. 
You need to decide which of the two options you prefer. What the partner receives, we will put in this mint 
envelope [show envelope]. What you receive, we will put in this white envelope. You will be paid for sure for this 
task. Mind that your decision affects also the outcome of somebody else in this room! The money will be handed 
out to you at the very end of the workshop.  
 
A11 !!! MARBLE ACTIVITY: I will place one marble on the ground. With a rope, I will measure a certain distance. Your 
task is to stand 1meter and hit the marble lying on the ground with another marble. We will count how many times you hit the 
marble. We will play three rounds. You have 10 shots for each round. At the very end of the workshop you will be paid for this 
activity as we explain below. Before we continue, please try five times to get a feeling for that activity! 




A12: The Grain Farmer – on extra sheet! 
 
SECTION B: WORKER INFORMATION 
B1. Surname of Worker:   B2. Name(s)   
B3. Gender: 1   Male  2  Female 
B4. Is English your 
mother-ton tongue?  
1  Yes  2  No 
B5. Age (in years) 
   years 
 
B6.    How many people live in your household?  No. of People including Children 
B7.    How many are children below 15 years?  No. of  Children 
B8.    In how many houses are all the household  members 
accomodated? 
 No. of  Houses 
B8. How many bedrooms does your house(s) have to accommodate all 
persons in the household? 
 Bedrooms (amount) 
B9. What is the monthly income in your household? (Please give your best estimate!) 
1 Less than GHC160       2 Between GHC160-299  3 Between GHC 300-499       4 Between GHC 500-999    5 More than GHC 1000 
B10. Are you, in your household, the person 
who contributes most to the household income?  
 1   Yes;        2 No        3 As much as others (50 + 50) 
B11. Marital Status  1 Married       2 Single     3 Separated        4 Divorced        5 Widowed 
B12. What is your main ethnicity? 
 
1 Akan           2 Ewe        3 Ga/Dangbe      4 Krobo             5 Hausa   
 
6  Other (specify)  ______________________________________________ 
B13. What was the last school level you 
attended?  
0 None                             1 Primary School;                 2 JSS/JHS Middle 
School       3 SHS -High School        4 HND / Diploma (Go to B14) 
5 Graduate / Post-graduate – University (Go to B14) 
B14. At  this level, how many years have you 
approved? 
 _______  Years 
 
SECTION BII. PREFERENCES  












B14. How do you see yourself: Are you generally a person who is fully 












B15. Are you generally an impatient person, or someone who always 
shows great patience?      
 
 
B16. Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they        1 Most people take advantage   2 Most people try to be fair 
got a chance, or would they try to be fair? 
 
B17. Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or       1 Most people can be trusted   2 Need to be very careful 
that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?  
  
B18. Imagine that you received a gift of money. You can choose between getting the gift tomorrow or in one month. If you wait one month, 
you will receive more money. Would you prefer to get:   
 Tomorrow In one month 
a- GHC100 tomorrow or GHC110 in one month?    |______|     |______| 
b- GHC100 tomorrow or GHC120 in one month?    |______|     |______| 




d- GHC100 tomorrow or GHC140 in one month?    |______|     |______| 
 
B19. Given you had the option to get a gift tomorrow of GHC100 – how much money would somebody has to offer you that you 
would be willing to wait for one month for that gift?         |__|__|__| 
C. OPINION 












C1. Many of the unhappy things in people's lives are partly due to bad luck.      
C2. Becoming a success is a matter of hard work, luck has little or nothing 
to do with it.      
C3. Many times we might just as well decide what to do by flipping a coin.      
C4. I feel that I am a person of worth, at least on an equal plane with others.      
C5. I am able to do things as well as most other people.      
C6. On the whole, I am satisfied with myself.      
 
D. PERSONALITY 
Here we briefly describe some other guy. Please listen to each description and think about how much that person is or 
is not like you.  
Items 





like me Like me 
Very much 
like me 
D1. It's very important to him to help the people around him. He 
wants to care for their well-being.      
D2. It's important to him to show his abilities. He wants people to 
admire what he does.      
D3. He believes that people should do what they're told. He thinks 
people should follow rules at all times, even when no-one is 
watching. 
     
D4. It is important to him that he does his job better than others.      
D5. He relies on himself most of the time; he rarely relies on 
others.      
D6. If a co-worker gets a prize, he would feel proud.      
D7. The well-being of his co-workers is important to him.      
 
E. WAGE EMPLOYMENT  
E1. When did you start your employment?    Month/ Year 
E2. How many hours do you work per day on average?   Hours 
E3. What is your salary?   GH₵ per month 
E4. If salary is paid per crate/ box, how many do you fill per 
day?  
  Number (if the salary is not paid per crate/box, make a cross) 
E5. Is overtime paid extra?   1 = Yes / 2 = I don’t work extra hours / 3 = The company does 
not pay overtime / 4 = No   >>> E6 
E6a. If yes, how much?   GH₵ per hour 
E6. Do you get extra payments based on the overall 
performance of the company? 
  1 = Yes / 2 = No 
E7. Do you get extra payments based on the overall 
performance of a group (for instant targets)? 
  1 = Yes / 2 = No 
E7a. If you get a production/productivity bonus – how much  GH₵ per month (if no “Productivity Bonus” is received, make 
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do you get on average per month? a cross) 
E7b. If you get a bonus for high quality work – how much do 
you get on average per month? 
 GH₵ per month  (if no “Quality Bonus” is received, make a 
cross) 
E8a. On average, what is the amount you get usually as an 
attendance bonus? 
  GH₵ 
E9. Everything included, what do you earn within a month on 
average? 
  GH₵ 
E10. Which of the following alternatives would best describe 
your skills in your own work? 
  
1 I need further training to cope well with my duties 2 My 
duties correspond well with my present skills 3 I have the 
skills to cope more demanding duties 
E11. Do you feel bullied/ discriminated at work?   1 Yes                2 No (Go to F1) 
E2a. If yes, why? 
 
1 Threats of physical violence; 2= Bullying/ harassment 3 
Discrimination linked to ethnic background;  4 Other, please 
specify_______________ 
F. JOB SATISFACTION  
Statement 
Terrible Unhappy Mixed  
Mostly 
satisfied Pleased 
F1. How satisfied are you with the working conditions at Golden 
Exotics?      
F2. How do you feel about your job?      
F3. How do you feel about the people you work with – your co-workers?      
G. ORGANIZATIONAL IDENTIFICATION / COMMITMENT  












G1. When someone criticizes [CN], it feels like a personal insult      
G2. In general, I view [CN] problems as my problems      
G3. I am willing to put in a great deal of effort beyond that normally 
expected in order to help [CN] to be successful.      
G4. There are often breakdowns in communication here*      
G5. People are suspicious of other departments /working groups*      
G6. There is very little conflict between departments/working groups 
here       
G7. Does your job involve doing all or part of your work in a team? Yes No 
          [If yes, ask the following, if not jump to ENDING]      
G8. I feel strong ties with my working group      
G9. The supervisors at [CN] do not foster competition between 
workers*      
G10. Suggestions and contributions of team members are respected.      
G11. There were many personal conflicts in our team.*      
G12. Every team member feels responsible for maintaining and 
protecting the team.      
ENDING: Thank you very much for answering the questions. Please take the questionnaire and go to 
Kerstin to receive your payment for today. If there is a queue, please keep some distance to her desk and 
wait until she is free.
A.4. Questionnaire 159
 MARBLE_ACTIVITY/FEHR-ALLOC  
 
 
A10: FEHR-ALLOCATION; PARTICIPANT:  |________| 













 Round 1: In this round, you will be matched with someone else in this room. Kerstin will 
draw any other participant number afterwards to determine your matched partner. 
Depending on who of you two will hit the marble more often, will get GHC2,5 whereas the 
other one receives GHC0,5. Start now with your ten throws! 
 Round 2: In this round, you will get for each hit GHC 0,25! Start now with your 10 
throws! 
 Round 3: In this round, you can decide on how you want to be paid: 
Option 1: Get paid GHC 0,25 for each marble hit 
Option 2: Become matched with somebody else and you will receive GHC2,5 if your 
performance is better than the performance of your matched partner. Otherwise you will 
receive GHC0,5. 
For which option do you decide?   OPTION  |_____| 
 












Round Option 1 
YOU / Partner 
Option 2 
YOU / Partner 
Decision (Option1 or 2) Information for 
Kerstin only 
ENV 0,50 / 0,50 0,50 / 1,00 |______| 3 
PRO 0,50 / 0,50 0,50 / 0,00 |______| 2 
SHA 0,50 / 0,50 1,00 / 0,50 |______| 1 
Round Performance Information for Kerstin only 
1  COMPETITION 
2  PIECE-RATE 
3  SELF-SELECTION 
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A12: The Grain-Farmer 
 
We are on the Golden Exotics banana plantation right now. There is good weather and bad 
weather for bananas. Which of the two pictures stands for good weather and which stands for bad 
weather? 
Imagine that you are a grain farmer and you are given 10 kilos of seeds for free for the coming 
season. You can choose between two different types of seeds to take. You can either take the 
seeds of Abdu or of Bara. It is important that you realize you can take as many kilos of Abdu and 
Bara seeds as you want as long as at the end you are taking 10 kilos in total—no more and no 
less. On your answer sheet you will see a place for you to write how many Abdu seeds and Bara 
seeds you will take. 
 Explanation of the differences of Abdu and Bara seed: Abdu seed is of higher quality than Bara 
seed but is more vulnerable to the weather.That is, when there is good weather the Abdu seed 
produces a harvest that sells for GHC 300. When the weather is bad the harvest is so bad that it cannot 
be sold, eaten, or fed to the animals. On the other hand, the Bara seed does not respond to the weather 
and always gives GHC 100 per kilo. 
 Go through the different columns for the ABDU seed and explain the different quantities of Abdu seed 
affect one*s income from the harvest given GOOD weather (afterwards bad weather)!  
 Go through the different columns for the BARA seed and explain the different quantities of Abdu seed 
affect one*s income from the harvest given GOOD weather (afterwards bad weather)! 
 Ask control questions: If the weather is good and one had 5 kilos of bara seeds, how many Abdu seeds 
does one have? How much money does one make from these Bara seeds? … from these Abdu seeds? 
In total? (repeat those type of questions until you feel confident about understanding) 
 Tell about weather: That it is unknown if there is bad weather or good weather. The chance of good 



























 0 10 0 1000 1000 0 1000 1000 
 1 9 300 900 1200 0 900 900 
 2 8 600 800 1400 0 800 800 
 3 7 900 700 1600 0 700 700 
 4 6 1200 600 1800 0 600 600 
 5 5 1500 500 2000 0 500 500 
 6 4 1800 400 2200 0 400 400 
 7 3 2100 300 2400 0 300 300 
 8 2 2400 200 2600 0 200 200 
 9 1 2700 100 2800 0 100 100 
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B.1 Tables
TABLE B.1: Summary statistics on destructive behavior and performance
in the treatments
Discrimination Competition Random All data
Number of observations
Type B 40 48 38 126
Type A5 20 24 19 63
Type A15 20 24 19 63
All data 80 96 76 252
destruction level
Type B 1.80 1.27 0.89 1.33
Type A5 0.70 0.42 0.89 0.65
Type A15 0.60 0.75 1.32 0.87
All data 1.23 0.93 1.00 1.04
destruction frequency
Type B 0.50 0.31 0.29 0.37
Type A5 0.20 0.21 0.32 0.24
Type A15 0.25 0.25 0.42 0.30
All data 0.36 0.27 0.33 0.32
performance (RE task)
Type B 30.65 24.60 23.58 26.21
Type A (A5 & A15) 29.43 36.69 25.29 28.58
Type A5 23.85 32.96 25.53 27.83
Type A15 35.00 40.42 25.05 34.06
All data 30.03 30.65 24.43 28.58
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TABLE B.2: Inequality-aversion interactions for Table 3.2
destruction level of type-B workers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Inequality Aversion
Alpha 0.184*** 0.176*** 0.183*** 0.175 0.162
(0.063) (0.063) (0.065) (0.108) (0.106)
Beta -0.798** -0.794** -0.986** -1.366 -1.385
(0.358) (0.363) (0.386) (0.873) (0.863)
Alpha x Unj. Base -0.163 -0.152
(0.242) (0.242)
Beta x Unj. Base -1.018 -1.068
(1.199) (1.203)
Alpha x Unj. Random -0.127 -0.0998
(0.204) (0.203)
Beta x Unj. Random 1.243 1.012
(1.136) (1.182)
Pseudo R2 0.053 0.064 0.103 0.115 0.117
Obs. 126 126 126 126 126
Covariates NO NO NO NO YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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B.2 Experimental instructions
Information for the reader of the experiment’s instructions:
• The experiment was conducted in the German language at the University of Goet-
tingen. This is a translation of the original text.
• To ease readability/understanding, words or explanations are added. This is
marked by square brackets.
• We conducted the experiment on computers with z-tree. The instructions were
displayed on the screen, except for the real-effort task. For the real-effort task, we
handed out printed instructions.
Introduction
Welcome to the experiment. We are glad that you made time for participating today.
Participants earn at least e5 today. Depending on your decisions and the decisions
of the other participants, you may earn additional money during the experiment. We
guarantee your anonymity during and after the experiment. Please do not talk to other
participants and switch off your mobile phone. The experiment contains a small ques-
tionnaire, the experiment with four phases and a concluding questionnaire. You will
get instructions at the beginning of each phase. Please look at your display now and
answer the following questions.
Phase 1
Phase 1a [Social Value Orientation]
We will now start with the instructions for phase 1. It contains three parts: 1a, 1b and 1c.
Please press “ok” and we will start with the instructions for phase 1a. Here, the com-
puter will randomly match you with another participant. Then, you and the matched
participant will simultaneously face multiple decisions. The identity of you and the
matched partner will not be revealed during or after the experiment. Decisions will be
made in Tokens with an exchange rate of 1 Token = 0.02 Euro. You will face six dif-
ferent decision sets. The decision sets hold different payoffs for you and the matched
participant. Below you can see a possible example. Your personal payoff is displayed
in the upper row “Sie erhalten” (“You receive”). The payoff of the matched participant
is displayed in the lower row “Anderer erhaelt” (“Other receives”). You can choose
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between nine different allocations of Token between you and the other participant. In
each of the six situations, you have to choose one of the nine possibilities.
We describe two examples based on the decision set below: If you chose “2”, you would
receive 54 Token. The matched participant would receive 98 Token.
If you chose “6”, you would get 72 Token. The matched participant would get 91 Token.
Role of A and B: The person in role A decides actively about money allocations. The
person in role B is passive and has to accept A’s decision. Each participant will decide
in role A. At the end of the experiment, the computer will randomly assign you role A
or role B (equally for the matched participant). If you get assigned to role A, your active
decision determines the payoffs and the matched participant has to accept the alloca-
tion. Similarly, if you get assigned to role B, the matched participant is active (and you
are passive) and his/her decision determines the payoffs.
Payoff: At the end of this phase the computer randomly draws one of the six decision
sets for payment. Moreover, the computer randomly assigns role A and role B within
the dyads. At the end for payment, Tokens will be converted to Euro. We will inform
you about the chosen decision set and which role (A or B) was assigned to you at the
very end of the experiment. Furthermore, you will learn about the resulting payoff of
phase 1a. Please raise your hand if you have any questions. If that is the case, we will
come to your cabin to answer your question in private. After all participants finished
reading and all questions are answered, we will start with decision-making in phase 1a.
Phase 1b [Inequality aversion (beta)]
We will now start with the instructions for phase 1b. In this phase the computer will
randomly match you with another participant. Afterwards you and the matched partic-
ipant will simultaneously face multiple decisions. The identity of the matched partner
will not be revealed during or after the experiment. Your decisions will be made in
Token. The exchange rate is 1 Token = 0.15 Euro. In this phase the person in role A will
choose between two possible distributions of Token between him-/herself and another
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Decision-making
[Translation: Sie erhalten = You receive; Anderer erhält = Other person
receives; Ihre Auswahl = Your choice]
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person in role B. There are 22 decision situations. Please read the following sections
carefully before making your decision.
The decision sets will be displayed in a table. Below you can see an example which is
an excerpt from the table. You will decide in role A. For the problem displayed below
the choice of LINKS [Translation: links = left] results in an outcome of 20 Token for
yourself. The choice of RECHTS [Translation: rechts = right] results in an equal out-
come for you and participant in role B of 5 Token each.]
The decision problems will be displayed in a table encompassing 22 decision sets.
Below you can see a screen shot of the table.
One single decision is relevant for all 22 decision situations: As you can see below the
left distribution is always the same for each of the 22 situations. You earn 20 Token
and person B receives 0 Token. The distributions on the right are always distributions
with equal payment of you and person B. By clicking on “RECHTS AB DER NÄCH-
STEN ZEILE RECHTS” [Translation: rechts ab der nächsten Zeile = right from the next
row on) you can decide from which distribution onwards you would prefer to choose
distributions on the right. This means you decide for LINKS in all previous lines. The
decision from LINKS to RECHTS automatically influences all 22 decision situations.]
After clicking the button the lines will be colored accordingly: All decisions you chose
LINKS will be marked green and all decisions you chose RECHTS will be marked blue.
Roles A and B: The person in role A has to decide between two possible distributions
of Token between him-/herself and person B. The person in role A can decide actively,
whereas the person in role B is passive and has to accept the decision of A. Each partici-
pant decides in role A. At the end of the experiment the computer will randomly assign
the roles A and B within the dyads. If you get assigned to role A, your decisions will
determine the outcome. The matched participant will be in role B in this case and has to
accept your chosen distribution. If you are assigned to role B, the matched participant
acts as person A and his/her decision will be implemented. You have to accept this
decision in this case.
Payoff: The computer will randomly draw one of the 22 decision sets at the end of
the phase. The drawn decision set is the one that will be relevant for your payoff in
this phase. Furthermore, the computer will select if your own decision (role A) or the
matched participant’s decision will determine the payoffs. For payment, Tokens will be
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converted to Euro. We will inform you about the chosen decision situation at the end
of the experiment. In addition, we will inform you if you were randomly assigned to
role A or role B. Furthermore you will learn the resulting payoff for phase 1b. Please
raise your hand if you have any questions. If that is the case, we will come to your
cabin to answer your question in private. After all participants finished reading and all
questions are answered we will start with phase 1c.
Phase 1c [Inequality Aversion (alpha)]
We will now start with the instructions for phase 1c. In this phase the computer will
randomly assign a partner to you. Afterwards you and the matched participant will
simultaneously face multiple decisions. The identity of the matched participant will
not be revealed during or after the experiment. Your decisions will be made in Token.
The exchange rate is 1 Token = 0.15 Euro.
In this phase all participants decide first as person A and afterwards as person B. Per-
son A has to choose one of 20 possible distributions of Token between him-/herself and
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Decision-making
[Translation: Links: Auszahlung Person A/B = left: payoff person A/B;
Rechts: Auszahlung Person A/B = right: payoff person A/B; immer rechts
= always right; RECHTS ab der nächsten Zeile = right from the next row
on forwards]
the assigned partner. Person B can either accept or reject the distribution person A will
choose. If person B accepts the proposed distribution, this distribution will determine
the payoffs. If person B rejected the distribution, both persons receive 0 Token. The
computer will randomly select the two participants in a dyad into the roles of person
A and B.
Please read all of the following sections carefully before making your decision. First
you decide in the role of person A which share of 20 Token you want to offer person B.
Afterwards you have to decide as person B which of the 20 possible distributions you
accept and which money distributions you would reject. The decision problems will be
displayed in a table. On the next screen we will show you the table. You will see 21
decision sets and you will decide from which distribution onwards you would accept
the proposal of person A. After clicking the distributions will be colored accordingly.
One decision is relevant for all 21 situations: You can see below that on the left side
all possible distributions of the 20 Token are displayed. If you decide to click on “An-
nahme ab der nächsten Zeile” [Translation: Annahme ab der nächsten Zeile = accepted
distribution from next row onwards] from a particular distribution, this means you
are willing to accept all subsequent distributions between person A and yourself. The
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accepted distributions will be marked green. All previous distributions (where you
would get less Token) will be refused. Those are marked blue.
The computer decides randomly if you will be assigned to role A or role B. If you
will be in role A you will determine the payoffs if person B accepted your proposed
distribution. However, if person B rejected your proposed distribution you and person
B get 0 Token. If you will be in role B, you are passive and the other person in role A
will determine the payoffs - however, only if you accepted that particular distribution.
If that money distribution was rejected according to your choice both you and person
B get 0 Token. We will inform you about your role, the decision and your payoff in
phase 1c. Please show up if you have any questions. If that is the case, we will come
to your cabin to answer your questions. After all participants finished reading and all
questions are answered we will start with phase 1c.
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Decision-making
[Translation: Sie entscheiden in der Rolle als Person A = You decide in the
role of person A; Auszahlung Person A = payoff person A; Auszahlung,
die Sie für Person B auswählen = Payoff, you choose for person B]
Phase 2 [Real-effort task]
[Comment: The instructions for phase 2 were handed out on paper]
[Treatment Baseline] In this phase you will participate in a task. Your display will
show matrices with the numbers 0 and 1. Below you can see an example:
Your task is to count the zeros in each of those matrices. Please enter your result in
the box below “How many zeros are in the matrix?”. Afterwards a dialogue box saying
“Please start now with the next matrix” will be displayed. Press “o”. A new matrix will
pop up. Your old result will still be in the result box. Please, simply delete it. You will
have 8 minutes for this task.
Payoff of the task: After finishing the task, the computer will randomly select 12 par-
ticipants (of 24). Those will be called participants A and rewarded according to the
number of correctly counted tables. The other 8 participants are called participants B
below and do not get a reward for this task. Participants A will be ranked according to
their performance. The more tasks will be solved correctly the higher the ranking. The
amount of payment for participants A is linked to the ranking: Ranks 1-6 receive e15
cash each and ranks 7-12 receive e5 cash each. The payment of the task will take place
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Decision-making
[Translation: Entscheiden Sie nun in der Rolle von Person B ab welcher
Zeile Sie annehmen würden = Decide now in the role of person B
from which row on you would accept the distribution; Annahme:
Auszahlungen Person A/B = acceptance: payoff person A/B; Ablehnung:
Auszahlung Person A/B = rejection: payoff person A/B; Annahme ab der
nächsten Zeile = acceptance from next row on; immer annehmen = always
accept; immer ablehnen = always reject; Beider Personen erhalten = both
persons receive]
right after completion. All 24 participants will be handed in an envelope. If you are a
participant A, the envelope will contain money.
• You receive e15 if your performance is ranked 1-6. Furthermore you get a card
with a note that you are a participant A.
• You receive e5 if your performance is ranked 7-12. Furthermore you get a card
with a note that you are a participant A.
If the computer randomly draws you as a participant B your envelope will not contain
money, but a note that you are participant B.
[Treatment: Competition]
In this phase you will participate in a task. Your display will show matrices with the
numbers 0 and 1. Below you can see an example:
(Translation: Sie haben 8 Minuten Zeit, um in dieser Phase möglichst viele Tabellen zu
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[Translation: Sie haben 8 Minuten Zeit, um in dieser Phase möglichst viele
Tabellen zu zählen. Die verbleibende Zeit wird oben rechts angezeigt. =
You have 8 minutes in this phase to count matrices. The time that is left, is
displayed on the top left of the screen.; Wie viele Nullen befinden sich in
der Tabelle? = How many zeros are in the matrice?]
zählen. Die verbleibende Zeit wird oben rechts angezeigt. = You have 8 minutes in this
phase to count matrices. The time that is left, is displayed on the top left of the screen.;
Wie viele Nullen befinden sich in der Tabelle? = How many zeros are in the matrice?)
Your task is to count the zeros in each of those matrices. Please enter your result in the
box below “How many zeros are in the matrix?”. Afterwards a dialogue box saying
“Please start now with the next matrix” will be displayed. Press “ok”. A new matrix
will pop up. Your old result will still be in the result box. Please, simply delete it. You
will have 8 minutes for this task.
Payoff of the task: After finishing the task the computer will calculate the ranking of all
participants. The more tasks are solved correctly the higher the ranking. The partici-
pants on the first 12 ranks will be called participants and rewarded according to their
ranking. The other 12 participants are called participants B.
The amount of payment for participants A is linked to the ranking: Ranks 1-6 receive
e15 cash each and ranks 7-12 receive e5 cash each. The payment of the task will take
place right after finishing. All 24 participants will get an envelope:
If you are a participant A, the envelope will contain money.
• You receive e15 if your performance is ranked 1-6. Furthermore you get a card
with a note that you are a participant A.
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• You receive e5 if your performance is ranked 7-12. Furthermore you get a card
with a note that you are a participant A.
If the computer randomly draws you as a participant B your envelope will not contain
money, but a note that you are participant B.
[Treatment: Random] In this phase you will participate in a task. Your display will
show matrices with the numbers 0 and 1. Below you can see an example: [Picture
comes here in original instructions. As examples were similar across treatments and to
economize see for the example in treatment Baseline above]
Your task is to count the zeros in each of those matrices. Please enter your result in the
box below “How many zeros are in the matrix?”. Afterwards a dialogue box saying
“Please start now with the next matri” will be displayed. Press “ok”. A new matrix
will pop up. Your old result will still be in the result box. Please, simply delete it. You
will have 8 minutes for this task.
Payoff of the task: After finishing the task the computer will randomly select 12 partici-
pants (of 24). Those will be called Participants A below and rewarded independently of
the number of tasks solved correctly. The other 12 participants are called Participants B
and do not get a reward for this task.
To get the payoff for the participants A the computer creates a random ranking, which
is independent of the number of tasks solved correctly. The amount of payment for par-
ticipants A is linked to the ranking: Ranks 1-6 receive e15 cash each and ranks 7-12
receive e5 cash each. The payment of the task will take place right after finishing. Each
of the 24 participants will get an envelope: If the computer selected you to be one of the
participants A, the envelope will contain money.
• You receive e15 if your randomly assigned performance is ranked 1-6. Further-
more you get a card with a note that you are a participant A.
• You receive e5 if your randomly assigned performance is ranked 7-12. Further-
more you get a card with a note that you are a participant A.
If the computer randomly draws you as a participant B your envelope will not contain
money, but a note that you are participant B.
..8 minutes pass by...
Do you think, you will become a participant A? Yes:_, No:_
[Oral information that envelopes will be distributed]
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[Translation: In the following, you can give an assumption about your own
performance compared to the other 11 participants. If you hit it, you re-
ceive e0.50 in addition.]
Phase 3 [Joy of destruction game]
Open your envelope now. Empty the envelope and put it aside. You learn now, if you
have been assigned to group A or group B. Information regarding the assigned group,
can be found on a laminated card, enclosed in the envelope. If you are a participant
A, your ranking can be found on the card’s back. Additionally, participant As will
find their payment enclosed in the envelope. If you have screened the content of your
envelope, press “ok” and we continue to the next phase.
• In phase 3, all participants A and B receive 6 vouchers for e1 for the canteen.
• The computer randomly assigns a participant A to a participant B. Complete
anonymity is ensured during the experiment as well as after the experiment.
• Both participants decide at the same time, how many vouchers they want to re-
move from the other participant. Removed vouchers are invalid and will not be
received by the participant who removed them. The following amounts of vouch-
ers can be removed: 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6.
• Participants B will be informed who much (e5 or e15) the matched participant
earned in the counting task.
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• Simultaneously the computer decides how many vouchers are removed from the
participant assigned to you, as well. Number of vouchers is thereby selected ran-
domly. Following amounts of vouchers can be removed: 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. They all
have the same probability to be selected.
• After you have confirmed your decision, with a probability of 50% either your
decision or the computer’s decision will become relevant.
• At the end of the experiment, will only learn about the remaining amount of
vouchers that they will receive. Thereby, we do not let you know, if the vouchers
have been removed by the other participant or from the computer.
Please press “OK” when you are done reading.
Phase 4 [Trust game]
We start with phase 4 now. In this phase, you are randomly assigned to another par-
ticipant. The participants are called Person 1 and Person 2 during this phase. Your
decisions will be made in Token. Thereby, the following exchange rate applies: 1 Token
= 0.20 Euro
Your decision: In this phase, you have to decide in both roles (Person 1 and Person 2).
Deciding as Person 1, you can choose either LINKS or RECHTS (see image below). In
case you choose LINKS, Person 2 has to choose between LINKS and RECHTS, too. In
case you choose RECHTS, the game directly ends and Person 2 does not have to choose.
Image: The upper number presents the payment in Token for person 1. The lower
number presents the payment in Token for person 2.
In case both persons choose LINKS, both persons receive 14 Token.
If person 1 chooses LINKS and person 2 chooses RECHTS, person 1 receives 7 Token
and person 2 17 Token.
If person 1 chooses RECHTS, person 2 cannot choose and both persons receive 10 To-
ken.
You will make your decision in the role of person 1 and person 2. In the last case, you
have to decide if you choose LINKS or RECHTS, assuming that person 1 chose LINKS.
Payment: At the end of this stage, the computer will randomly match you with another
participant from this room. Furthermore, the computer randomly assigns the two roles
to the two persons in the dyad. You will only learn your role at the end but not with
whom you were matched. After the matching and assignment of roles, the respective
decisions of the two participants will be implemented. Hence, your payment might
depend on the decision made by the participant that is matched with you, too.
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Please show up if you have any questions. We will turn to you in private to answer
any questions. After all participants finished reading, and in case there are no further
questions, we will start with phase 4.
Decision-making
[Translation: If the computer assigned the role of person 1 to you, would
you choose LEFT or RIGHT? If the computer assigned the role of person 2
to you and you know that person 1 had chosen LEFT, would you choose
LEFT or RIGHT?]
Before the questionnaire [Cheating Game]
In the following, we ask you to fill out a questionnaire. You will get an additional
payment for this task.
• The payment will be determined by die rolls.
• Please roll the die 10 times and type in the number on the die (and input screen
will appear on the next screen)
• At the end of the experiment, one of the die rolls will be randomly selected. This
number will determine your additional payment for filling out the questionnaire.
• The numbers on the die will lead to the following payments: 1= e0.20, 2= e0.40,
3= e0.60, 4= e0.80, 5= e1.00, 6= e0.00
Please press “ok” when you finished reading. We will hand out die and cups now.
180 Appendix B. Appendix of Chapter 3
Decision-making
[Translation: Please roll the die 10 times and report the rolled number on
the die. You earn for a rolled 1 = e0,20, ... Click “ok” if you will have made
all entries.]
[Translation: Please roll the die 10 times and report the rolled number on
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C.1 Tables
rep. p. level rep. p. level SVO angle rep. p. level SVO angle
OLS SEM SEM SEM SEM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
female -0.188** -0.125 3.334** -0.144 3.468***
(0.094) (0.093) (1.603) (0.092) (1.596)
SVO angle -0.013*** -0.013***
(0.004) (0.003)




econ student 0.033 -2.912
(0.122) (2.122)
constant 3.290*** 3.169*** 21.188*** 3.169*** 24.634***
(0.068) (0.293) (4.949) (0.296) (0.108)
var (rep. p. level) 0.549 0.554
(0.047) (0.048)
obs. 267 267 267 267 267
R2 0.015 – – – –
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
TABLE C.1: Mediation analysis with Structural Estimation Models (SEM).
We use the following abbreviations: rep. p. level (= reported profit level), var (rep. p. level) (=
variance (reported profit level)).
C.2 Experimental instructions
Information for the reader of the experiment’s instructions:
• This experiment was conducted as part of a larger experiment which has been
presented in Chapter 3. Therefore, experiment’s instructions can be found in Ap-
pendix B.2. Only data from the Social Value Orientation (Phase 1a) and the cheat-
ing game, which can be found at the very end of the experimental instructions in
Appendix B.2, were used for this paper.
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D.1 Tables




offers (seller) 72 (31.58%) 156 (68.42%) 228 (100%)
acceptances (buyer) 32 (32.80%) 125 (67.20%) 186 (100%)
fulfillable contracts 60 (41.96%) 83 (58.04%) 143 (100%)
Treatments
control 53 (43.80%) 68 (56.20%) 121 (50.63%)
anchor 23 (19.49%) 95 (80.51%) 118 (49.37%)
total sellers 76 (31.80%) 163 (68.20%) 239 (100%)
TABLE D.2: Observation numbers in treatments and conditions (only ful-
fillable contracts)
control anchor Total
shock 68 (43.80%) 64 (54.24%) 132 (55.23%)
no shock 53 (56.20%) 54 (45.76%) 107 (44.77%)
total 121 (100%) 118 (100%) 239 (100%)
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Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
None of the covariates included in Model
(4) are significant expect risk seeking is pos-
itively correlated with overestimation (p <
0.10)
D.2 Experimental design
Individual overestimation and preferences
Baseline overestimation
Participants exert a similar designed real-effort task as in step 1 of the investment game
described in Section 5.3.1. Puzzles are not exactly the same but of a similar style. For
each correctly given answer participants earn GHS 0.20. Then, participants assessed
their performance in the real-effort task and receive GHS 5 if their guess was exactly
correct.
Social value orientation: We apply the method of Murphy et al. (2011) and the reduced
set of six decision sets to measure Social Value Orientation (henceforth SVO). Partic-
ipants are matched in dyads and decide for their most preferred money distribution
out of a set of nine. The original amounts from Murphy et al. (2011) were kept for
decision-making and we introduce an exchange rate of 1 unit = GHS 0.03. At the end,
one decision set is selected for payment and one player is randomly assigned the role
of the active decision-maker. An angle, the SVO angle, can be calculated from the deci-
sions made. An increasing SVO angle expresses peoples’ rising magnitude of concern
for another person’s payoff.
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Inequality aversion (alpha): We apply a simplified version of the method of Blanco et al.
(2011) to measure envy. Participants are matched in dyads and are first in the role of
a proposer and then in the role of a responder . The proposer is endowed with GHS 8
and makes an offer of GHS x to the responder, keeping GHS 8 - GHS x to herself. Then,
the responder can accept or reject the offer. In the case of rejection both players earn
zero. The parameter alpha captures the level of envy and is estimated by the minimum
amount a responder is willing to accept in an ultimatum game. After decision-making,
the two roles in the dyad are randomly assigned.
Risk preferences: The method from Eckel and Grossman (2002) serves as a simple way
to measure risk preferences. Here, participants are presented six different gambles and
are asked to choose their preferred one. Each of the gambles involve a 50% chance
of receiving a low payoff and a 50% chance of receiving a high payoff. There is one
non-risky gamble with a certain payoff of GHS 2.5 in both states. For the subsequent
4 lotteries, the expected payoff increases with the risk involved in the lotteries, mea-
sured by the standard deviation. The last lottery increases only in riskiness but not in
expected payoff.
Loss aversion: Loss aversion is measured by a method following Gächter et al. (2007).
Participants face seven different gambles with a good state and a bad state; each com-
ing into effect with a 50% chance.1 The good outcome is always GHS 9 whereas the bad
outcome increases from a loss of GHS 1.5 to a loss of GHS 10.5 in gamble 7. For each
gamble, participants have to decide if they want to take the risk and play the lottery
or not. Only one lottery is randomly chosen for payment. Rejection of a lottery gives a
payoff of GHS 0.2 One lottery was randomly chosen for payment.
We apply stranger matching when measuring SVO and inequality aversion. As well
as that, these games are played as strategy method. The preferences for risks and losses
are individually played. Information about decisions made and payoffs earned are only
given at the very end of the experimental session.
D.3 Experimental Instructions
1Note the original game consists of only 6 gambles. We add a first gamble with a potential loss of
GHS 1.5 to increase variance in choices.
2As the gambles become riskier with each gamble, it is irrational to switch once accepting a gamble
to rejecting a riskier gamble. Therefore, we restricted choice-making and participants could only switch
one time from acceptance to rejection.
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Information for the reader of the experiment’s instructions:
• The study was conducted with tablets. To make their decisions, participants just
touched the respective alternative/choice. In some cases, e.g., the calculation ta-
bles the computer filled out automatically some spaces based on precedent entries
by the participant, which are marked by “...”. Blank spaces where subjects could
enter a number are indicated by these rectangles
• To ease readability, sometimes words or explanations are added. This is marked
by square brackets.
• For each different game, we asked control questions to deepen the understanding
of the games. Since experimental instructions become very long, I decided not to
include control questions in the thesis. I marked the omission by “[...] Control
questions [...]”
• Also, the in total 50 puzzles of the real-effort task are left out for economy of space
in this dissertation.
Welcome to today’s session!
We would like to welcome you to today’s session! We start when all participants are
in the room. If all participants are seated, you will get a little introduction and further
information on today’s session.
Two short questions before we start...
1. Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that your
need to be very careful in dealing with people? Please answer on a scale from 1 to 10
whereas 1 means "need to be very careful" and 10 means "most people can be trusted".
Please choose one number between 1 and 10. You may grade your answers with values
in between.
2. Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance, or
would they try to be fair? Please answer on a scale from 1 to 10 whereas 1 means "people
would try to take advantage" and 10 means "people would try to be fair". Please choose
one number between 1 and 10. You may grade your answer with values in between.
Section 1
Section 1 contains 4 subsections: 1A, 1B, 1C and 1D. We start with subsection 1A.
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Section 1A: [Social Value Orientation]
In this section, you will be paired with one other participant in the room. You will
not learn who this other participant is and the participant you are matched with will
not learn who you are. There are two roles in this activity: role A (in the following
person A) and role B (in the following person B). Person A has to actively decide how
to allocate coins between person B and himself/herself. Person B has to accept the
preferred allocation by person A. All persons will actively decide in the role of person
A - however, for which role (A or B) you will be paid will be randomly chosen by the
computer. On the following page, we will explain the activity in further detail.
You will be presented a series of decision like this one:
Each of the middle lines determines how much person A and person B receives.
Looking at the first middle line, person A (that is you if you are selected into this role)
receives 50 coins and person B (that is the person you are matched with) receives 100
coins. As we move to the right, the payment for the person in role A increases to 54,
59 up to 85. The payment of participant B decreases from 100 to 15 at the same time.
The task of the person in role A is to decide on the preferred allocation by choosing one
of nine money allocations. The chosen distribution will determine the payments of the
person in role A and the person in role B. Only one distribution can be marked in each
question. On the next slide, we will give you an example of how such a decision can
look like.
A person in role A decided for the coin-allocation you see here:
A participant in role A decided for allocation 5. If this decision set is chosen for
payment, person A would receive 68 coins. The person he/she is matched with, would
receive 58 coins. On the next page, we show you a second example.
A person in role A decided for the coin-allocation you see here:
A participant in role A decided for allocation 3. If this decision set is chosen for
payment, person A would receive 89 coins. The person he/she is matched with, would
receive 24 coins. On the next page, we will explain how the payoff will be calculated.
Payment: You will make decisions for six different decision sets. You make your de-
cisions with "coins" whereas 1 coin = GHC 0.03. The computer will randomly decide
for which role you are paid. The computer will randomly pick one of the decision sets
for payment. You will only learn which decision set was drawn, for which role you are
paid and how much you earned at the very end of today’s workshop. We have finished
the instructions for this subsection. Now, we move on to the control questions.
[...] Control questions [...]
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You finished section 1A. We will now start with section 1B. We wait until all other
participants have finished this subsection.
Section 1B: Inequality Aversion
We start now with the instructions for subsection 1B. In 1B, the computer will randomly
pair you with one other participant in the room. You will not learn who this other
participant is and the participant you are matched with will not learn who you are. In
this section, the situation is as follows: Person 1 is matched with person 2. Person 1
will receive GHC 8 and can decide how much of the GHC 8, he/she wants to pass on
to person 2. Person 2 knows that person 1 has been called to make this decision, and
may either accept the distribution chosen by person 1, or reject it. In case that person
2 accepts person 1’s proposed distribution, that distribution will be implemented. If
person 2 rejects the offer, both receive nothing. You will have to make decisions as if
you were person 1 and also as if you were person 2. In the latter case, you will have to
decide when you would accept or reject the distribution by person 1.
Payment: The computer will randomly chose if you will be paid for the role of person
1 or the role of person 2. If the computer picks you to take up the role of person 1, there
are two cases:
1) Person 2 accepts your offer. Then your decision will be implemented: You earn GHC
8 minus the amount you pass on. (And Person 2 receives the amount you pass on).
2) Person 2 does not accept your offer. Then your decision will not be implemented.
You and Person 2 both earn GHC 0.
If the computer picks you to take up the role of person 2, you will earn the payoff that
person 1 (the participant in the role of Person 1 you are paired with) chose for person
2 but only if you had accepted that particular offer. Otherwise, you both earn nothing.
You will only learn at the very end of today’s session how much you earned in this
activity. We will give you an example on decisions of a person 1 and a person 2 and the
resulting payoffs on the following pages.
Person 1 is asked: How much of the GHC 8 would you pass on to person 2? It could be
any amount between 0 and 8 but only full amounts (0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 or 8). Decision
of person 1: GHC 3
Person 2 is asked at the same time: Person 1 received GHC 8. What is the minimum
amount Person 2 has to offer you that you accepted the offer? Decision of person 2:
GHC 2
Payment: Person 1 would pass on GHC 3. Person 2 only claims GHC 2 to accept the
offer. Therefore this distribution will be implemented. Person 1 earns GHC 5 (GHC 8 –
GHC 3 = GHC 5). Person 2 earns GHC 3. We will give you one other example on the
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next page.
Person 1 is asked: How much of the GHC 8 would you pass on to person 2? It could be
any amount between 0 and 8 but only full amounts (0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 or 8). Decision
of person 1: GHC 5
Person 2 is asked at the same time: Person 1 received GHC 8. What is the minimum
amount Person 2 has to offer you that you accepted the offer? Decision of person 2:
GHC 7
Payment: Person 1 would pass on GHC 5. However, person 2 claims GHC 7 to accept
the offer. Therefore this distribution will not be implemented. Person 1 earns GHC 0.
Person 2 earns GHC 0.
[...] Control questions [...]
You finished reading the instructions and answered the control questions. You are now
ready to make your final decisions. You will first make your decision in the role of
person 1. Afterwards, you will make your decision in the role of person 2.
You are now making your decision for the role of person 1: How much of the GHC 8
would you pass on to person 2? It could be any amount between 0 and 8 but only full
amounts (0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 or 8).
Your decision GHC:
You now make your decision for the role of person 2: What is the minimum amount
Person 2 has to offer you that you accepted the offer?
Your decision GHC:
You finished section 1B. We will now start with section 1C. We wait until all other
participants have finished this subsection.
Section 1C: Risk Preferences
In this subsection, we will offer you six different lotteries. These lotteries can have two
outcomes: a high outcome (state A) or a low outcome (state B). It is randomly decided
by a coin flip by the computer, which state will be realized. (Heads and tails are equally
likely). You have to select one of the six lotteries. That should be the one that you prefer
most. On the next page, we give you an example how the lotteries will look like.
Example I: In the table you see six different lotteries. Each row defines one lottery.
There are two states A and B. If a participant decides for the first lottery, then he/she
receives GHC 2.5 for sure because the payoff is GHC 2.5 for heads and tails.
Example II: If a participant decides for lottery 4, the coin flip will be relevant for the
outcome: If the coin shows heads, the participant earns GHC 1.4. If the coin shows
tails, the participant earns GHC 4.6.
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Payment: In this activity, you will only make one decision. The computer will ran-
domly pick which state (A or B) will be realized in the lottery you picked. You will be
paid for this decision for sure. You will only learn how much you earned at the very
end of todays workshop. We have now finished the instructions for this subsection and
will now check for your understanding with three control questions.
[...] Control questions [...]
As announced, you have six lotteries to choose from! Please choose now the lottery that
you would like to play most of all six lotteries:
You finished section 1C. We will now start with section 1D. We wait until all other
participants have finished this subsection.
Section 1D: Loss Aversion
In the following activity, you can again decide on if to play a lottery. However, this
time you can choose more than one lottery that you would like to play. If you accept
the lottery, you can either win or lose money. Whether you win or lose is decided
randomly by a coin flip. If you reject the lottery, you earn 0. Please press next to see
how such a lottery would look like.
Above you see an example of a lottery. Left is described what you can lose if the
coin turns up heads and what you can gain if the coin turns up tails. Right you can
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decide for acceptance or rejection of the lottery. In the example above, the participant
has to decide if he/she wants to accept the lottery of winning GHC 6 if the coin turns
up tails and lose GHC 2 if the coin turns up heads. If the participant decides to accept
the lottery, the computer will toss a coin. If tails is up, the participant wins GHC 6.
However, if the computer coin turns up heads, the earnings from the participant are
reduced by GHC 2. If the participant decides to reject the lottery, the participant will
earn 0.
Payment: You will make decisions for six different lotteries. The computer will ran-
domly pick one of the lotteries for payment. If you accept a lottery, there will be a
random "coin toss" by the computer. This coin toss is decisive for your earnings - if you
gain something or lose something - in the lottery. You will only learn which lottery was
drawn and how much you have earned or lost at the very end of today’s workshop. If
you lose money, it will be deduced from your total payoff in today’s session. Of course,
you will never end up with less than GHC 20 (your participation fee). Please note that
the lotteries will be ordered in the final decision. The amount that can be lost will in-
crease while the amount that can be won is the same in all lotteries. Therefore, you can
only switch once. We have finished the instructions for this subsection. We now move
on to the control questions.
[...] Control questions [...]
Please make your decision for each of the following lotteries now. Please note that the
lotteries will be ordered in the final decision. The amount that can be lost will increase
while the amount that can be won is the same in all lotteries. Therefore, you can only
switch once.
Lottery
1. If the coin turns up heads, then you lose GHC 1.5; if the coin turns up tails, you win
GHC 9 accept reject
2. If the coin turns up heads, then you lose GHC 3; if the coin turns up tails, you win
GHC 9 accept reject
3. If the coin turns up heads, then you lose GHC 4.5; if the coin turns up tails, you win
GHC 9 accept reject
4. If the coin turns up heads, then you lose GHC 6; if the coin turns up tails, you win
GHC 9 accept reject
5. If the coin turns up heads, then you lose GHC 7.5; if the coin turns up tails, you win
GHC 9 accept reject
6. If the coin turns up heads, then you lose GHC 9; if the coin turns up tails, you win
GHC 9 accept reject
7. If the coin turns up heads, then you lose GHC 10.5; if the coin turns up tails, you win
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GHC 9 accept reject
You finished section 1! We will now start with section 2. Please press the next button.
Please press Next. We wait until all other participants have finished this subsection.
Please be patient.
Section 2
All other participants have finished Section 1. Now we are ready to start with Section
2. Before we start, please answer the following question: Are you male or female?
Section 2 consists of three different parts. The three parts are associated with each other.
In Part 1 you are going to work on a production task in which you will solve puzzles.
In Part 2 you will assess your own performance and the performance of others. In
Part 3 you will perform the task with similar puzzles again. We will explain each part
separately in detail one after another.
Section 2 Part 1
We start now with the instructions for Section 2 Part 1. In this part you will work on a
production task, that is producing goods by solving puzzles. For each puzzle that will
be solved correctly one good will be produced. You will be confronted with 25 puzzles
in form of multiple choice questions. For each puzzle you will have 15 seconds time to
choose the right answer. After 15 seconds the next question will appear automatically.
It will not be possible to go back to previous questions.
As a default always the first answer in every question is logged in automatically. If
you do not make any entry the computer will keep answer 1. Please note that it is
completely random which number belongs to the correct answer. Not choosing actively
the right answer and always leaving the default answer logged in does not increase
your chances of having correct answers. On the next page, we give you an example of
how such a puzzle could look like.
In this task you will have to choose the symbol that fits into the pattern. Example (1):
There is only one correct answer for each question. Note that by default the first
answer is logged in. Is that the right answer? Think about the right answer and check
if you are right on the next page.
In this task you will have to choose the symbol that fits into the pattern. Example (2):
The correct answer is answer number 2.
You will earn GHC 0.20 for each correct answer. We have finished the instructions for
Part 1. Now, we move on to the control questions.
[...] Control questions [...]
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You finished the control questions! Now you are ready to produce goods!
Section 2 Part 1: Task 1
Complete the row!
[...] 25 Tasks [...]
You finished Section 2 Part 1! We will now start with Part 2.
Section 2 Part 2
We start now with the instructions for Part 2. In this part we will ask you questions
about how you evaluate your own performance and also the performance of other peo-
ple in the production task. Payment: For each correct guess you can earn 5 Ghana Cedi.
You will be informed at the end of the session about how much you earned in this part.
Estimate how many goods you have produced in the production task in Part 1! Recall
that you worked on 25 tasks in total. If your estimation is correct you will earn GHC 5.
What do you think, how many goods did you produce in Part 1?
I think I produced goods.
Please give us your estimation on how many goods have been produced by men on
average.cIf your estimation is correct you will earn GHC 5. What do you think, how
many goods have been produced on average by other men in the room (excluding your
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own performance).
I think other men produced on average goods.
Now we would like you to estimate how many goods have been produced by other
participants in the room. Please give us your estimation on how many goods have
been produced by the other female participants on average. If your estimation is cor-
rect you will earn GHC 5. What do you think, how many goods have been produced
on average by other women in the room (excluding your own performance).
I think other women produced on average goods.
We have finished Part 2 of Section 2.
Section 2 Part 3
We start now with the instructions of Part 3. Instructions for this part are a little bit
longer than for the other activities. We explain the procedure therefore first only in
words. Afterwards you will see illustrated instructions again. So do not worry if you
do not get everything the first time. In this section, you will be paired with one other
participant in the room. You will not learn who this other participant is and the partic-
ipant you are matched with will not learn who you are.
The two persons who are matched with each other will be assigned different roles. One
person will be selected to be a buyer and the other person will be selected to be a seller.
The buyer receives an endowment of GHC 4. It will be random whether you will have
the role of the buyer or the role of the seller.
The buyer and the seller will be able to earn money by trading with each other.The
seller produces low value goods. Buyer and seller can decide to virtually sign a con-
tract under which the buyer makes an investment that increases the value of the seller’s
goods and the seller delivers high value goods to the buyer. The steps of trading are
explained in detail on the following pages:
Step 1: Production of goods (1)
The seller gets the opportunity to produce goods by answering 25 questions that are
very similar to the ones in Part 1. For every correct answer a low value good will be
generated. That means that if all 25 questions will be answered correctly, a maximum
of 25 goods can be produced by the seller. The value of one low value good produced
is GHC 0.20.
Step 1: Production of goods (2)
It is possible that a shock occurs and affects the production of the seller. If the shock
occurs, the production of the seller can be affected positively or negatively. That means
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that some more goods are generated or some less goods are generated by chance, inde-
pendently from the performance of the seller.
Step 2: Decision of Seller
The seller can decide to offer a contract to the buyer on selling a certain quantity of
goods to the buyer or choose to sell the goods to an alternative market for 0.20 GHC.
The seller does not know yet the number of goods that he or she produced but will be
asked to give an estimation about his production similar as in Part 2. If the seller does
not offer a contract then the buyer keeps his endowment of GHC 4. If the seller decides
to offer a contract she/he will choose the number of goods that she/he is willing to sell
to the buyer. Only when the seller decides to offer a contract to the buyer, we continue
with step 3.
Step 3: Decision of Buyer
The buyer can decide whether to accept or to reject the contract. If the buyer accepts
the contract the endowment of GHC 4 will be invested in the seller’s production. The
investment of the buyer increases the value of the seller’s goods. The goods are trans-
formed by the buyer’s investment to high value goods. If the buyer rejects the offer, the
buyer keeps his endowment and the seller sells each good to the alternative market for
0.20 GHC.
Step 4: Selling goods (1)
After the contract has been made, the seller and the buyer will be informed about the
amount of goods produced. Seller and Buyer also get the information on whether or
not a random shock could have affected the production. In case there was a shock
neither the seller nor the buyer will be informed about whether the shock was positive
or negative.
Step 4: Selling goods (2)
The seller has two different opportunities for selling high value goods. High value
goods can be sold to the buyer for GHC 1 per good. High value goods can also be
sold to the alternative market for GHC 2.5 per good. The seller is supposed to sell the
number of goods to the buyer, that has been agreed upon in the contract. The surplus
in produced goods are not supposed to be sold to the buyer and can be sold to the
alternative market.
Step 4: Selling goods (3)
The contract is not enforceable: The seller has the final decision on how many goods to
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sell to the buyer. The buyer earns GHC 1 for each good that the seller sells to him. The
buyer does not earn anything for goods that are sold to the alternative market.
Please remember that in Part 1, you all engaged in a similar production task already.
Please note that the buyers will be informed about the performance of the sellers dur-
ing the test questions in Part 1.
We have finished the instructions for Part 3. Now, we move on to the control questions.
[...] Control questions [...]
You finished the control questions. You are now randomly matched with another per-
son and randomly assigned by the computer to either the role of the buyer or the role
of the seller.
Seller (before working on re-task)
You have been randomly selected to be a seller. You will stay a seller for the entire
second part of this section.
[Re-task (all treatments)]
You can now start to produce goods. Be reminded that the task consists of 25 puzzles
and you will have 15 seconds for each puzzle. For every correct answer one low value
good with a value of GHC 0.20 will be produced.
[...] 25 Tasks [...]
[Buyer (before working on re-task)]
You have been randomly selected to be a Buyer. You will stay a Buyer for the entire
second part of this section.
Before you start to produce goods we would like to inform you about how many goods
you produced in Part 1.
Your performance in Part 1 was ... goods .
The seller is now producing goods. In the meantime you have two different options,
while you are waiting. You can
1. Do the task of Part 1 with similar puzzles again for yourself. You will get 1 candy if
your performance is above 3 goods. OR
2.Do the task of Part 1 with similar puzzles again in a competition against another
randomly selected player. You will compete against the performance of a randomly
selected player in Part 1. If you win the competition you will earn 4 candys.
You will learn about how many candies you earned only at the very end of today’s
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session.
Please decide what you want to do while the seller is producing goods. (The first op-
tion is logged in automatically. If you want to switch, please press the button for option
2.)
I want to do the task again for myself.
I want to do the task again and compete against another participant.
[...] 25 Tasks [...]
[Seller in anchor treatment (after re-task)]
Time’s up! Do you think you gave more than 20 correct answers?
Yes No
What do you think, how many correct answers did you give? I think my performance
was
correct answers.
If your guess is correct you will earn GHC 5. How sure are you that your guess is cor-
rect? The more you move the slider to the right the more sure you are. The more you
move the slider to the left the less sure you are.
Not Sure - - - -|- - - - Sure
Does the position of the slider represent how sure you are with your estimation?
Yes
If not, please adjust the ruler, so that it fits you.
You can now decide to offer a contract to the buyer or not to offer any contract and sell
your goods for GHC 0.20 per piece to the alternative market. If you offer a contract: You
will make a decision on the amount of produced goods you want to sell to the buyer for
a price of GHC 1. If the buyer accepts the contract by making an investment the value
of your goods will increase. According to the contract terms you will be supposed to
sell the number of goods to the buyer that you have agreed upon.
You stated that you estimate that you produced ... goods. The buyer will only be in-
formed about the amount of goods that you produced in the trial round in Part 1.Please
remember that the value of your goods will only increase if the buyer agrees to make
an investment. Therefore, think carefully about your offer.
Calculate Profits
With this tool you can calculate the expected profit from the contract depending on
your expected performance and your offer. You can change your entry as often as you
want. You can also see your profit and the buyers profit.
My expected performance is ... goods
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I offer goods to the buyer.
Your income from selling to the buyer: GHC ...
Your income from selling to outside option: GHC ...
Your total income: GHC ...
The buyers’ total income: GHC ...
Your expected performance is ... goods. Will you offer the buyer a contract?
Yes No
Your expected performance is ... goods. How many goods do you want to offer?
Waiting for other participant.
Offer accepted
The buyer decided to accept your contract and made the investment. Your goods are
now transformed to high value goods.
No Shock Treatment
Your production has not been affected by a shock.
You produced ... goods.
The buyer has been informed about the number of goods that you produced and that
your production has not been affected by a random shock. The buyer also knows your
performance in Part 1.
Contract Overview
Your expected performance was ... goods . You produced ... goods. According to the
contract you are supposed to sell ... goods to the buyer. According to your expected
performance and the contract that you signed your expected payoff was ... GHC . If
you sticked to the contract you and the buyer would earn the payoffs written below:
Please note that if your number of produced goods is not enough in order to fulfill
the contract this overview assumes that you sell all produced goods to the buyer and
nothing to the alternative market.
Your income from selling to the buyer: GHC ...
Your income from selling to outside option: GHC ...
Your total income: GHC ...
The buyers’ total income: GHC ...
Your expected performance was ... goods . You produced ... goods. According to the
contract you are supposed to sell ... goods to the buyer. According to your expected
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performance and the contract that you signed your expected payoff was ... GHC.
Please make now your final decision on how much you want to sell to the buyer. You
can see your profit and the buyer’s profit depending on your decision. You can try out
scenarios in the upper part of the page. You make your final decision at the bottom of
the page.
Please note that you can’t sell more than the maximum amount of produced goods.
I sell goods to the buyer.
Your income from selling to the buyer: GHC ...
Your income from selling to outside option: GHC ...
Your total income: GHC ...
The buyers’ total income: GHC ...
How much do you want to sell to the buyer?
You sold ... goods to the buyer. Your income from the contract is GHC...
Shock Treatment
Your production has been affected by a shock.
The shock could have been positve or negative. That means that the number of goods
you produced was either increased by two or decreased by two. You’re final output is
... goods.
The buyer has been informed about the number of goods that you produced and that
your production has been affected by a random shock. The buyer also knows your
performance in Part 1.
Contract Overview
Your expected performance was ... goods . You produced ... goods. According to the
contract you are supposed to sell ... goods to the buyer. According to your expected
performance and the contract that you signed your expected payoff was ... GHC . If
you sticked to the contract you and the buyer would earn the payoffs written below:
Please note that if your number of produced goods is not enough in order to fulfill the contract
this overview assumes that you sell all produced goods to the buyer and nothing to the alternative
market.
Your income from selling to the buyer: GHC ...
Your income from selling to outside option: GHC ...
Your total income: GHC ...
The buyers’ total income: GHC ...
Your expected performance was ... goods . You produced ... goods. According to the
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contract you are supposed to sell ... goods to the buyer. According to your expected
performance and the contract that you signed your expected payoff was ... GHC.
Please make now your final decision on how much you want to sell to the buyer. You
can see your profit and the buyer’s profit depending on your decision. You can try out
scenarios in the upper part of the page. You make your final decision on the bottom of
the page.
Please note that you can’t sell more than the maximum amount of produced goods.
I sell goods to the buyer.
Your income from selling to the buyer: GHC ...
Your income from selling to outside option: GHC ...
Your total income: GHC ...
The buyers’ total income: GHC ...
How much do you want to sell to the buyer?
...
You sold ... goods to the buyer. Your income from the contract is GHC...
You finished section 2! Before you proceed to the questionnaire, we want to give you
an extra payment for answering the questionnaire. For that, we do a short activity with
dice. There will be two questions and one of these questions will be randomly chosen
for payment at the end of today’s session. We will now distribute dice and cups.
Buyer (after re-task)
The seller produced in the trial round in Part 1 ... goods. Now you have been offered ...
goods. Do you want to accept the contract?
Yes No
Waiting for the other participant.
[No Shock Treatment]
The seller’s production has not been affected by a shock.
The Seller’s output is ... goods.
[Shock Treatment]
The seller’s production has been affected by a shock.
The shock could have been positive or negative. That means that the number of goods
the seller produced was either increased by two or decreased by two. The seller’s final
output is ... goods.
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The seller sold ... goods to you. Your income from the contract is GHC...
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